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The thesis is motivated by the unique retirement provision system in New Zealand 
(NZ). NZ  has a low replacement rate from its public pension provision, New Zealand 
Superannuation (OECD, 2015), lack of a public mandatory contributory retirement 
savings scheme,2 a voluntary retirement savings system with limited power to 
accumulate wealth and lacking annuitisation options (KiwiSaver)3 and a taxation system 
that favours investment in housing. The nature of the system limits retirees’ capacity to 
accumulate wealth for retirement and puts considerable pressure on them to manage their 
wealth but not outlive their wealth. Despite the concerns, there is limited research on the 
investigation of the financial wellbeing of New Zealand retirees. This thesis consists of 
three essays which contribute to closing this gap in the literature. 
The first essay reports on the impact of housing on the financial adequacy of NZ 
retirees using panel data from the Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE) 
for the period 2002–2009. The essay examines the differential effect of housing 
liquidation options, rent imputation and asset liquidity on financial adequacy. The essay 
finds that Māori, renters and individuals living in multi-dwelling occupancies have much 
lower levels of financial adequacy. Individuals of Pākehā4 or Asian ethnicity, 
                                                          
1 Statistics NZ Integrated Data Infrastructure Disclaimer:  
The result of this presentation are not official statistics, they have been created for research purposes from 
the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI), managed by Statistics NZ. The opinions, findings, 
recommendations, and conclusions expressed in this presentation are those of the authors, not Statistics 
NZ. Access to the anonymised data used in this study was provided by Statistics NZ in accordance with 
security and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. Only people authorised by the Stat istics 
Act 1975 are allowed to see data about a particular person, household, business, or organisation, and the 
result on this presentation have been confidentialised to protect these groups from identification. Careful 
consideration has been given to the privacy, security, and confidentiality issues associated with using 
administrative and survey data in the IDI. Further detail can be found in the Privacy impact assessment for 
the Integrated Data Infrastructure available from www.stats.govt.nz. Access to the data presented was 
managed by Statistics NZ under strict micro-data access protocols and in accordance with the security and 
confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. Our findings are not Official Statistics. The opinions, 
findings, recommendations, and conclusions expressed are those of the authors, not Statistics NZ.  
2 See section 1.4.1.1 for details. 
3 See section 1.4.1.2 for details. 
4 European New Zealander. 
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homeowners and those living alone benefit more from imputed rent derived through 
home ownership. 
The second essay examines the effects of holding asset class liquidity, specifically 
housing and liquid wealth on optimal consumption and housing options. By using an 
analytic tool of the Life-Cycle model, the essay presents findings for optimal 
consumption and housing that incorporate uncertainty over a person’s health, income and 
their time of death, and the probability of health, income and house price shocks. By 
applying two sets of probability matrices, the study reports that housing liquidation 
options change when there is persistent bad health probability. Persistent health 
probability causes a divergence of utility between Renting, Sell/Buy and Stay scenarios. 
Renting is the most flexible option when it comes to dealing with health shocks, although 
it may not be the optimal choice. Sell/Buy is an optimal choice for many different 
scenarios, but is also the most prone to utility drops in the event of a bad health shock. 
The third essay investigates the financial literacy of older New Zealanders and the 
relationship between financial literacy and decision-making. The study finds that the 
level of financial literacy in New Zealand is high. Subjects who are younger, of Māori 
or Pacific Islands ethnicity, female, have lower educational attainment, lower incomes 
and high family responsibility have significantly lower levels of financial literacy, and 
this potentially leaves them more vulnerable to financial mistakes (Calvet et al., 2009; 
Stolper and Walter, 2017). The study also finds that higher financial literacy has a 
significant correlation with better debt position and higher risk tolerance. The results 
show that higher financial literacy has a strong positive effect on choosing KiwiSaver 
and that having more worrying levels of debt is the main driving factor behind choosing 
to pay off debt, regardless of financial literacy levels.  
iii 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature on retirement wellbeing, in general, and 
particularly in New Zealand. The findings on financial adequacy, optimal consumption 
and housing choices, financial literacy and role of financial literacy in spending decisions 
can better inform retirement decision-making. The essays in the thesis provide 
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This chapter introduces the thesis. It discusses the motivation for studying 
retirement wellbeing in New Zealand (NZ), the contribution to the literature and 
important practical policy implications. The chapter provides background information 
about NZ retirement provision and outlines the conceptual and theoretical background 
and research design of the thesis. 
1.1 Motivation 
The thesis is motivated by the unique retirement provision system in NZ. 
Specifically, the low replacement rate5 from New Zealand Superannuation (NZS),6 NZ’s 
public pension, of around 40% is one of the lowest compared with other countries in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2015). In addition, 
NZ is one of only a few OECD countries that does not have a mandatory contributory 
retirement savings plan. Moreover, KiwiSaver, NZ’s voluntary contributory retirement 
savings scheme, does not provide retirees with a default annuitisation option for 
withdrawals.  
This thesis considers several important concerns regarding the NZ retirement 
system. First, the capacity for retirees to accumulate enough money or wealth to provide 
an adequate standard of living in retirement. The low public provision from NZS requires 
retirees to make additional savings because the government-paid pension only covers 
around 40% of the population’s average net earnings, whereas generally accepted income 
replacement rates range between 65% and 85% (Binswanger and Schunk, 2012). The 
                                                          
5 Replacement rate is the ratio between post- and pre-retirement income studies (Benartzi, 2012; 
Binswanger and Schunk, 2012; Crawford and O'Dea, 2012; Scholz and Seshadri, 2009) . 
6 See section 1.4.1.1 for NZS information. 
2 
 
lack of a mandatory contributory retirement savings scheme in NZ puts more pressure on 
individuals to take responsibility for making additional savings for retirement. Unlike 
other OECD countries that have a mandatory contributory retirement savings scheme, 
New Zealanders must exercise their own initiative to decide how much to save and where 
to invest funds accumulated for retirement. Saving for retirement is further confounded 
by the NZ tax system. In particular, investors do not pay capital gains tax on housing 
sales (for homes sold at least five years after the date of purchase). This encourages New 
Zealanders to invest in housing and has made ‘bricks and mortar’ retirement portfolios 
more attractive than other forms of saving for retirement.7  Furthermore, research shows 
that retirees are reluctant to sell their homes to fund their retirement (Moore and Mitchell, 
1997; Poterba et al., 2011; Telyukova and Nakajima, 2011; Venti and Wise, 1989, 2004). 
The mismatch between overinvestment in housing with the initial intention of using it to 
fund retirement (Coleman, 1998) and the actuality that retirees are reluctant to liquidate 
their homes for retirement suggests that other means for retirement funding may be 
necessary. 
Second, the KiwiSaver scheme, initially designed to provide additional retirement 
savings for New Zealanders, has several limitations. The allowance for withdrawal of 
funds from KiwiSaver to purchase a first home (KiwiSaver, 2015) and allowance for 
contribution suspensions of between three months to a year (KiwiSaver, 2019) limits 
KiwiSaver’s capacity as a means for retirement savings. Also, KiwiSaver accumulated 
wealth is available for withdrawal as a lump sum and does not have an option for 
annuitisation. The lack of an annuitisation option upon withdrawal means that retirees 
must manage the accumulated funds themselves or with the help of a financial investment 
advisor. Crossan et al. (2011) find that New Zealanders have a comparatively high level 
                                                          
7 Coleman (1998) finds that New Zealanders have most of their wealth in housing. 
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of financial literacy, but their financial literacy level does not correlate to better 
retirement planning. Their findings pose concerns about the retirees’ capacity to manage 
their wealth in retirement in order to avoid outliving their wealth. The current provision 
for retirement preparation in NZ is a primary point of motivation to investigate issues 
about retirement wellbeing among older New Zealanders. In particular, the study seeks 
to better understand the current living situations of older New Zealanders and to 
investigate measures to improve their wellbeing.  
1.2. Research Contribution 
This thesis (i) provides new evidence on the level of financial capacity of older 
New Zealanders to support their wellbeing in retirement; (ii) investigates how housing 
decisions may affect older New Zealanders’ wellbeing; (iii) proposes findings on optimal 
spending and housing decisions for older New Zealanders; and (iv) explores financial 
literacy levels of older New Zealanders and shows how financial literacy may affect 
different spending preferences. 
This research contributes to the existing literature on financial adequacy levels of 
retirees and is the first to incorporate different housing liquidation options in assessing 
financial adequacy. Chapter 2 provides empirical evidence on financial adequacy levels 
of NZ retirees by using data from the New Zealand Survey of Family, Income, and 
Employment (SoFIE). It is the first study to examine the effect of a wide range of 
different housing liquidation options on financial adequacy in retirement. Specifically, 
the analysis considers housing wealth in terms of (i) full liquidation and living with 
family, (ii) downsizing and living in the same area, (iii) downsizing and moving to a 
different region, (iv) obtaining a reverse mortgage and (v) full liquidation and renting. In 
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general, the majority of literature only examines either full liquidation8 or a simple partial 
housing liquidation option.9 
The findings provide new insight into how different housing liquidation options 
may result in differing levels of financial adequacy among retirees. Chapter 2 shows that 
although the full liquidation option results in the greatest share of financially adequate 
retirees, after accounting for rent payments, it is the worst option. These results contest 
previous studies that assume full liquidation10 and conclude that retirees are financially 
adequate. However, this body of literature fails to account for the fact that following the 
sale of their own home, retirees must either move in with family or pay rent for 
accommodation. Therefore, failure to account for changes in retiree living may provide 
misleading conclusions. 
A further important contribution in Chapter 2 is the inclusion of imputed rent in 
estimating financial adequacy. Imputed rent is defined as the return on housing 
ownership in the form of the money saved from not paying rent. Previous studies have 
ignored imputed rent because rent values are property and region specific, and are further 
affected by perceptions and expectations of the homeowners (Munnell and Soto, 2005).  
This thesis adjusts for imputed rent based on regional rent prices in NZ.  
Chapter 3 details the development of a program that can estimate optimal 
consumption, health and housing spending, as well as finding the optimal housing 
arrangements for older New Zealanders. This thesis develops a unique dynamic program 
that incorporates each of the five different housing scenarios available to retirees. 
                                                          
8 Engelhardt and Kumar (2011); Gibson et al. (2010); Le et al. (2012); Le et al. (2009); Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007); Moore and Mitchell (1997); Munnell and Soto (2005); Scobie and Henderson (2009); Scobie et al. 
(2006). 
9 Engen et al. (2000) include partial housing equity liquidation of 0%, 50% and 100%. 
10 Engelhardt and Kumar (2011); Gibson et al. (2010); Le et al. (2012); Le et al. (2009); Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2007); Moore and Mitchell (1997); Munnell and Soto (2005); Scobie and Henderson (2009); 
Scobie et al. (2006). 
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Next, the thesis investigates the effect of a health shock on different retiree 
housing arrangements and retiree wellbeing, respectively. The program in Chapter 3 
includes health shocks and shows that renting is the more flexible option when retirees 
are confronted with health shocks, even though it may not be the optimal choice. The 
results also show that staying or when they sell their current home then purchase a house 
of different size, may be optimal choices; however, when compared with renting, the 
retirees’ optimal utility level fluctuates more in the event of a health shock. 
The GAUSS program used in Chapter 3 incorporates multiple shocks to health, 
income and house prices. In contrast to the prior literature, health shocks (Yogo, 2016), 
house price shocks (Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018; Andreasson et al., 2017) or 
shocks to income (Kraft and Munk, 2011) have only been examined separately. 
Currently, no study has considered shocks of all three simultaneously. While the primary 
focus of Chapter 3 is the effects of health shocks, the study also investigates income and 
house price shocks simultaneously. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the limited literature on financial literacy in NZ. Crossan 
et al. (2011) show that most New Zealanders are financially literate compared with other 
countries, but their levels of financial literacy do not affect retirement planning. Survey 
data gathered as part of the thesis show that those reaching or at the early years of 
retirement, less educated, with lower income, Māori/Pacific female, retirees have the 
lowest financial literacy level in NZ.  The survey data also suggest that older New 
Zealanders are financially literate, with 57% answering all the questions on financial 
literacy correctly. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on financial literacy and debt 
position.11 It also adds to the limited literature on financial literacy and risk attitude.12 
                                                          
11 Lusardi and Tufano (2015) find that better financial literacy is associated with lower debt position.  
12 Previous studies have yet to propose a relationship between financial literacy and higher risk tolerance, 
but high stock market participation from financial literacy (Japelli and Padula, 2015) can imply higher risk 
tolerance of retirees. 
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Results show that individuals with higher financial literacy have a lower debt position 
and a higher tolerance for risk. 
This thesis is the first to investigate retirement spending preferences. To do this, 
it uses conjoint analysis that implements a pairwise comparison method to consider 
potentially all pairwise rankings of all possible alternatives.13 The multi-criteria decision-
making method presents two choices at a time for all possible combinations of choices, 
and then ranks the subject’s preference. This is a novel method in the retirement 
literature. Chapter 4 shows that New Zealanders’ top three spending choices when 
receiving a windfall is to (1) put money in the bank, (2) spend on home improvements 
and (3) invest in KiwiSaver. 
This thesis is the first to investigate how financial literacy affects spending 
preferences of older New Zealanders. Furthermore, it is the first study that includes a 
variety of spending options, such as those with consumption motives (general 
consumption and luxury consumption), financial investment motives (putting money in 
the bank and purchasing shares), housing investments (paying a deposit for a home, 
paying a deposit for an investment property and home improvements) and philanthropic 
motives (leave money for family now or later and donations). The results in Chapter 4 
show that financial literacy has a positive effect on choosing KiwiSaver but not on debt 
repayment. 
Chapter 4 is the first study to investigate the complex relationships between 
financial literacy, debt, risk attitude and spending preferences. The results from structural 
equation modelling (SEM) report that relationships between financial literacy, debt, risk 
attitude and spending preferences are complex and depend on different subsampling. 
Chapter 4 splits the sample into groups according to gender, ethnicity, marital status and 
                                                          
13 The process was implemented using 1000Minds software, www.1000minds.com  
7 
 
living arrangements. The analysis shows that compared with female retirees, male 
retirees choose share purchases as one of their top three preferences, and the decision is 
affected by risk attitude rather than financial literacy. Financial literacy has a positive 
effect on choosing KiwiSaver across subsample groups. Māori/Pacific choose paying off 
debt as one of their top three preferences, whereas NZ Europeans do not. This motivation 
for choosing debt is strongly affected by higher debt position rather than financial 
literacy. 
1.3. Organisation of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 provide 
some historical context to the thesis and discuss the research design. Section 1.4 explores 
the NZ retirement provision system and how the current system may raise concerns about 
the wellbeing of older New Zealanders. It also includes a conceptual framework that 
explains how the three separate studies are interlinked, and how each contributes to the 
purpose of investigating retirement wellbeing among older New Zealanders. The end of 
section 1.4 elaborates on the different theories used in this thesis. Section 1.5 explores 
the research design, including the research philosophy, the data used and its sources and 
finally the data analysis techniques.  
1.4. Background of the Study 
NZ’s pension system as a means of financial provision in retirement is unique 
compared with other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). NZ does not follow the World Bank’s popularised three-tier 
pension system (Appendix A); however, the pension is considered to be “remarkably 
durable, acceptable, and fiscally responsible” (St. John, 2001) and “ensures cost-
effective, secure, equitable and sustainable basic income for all” (St. John, 2007).  
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1.4.1. The NZ Retirement Provision System 
NZ was among the first to introduce the concept of public pension provision in 
1898 as a tax-funded, flat rate and non-contributory scheme. The Social Security Act of 
1938 modified the scheme to a two-tier tax-funded flat-rate pension scheme, consisting 
of an income tested age benefit starting at the age of 60 and a universal taxable flat 
pension from 65 for those not on the age benefit. This was later replaced by the single 
public provision of National Superannuation in 1977 (Scobie and Henderson, 2009; St. 
John, 2001).  
The move towards a flattened tax rate occurred in 1988. The government removed 
the pension saving tax credits for better resource allocation, as it tended to favour the 
high earners at the expense of general tax revenues (St. John, 2001). Furthermore, means 
testing was removed in 1997 in favour of a universal NZS for all New Zealanders. In 
2001, the NZ Superannuation Fund was established to partially finance the future of NZ’s 
public pension. Contributions are taken from budget surpluses each year until 2025, 
before the government makes large lump sum investments to finance future public 
pension (Scobie and Henderson, 2009). This marks the shift for NZS from a Pay-as-You-
Go (PAYG) to a partially prefunded Save-as-You-Go (SAYG) scheme. 
While not popular in NZ, the World Bank’s second tier of compulsory saving was 
implemented once in 1975.14 It was abolished later that same year due to a lack of 
support. Compulsory saving was reinvestigated by the Task Force on Private Provision 
for Retirement in 1992 and in 1996, but it was always rejected (St. John, 2001). On the 
other hand, KiwiSaver, a mandatory contribution voluntary membership saving scheme, 
was introduced in 2007 to encourage saving. It is an auto-enrolled voluntary occupational 
                                                          
14 See Appendix A for the World Bank Tier System. 
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saving scheme, with mandatory contributions from employers for employees who choose 
to stay in the scheme and contribute. 
1.4.1.1. New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) 
The public pension provision in NZ, the NZS, is the only provision guaranteed to 
all eligible New Zealanders in their retirement years. The NZS is a universal scheme 
based on residential qualifications provided by the NZ government. The NZ public 
pension provision is unique compared with other OECD countries, as it is universally 
available based solely on residential requirements and it does not entail forms of means 
testing. Research suggests that the purpose of a public pension is to provide a form of 
income floor for older generations so that they are able to support themselves at a very 
basic level without “creating intergenerational inequity, distortions, which impede 
economic growth or fiscal bankruptcy” (St. John, 2001, p. 1295). The universal nature of 
NZS allows NZ to achieve one of the greatest coverage levels of public pension, but it 
also has one of the lowest income replacement rates among OECD countries.15 Until 
2002, NZS was funded under a PAYG. Subsequently, the NZ government shifted to a 
smoothed PAYG or a partially funded SAYG by setting up the NZS Fund, in order to 
accumulate funds from taxes and budget surpluses for future payments of retirement 
provision. 
The NZS is a universal defined benefit (DB) government-provided pension for 
New Zealanders aged 65 or older.16 This scheme is available for NZ citizens or residents 
who have lived in NZ for at least 10 years since the age of 20, and have spent five of 
                                                          
15 Income replacement rate is the ratio of post-retirement income over pre-retirement income (OECD, 
2015). 
16 Refer to Appendix B for the types of pension schemes. 
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those years in NZ after turning 50 years old. The weekly current provision level (after 
tax) of the NZ Superannuation paid fortnightly as of April 2020 is  
$424 for single living alone,  
$391 for single living in a shared accommodation, 
$326/individual in a couple if both qualify, 
$310/individual in a couple if only one individual qualifies and he/she includes 
their partner in the payments, 
 $326/individual in a couple if only one individual qualifies and he/she does not 
include partner in the payments (Work and Income NZ (WINZ), 2019).  
According to the 2016 rate of pension and based on median gross weekly earnings, 
the rate is 40-43% for singles and 32-34% for individuals in a couple.17 The growth of 
the public provision is in line with the growth of Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) to 
maintain the relative adequacy levels of the scheme over time. 
There are advantages from an individual’s point of view of the NZS (St. John, 
2007): 
 The non-contributory nature of the scheme recognises both paid 
and unpaid contributions to society. This is particularly beneficial for women, 
widows and divorcees as they are often subject to discrimination (St. John, 
2001).18 
 Each person aged over 65 is treated as an individual and receives 
a pension in his or her own right. This implies the individuality of the right for 
public provision regardless of the spouse’s income. 
                                                          
17 Based on author’s calculations. 
18 There is evidence of a gender pay gap in NZ (Pacheco et al., 2017). 
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 Payment is indexed to living standards. This is because the 
provision is related to average wages, and thus is safeguarded from inflation and 
rising costs of living. 
 The pension protects against hardship, with those over 65 having 
better living standards than the rest of the population (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2006).19  
 The pension protects against longevity risks. 
 Simplicity, or the lack of income or asset assessments, makes NZS 
understandable and easy to apply for.  
St. John (2007) also added the advantages from a society’s point of view: 
 A social insurance: the scheme does not require a guarantee period 
or return of capital on death.20 People only receive benefits as long as they live 
and early death does not bring additional benefits to those left behind. 
 The level of pension provision has largely been proven to prevent 
poverty for the elderly. This, in turn, minimises the need for further 
supplementary welfare provisions. 
 The tax considerations on NZS to include investment income and 
on expenditure makes sure that the burden for NZS does not fall solely on those 
in the workforce. 
 Minimisation of administration cost and having no inherent 
disincentive to work or save past retirement age due to the absence of means 
testing.  
                                                          
19 NZS is set to be just above the poverty line (half of the median income). The majority of older New 
Zealanders are NZS recipients due to its universal nature, and would not fall under the poverty line, as 
compared with the rest of the population. 
20 NZS provides basic financial protection for the elderly regardless of their health.  
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The advantages of NZS from both an individual and society’s point of view are 
supported by Scobie et al. (2004). Both St. John (2007) and Scobie et al. (2004)  
emphasise that the public pension aims to provide basic support for elderly New 
Zealanders, helping them avoid poverty, and to reduce inequality levels among them. 
This view is in accordance with the purpose of the World Bank’s first pillar as a means 
to avoid absolute poverty (St. John, 2001).21  
NZ’s universal pension differs from the means-tested public pension implemented 
by many OECD countries. The universality aspect is supported by the World Bank report 
(1994, p. 240) cited in St. John (2001) that states 
 means-testing of the first pillar would diminish the simplicity of 
the scheme and result in higher running cost;  
 it would discourage people from working in retirement and 
continue saving rather than decumulating their wealth;  
 means-testing would imply that the provision is a welfare benefit, 
and so this may deter a number of the eligible poor from applying.  
Statistics NZ predicts that by 2051, 22.2% of New Zealanders will be aged 65 and 
over (Statistics New Zealand, 2000), joining the United Kingdom in facing an ageing 
population problem (Banks et al., 2005). Sustainability of the NZS is therefore of 
concern. Currently, it is sustainable, with the NZS expense being 3.6% of the GDP in 
2007 (St. John, 2007) and 4.3% of the GDP in 2019 (NZ Super Fund, 2019). However, 
it is expected to rise to 6.2% of the GDP by 2050 (NZ Super Fund, 2019). This may 
appear reasonable compared with other OECD countries at the moment, such as the 
United Kingdom, with 8.1% of the GDP used to fund its public pension in 2016 
                                                          
21 See Appendix A for the World Bank’s retirement provision pillars. 
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(ukpublicspending.co.uk). One indicator of a growing sustainability problem is the ratio 
of the working-age population (age 16–64) to those above age 65. The NZ ratio was 5.5 
in 2004 and was expected to fall to 3.0 in 2018 and further fall to 2.2 by 2051 (Kritzer, 
2007). This implies that the working population will face a greater burden to support its 
retired counterpart in the future.  
The first pension pillar provides the basic income required to avoid absolute 
poverty (Scobie et al., 2004; St. John, 2001; St. John, 2007). Supplementary provisions 
would be required if individuals wished to maintain their standard of living, particularly 
those in the middle- and high-income group (Kritzer, 2007). The lack of a mandatory 
contribution second tier has made the occupational pension only available to employees 
working in certain industries and for certain companies. These limited supplementary 
pension policies and schemes have caused New Zealanders to rely more on non-pension 
savings and non-pension wealth.  
1.4.1.1.1. Coverage of NZ’s Pension System 
NZ has one of the highest coverage rates of public pension compared with other 
countries due to the universality of the NZS (OECD, 2015). However, it has a low 
replacement rate of 32–44%, based on 2016 NZS rates and median average weekly 
earnings.22 Most OECD countries apply policies to mitigate the higher life expectancy 
rate imposing undue pressure on taxpayers to support the older generation. For example, 
in the United Kingdom, public pension eligibility is now more difficult due to an increase 
in the eligibility age and the required number of years of contribution. These changes 
have caused public pension coverage in the UK to fall (OECD, 2015).  
                                                          
22 Based on the author’s calculation. 
14 
 
The UK government has continuously encouraged ‘self-sufficiency’ by increasing 
the contribution rate of mandatory saving in occupational pensions. This is in contrast to 
NZ’s current universal public pension and voluntary contribution scheme. The current 
pressure on NZ taxpayers to support the universal public pension appears modest, with 
the illustration of the net cost of paying NZS of 6.2% of the GDP by 2050 (NZ Super 
Fund, 2019) as compared with the UK’s 2016 8.1% (ukpublicspending.co.uk). However, 
the pressure will continue to grow in the future as more New Zealanders retire, and NZ 
may face similar sustainability problems to the UK if there are no policy changes to 
mitigate the issue. 
KiwiSaver is an example of a government non-pension saving scheme introduced 
to promote savings. The eligibility of KiwiSaver withdrawal is set at retirement age and 
suggests that one of its objectives is to provide additional financial support in retirement, 
although KiwiSaver funds are withdrawn as a lump sum. Thus, New Zealanders should 
resort to non-pension investments, such as property and financial investments (St. John, 
2001), to further support them financially in retirement. 
1.4.1.2. KiwiSaver  
KiwiSaver is an automatically enrolled savings scheme for employees when they 
start a new job; however, they have the option to leave between the second and eighth 
week. Employees who choose to stay have their contributions at a default of 4% of gross 
salary unless they opt for the higher rate of 8%. Employers match their employees’ 
contributions up to 4% and do not incur tax on their contributions. The maximum annual 
member tax credit was $1,042.86 before July 2011 and $521.43 thereafter. From July 
2011, the government provides 50 cents for every dollar contribution made, so in order 
to achieve a full tax credit, individuals would have to contribute at least $1,042.86 a year. 
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If individual contributions are less than $1,042.86 per person, account holders can make 
additional voluntary contributions in order to receive the government’s maximum tax 
credit of $521.43. 
The tax credit limit on KiwiSaver may hinder the accumulation of KiwiSaver 
funds among those with a higher income, and this is due to investment choice substitutes, 
such as Portfolio Investment Entities (PIE). The top tax rate for PIEs is 28%, compared 
with an individual top tax rate of 33%. The annual maximum tax credit of $521.43 for 
$1,042.86 contributions made by members annually may cause members to only 
contribute the required minimum, and subsequently choose to allocate their resources in 
other investment options that offer greater incentives (e.g. in property, investments, and 
equity or PIE).  
1.4.1.2.1. KiwiSaver Scheme Provider 
Inland Revenue NZ holds the funds for the initial three months during which the 
employee can seek financial advice and select a fund provider. Savers can choose their 
own portfolio and fund providers but are limited to one provider at a time. Those who do 
not specify a fund will be allocated the default provider. Individuals who seek financial 
advice and improve their financial literacy can benefit greatly from the opportunity to 
choose portfolios and fund providers, and in turn, benefit from the fall in PIE tax (St. 
John, 2007). 
Individuals can choose from a wide range of schemes from a number of providers. 
All KiwiSaver schemes are registered with the Financial Markets Authority and are 
offered and managed by KiwiSaver providers. Individuals are allowed to change 
providers at any time but can only belong to one scheme at a time. Once individuals 
choose their providers, their primary relationship will be with their provider. KiwiSaver 
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is not guaranteed by the government, so individuals make investment choices at their 
own risk. However, all KiwiSaver schemes are regulated by the Financial Markets 
Authority to ensure the schemes are competitive and the members’ best interests are 
looked after. These policies include reasonable fees for all schemes, special contracts 
between default providers and the Government to meet additional reporting requirements 
and close monitoring of default providers’ activities and investment funds. 
For individuals who choose their own providers within the first three months of 
their new job, their contributions will be transferred directly to the chosen scheme. 
Employers can choose a KiwiSaver scheme for individuals who do not choose a scheme 
of their own, and all new employees will be provisionally allocated to the employers’ 
chosen scheme unless they choose to change providers. If employees or employers do 
not choose a scheme, Inland Revenue will allocate membership to one of the nine 
government-appointed default providers.23 The default providers’ scheme will be 
invested in the conservative fund option. If individuals have a greater appetite for risk, 
then they could opt out of their current scheme for a riskier portfolio investment scheme.  
The accumulated funds in KiwiSaver will be locked until the age of NZS 
eligibility, which is currently set at 65 years old. This is the case except in circumstances 
of financial hardship, permanent migration and serious illness. It is also possible for 
individuals to withdraw part of their KiwiSaver funds to contribute towards a deposit for 
a first home, but this may lead to conflicting goals and weaken the primary purpose of 
KiwiSaver to supplement NZS in retirement (Kritzer, 2007).  
                                                          
23 The approved providers are AMP Services (NZ) Limited, ANZ New Zealand Investments Limited, ASB 
Group Investments Limited, BNZ Investment Services Limited, Fisher Funds Management Limited, 
Grosvenor Investment Management Limited, Kiwi Wealth Limited, Mercer (NZ) Limited and Westpac 
New Zealand Ltd. 
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There are several limitations to KiwiSaver as a tool for retirement savings. First, 
the KiwiSaver scheme allows individuals who have been a member for three years to 
withdraw their contributions in order to purchase their first home, including withdrawing 
the contributions made by the NZ government.24 The lack of annuitisation options of 
funds upon withdrawal undermines the initial objective of the scheme to help prevent 
individuals outliving their asset. Finally, the voluntary nature of KiwiSaver, through an 
opt-out option and the choice to take contribution holidays, limits its asset accumulation 
strength and relies on individuals’ initiative. 
1.4.2. NZ’s Saving for Retirement Taxation System 
NZ applies a Tax-Tax-Exempt (TTE) taxation system for retirement savings; 
however, the system does not provide strong incentives to support retirement saving. The 
TTE system requires all retirement income saving to be fully taxed, with a maximum tax 
credit of $521.43 from the government for annual contributions to KiwiSaver. Investment 
incomes are taxed according to the corresponding PIE tax rate and withdrawals on NZS 
and KiwiSaver are tax free. This tax system does not differentiate between lump-sum 
withdrawals and pension withdrawals.25 The lack of mandatory annuitisation undermines 
the objective of KiwiSaver to provide supplementary income in retirement to improve 
retirees’ standard of living. 
The maximum tax credit limit for pension savings may incentivise individuals to 
shift their investment to more productive areas or to more tax-favoured housing 
investments. Housing is tax-favoured, as capital gains from housing are not taxed as long 
                                                          
24 KiwiSaver (2015). 




as the timing of the sell is not less than two years26 or five years27 from their 
purchase/built dates. Residential housing also benefits from the absence of tax on 
imputed rent, but on the other hand, rental property owners would have to pay rental 
income tax. The attractiveness of housing as an investment has led to housing becoming 
the major component of the dollar value of asset ownership in NZ (Le et al., 2012; St. 
John, 2001). The popularity of housing as an investment is mainly attributed to tax-
favoured issues (St. John, 2001). Additionally, KiwiSaver allows withdrawal of funds for 
first-home purchases, which impedes the strength of KiwiSaver to offer supplementary 
income for older New Zealanders. 
The lower PIE tax rate is only beneficial to the top earners and it may cause them 
to limit their contribution to retirement saving schemes, such as KiwiSaver. The current 
top PIE tax rate is lower than the highest income tax rate,28 making investing in assets 
under the PIE tax category more attractive than saving in other schemes with smaller tax 
credits, such as the KiwiSaver for top earners. The relative attractiveness may incentivise 
top earners to invest more in PIE assets, rather than in retirement saving schemes. 
Furthermore, the change in the PIE tax rate renders greater benefits for those who can 
structure the way their income is achieved (St. John, 2007). This means that those in the 
highest income tax bracket may wish to move more assets to PIE investments, so as to 
benefit from the lower top tax rate on PIE income. 
There is a possibility of middle earners’ vulnerability to old age poverty if saving 
incentives are not strong enough to encourage middle earners to actively save for their 
retirement in the absence of mandatory saving. The taxation system does not favour 
                                                          
26 For homes purchased between October 1st, 2015 and March 28th, 2018 (Inland Revenue, 2019). 
27 For homes purchased on or after March 29 th 2018 (Inland Revenue, 2019). 
28 See section 1.4.1.2 for PIE and income tax rate. 
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savings for KiwiSaver and other retirement savings scheme any more than the other 
methods of saving. The tax credit of $521.43 from the government may be less attractive 
for income earners other than those in the lower-income cohort. Saving may not even be 
possible for those in lower-income households due to smaller residual amounts after 
consumption expenditure. The lower-income cohort may also be discouraged to save due 
to the relatively high replacement rates of NZS for their income cohort. The situation 
differs for middle- and high-income earners, as the NZS replacement rates may only 
cover a smaller part of their working income. KiwiSaver is likely to be more relevant and 
important for middle earners, and this is because only top earners have significant 
investment assets (Le et al., 2012) as means for supplementary support in retirement. 
Furthermore, the lack of mandatory annuitisation for KiwiSaver poses the greatest risk 
to the middle-income cohort, as they would bear the greatest burden of managing 
KiwiSaver lump sums so that they would not outlive them. Outliving wealth is one of the 
main issues of old age poverty (Cocco and Gomes, 2012). 
1.4.3. Implications of NZ’s Pension System and Saving Scheme 
The lack of mandatory saving and annuitisation presents a greater reliance on 
public pension provision, voluntary saving and asset management. There are three 
reasons why mandatory saving is important and why it is adopted by many OECD 
countries (St. John, 2001) citing World Bank (1994). First, governments should protect 
taxpayers from retiree poverty vulnerability. If retirees only rely on public pension 
provision, and the public provision is of an inadequate level, many would require 
additional welfare provision to avoid poverty. With NZS’s limited provision,29 
individuals who wish to maintain their living standard would need to rely on additional 
                                                          
29 See section 1.4.1.1 for NZS weekly provision and section 1.4.1.1.1 for NZS coverage.  
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provisions to support their retirement income. This is especially true for those other than 
the lower-income cohort, who will receive better replacement rates from the NZS than 
the rest of the population. The old age poverty risk may put greater pressure on taxpayers 
for additional support if retirees are not able to provide additional support themselves. 
KiwiSaver, though it would help those who enrol and contribute to the scheme, may not 
provide sufficient additional retirement income due to its limitations.30 Upon withdrawal, 
people may not invest their KiwiSaver funds into an annuity, instead choosing to spend 
it in ways that do not improve their living standards in the longer term. This problem 
poses greater need for better individual asset management and retirement planning to 
avoid old age poverty. 
Second, the government should safeguard employees from a myopic behaviour of 
spending most of their income in the present. By implementing a mandatory saving 
scheme, individuals would be forced to put aside some of their income during their 
working age to provide extra income in retirement, when they possibly no longer work 
and receive a salary. KiwiSaver may inspire individuals to voluntarily save for their 
retirement. However, the saving rate may be far lower than if a mandatory saving policy 
was in place and individuals would be responsible for managing their wealth.  
Third, mandatory saving and pooled funds by the government can minimise the 
risk of adverse selection in the annuities market. The adverse selection present in the 
annuities market causes private annuities to be priced above actuarially fair prices. 
Individuals, who perceive they would live longer or with better health, are at greater risk 
of outliving their assets. Purchasing an annuity may be more beneficial to healthier 
individuals compared with those who are less healthy or believe their life expectancy is 
                                                          
30 See section 1.4.1.2.1 for KiwiSaver limitations. 
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shorter. Consequently, if annuity purchases are limited to retirees with greater life 
expectancy, annuity providers face greater risk and could price annuities above 
actuarially fair prices. Therefore, public mandatory saving and pooled funds can 
minimise individual risk and provide annuities that are actuarially fairly priced.  
The small and unattractive annuities market in NZ has led many New Zealanders 
to invest in assets that may not provide long-term additional retirement income and 
increase the risk of old-age poverty. The small nature of NZ’s annuities market may 
minimise the adverse selection risk in the annuities market, but it will also be unattractive 
for retirees (St. John, 2001). New Zealanders may find that, although they are presented 
with annuities that are actuarially fairer, non-annuitised investments are more attractive. 
For example, wealth among New Zealanders is dominated by investment in housing 
assets (Le et al., 2012; St. John, 2001) and may lead to old-age poverty. Specifically, 
there are cases of people outliving their assets, as property investments are very rarely 
liquidated, unless there are extreme shocks, such as health shocks or spousal deaths 
(Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler, 2011; Buiter, 2010; Moore and Mitchell, 1997; Poterba 
et al. 2011; Telyukova and Nakajima, 2011; Venti and Wise, 1989, 2004). 
There are certain challenges that the NZ pension system faces by not having a 
mandatory saving scheme to supplement the NZS. The lack of mandatory saving puts 
greater pressure on voluntary saving and asset management when reaching retirement 
age. KiwiSaver, for example, was established to provide the required additional support, 
but has many limitations.31 Hence, there is a need for greater financial management to 
accumulate enough wealth for retirement funding as well as managing wealth in 
retirement so that retirees do not outlive their wealth. 
                                                          
31 See KiwiSaver limitations in section 1.4.1.2.1. 
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1.4.4. Conceptual and Theoretical Background 
This thesis focuses on retirement wellbeing among older New Zealanders. The 
study is motivated by the unique retirement provision system in NZ: 1) the lack of a 
mandatory contributory retirement savings scheme; 2) a taxation system that favours 
housing investment that has led most New Zealanders to have their wealth in housing 
(Coleman, 1998); and 3) KiwiSaver does not have an annuitisation option that puts 
considerable pressure on retirees to manage their own wealth. First, the thesis investigates 
the current situation of wellbeing among older New Zealanders (Chapter 2). Second, the 
author investigates how to optimise the wellbeing of older New Zealanders, given their 
current financial, health and housing situations (Chapter 3).  
Finally, in Chapter 4 the author measures financial literacy that is found to have a 
positive effect on retirement planning among the older population (Lusardi and Mitchell, 
2011). The author investigates whether financial literacy is adequate among older New 
Zealanders and if there are positive effects on retirement spending decisions. The purpose 
of the third study is to examine whether improving financial literacy would encourage 
older New Zealanders to make spending decisions that would improve their wellbeing. 
The studies are presented in Chapters 2 to 4. Figure 1.1 summarises the content of each 
chapter. 
[Insert Figure 1.1.] 
The thesis investigates the current wellbeing of older New Zealanders (Chapter 
2). The wellbeing assessment considers current overinvestment in housing wealth among 
New Zealanders. By having a better understanding of the current wellbeing situation in 
NZ, the author gains insight into wellbeing improvements. The first study contributes to 
the literature on financial adequacy by introducing possible housing liquidation and 
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living arrangement scenarios. Findings from Chapter 2 show that the assumptions about 
wealth and income in assessing financial adequacy and the application of different living 
arrangement scenarios result in varying levels of financial adequacy. 
A number of studies have applied the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) 
expected utility hypothesis in estimating optimal utility as a measure of wellbeing.32 
Chapter 3 follows existing studies and estimates how New Zealanders can optimise their 
wellbeing, subject to finding the optimal combination of consumption and housing 
situations. The findings from Chapter 3 can be used as an assessment of wellbeing or 
financial adequacy when comparing optimal options to current wealth and housing 
situations that may be suboptimal.  
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) find that financial literacy is positively correlated 
with retirement planning and accumulated wealth in retirement. Chapter 4 follows 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) in investigating financial literacy levels in NZ and tests the 
hypothesis that financial literacy affects decision-making. Findings from Chapter 4 
provide insight on decision-making in NZ, and whether higher financial literacy levels 
would encourage retirees to make financial decisions that would improve their wellbeing. 
[Insert Table 1.1.] 
The thesis uses the theoretical frameworks as shown in Table 1.1. Additionally, 
this thesis follows the Life-Cycle theory of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) suggesting 
that individuals aim to smooth consumption over the lifecycle. In Chapters 2 and 3, the 
thesis applies the Life-Cycle theory assumption that individuals accumulate wealth when 
they are young and working, so that they can decumulate their wealth in retirement, when 
                                                          




working may no longer be possible. The application of the theory allows the thesis to 
focus on the investigation of retirees’ wealth level adequacies in Chapter 2. The Life-
Cycle theory also assists with the design of the program to analyse wealth decumulation 
of retirees in Chapter 3. The utility maximisation theory of Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
(1945) is applied in Chapter 3, as the program is designed to estimate optimal choices 
that assume utility maximisation, which is based on a set of probabilistic future outcomes. 
Chapter 4 follows the bounded rationality theory of Simon (1957) that individuals make 
choices that are deemed rational to them, based on limited information and bounded by 
their cognitive capacity. The focus of Chapter 4 is to investigate how financial literacy, 
an example of a measurement of financial information and individuals’ cognitive 
capacity to understand financial information, affects their decision-making. 
1.5. Research Design 
Research design is described as a process in research studies involving the 
collection and analysis of data, understanding the meaning of the findings and 
communicating those findings through a report (J. Creswell, 2012). This thesis first 
identifies the main field of focus, which is retirement wellbeing. The author is motivated 
by the growing number of retirees and concerns about their limited saving for retirement 
(Skinner, 2007; Scholz et al., 2006). This study considers NZ because of its unique 
retirement system (section 1.4). In investigating retirement wellbeing, the author has 
focused on retiree financial adequacy (Crawford and O'Dea, 2012, 2016) and retiree 
financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011). Retirees are limited in their capacity to 
return to the work force (Lusardi, 2012) and are more prone to health shocks (Guiso et 
al., 2002; Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004), so unless they are already financially adequate in 
retirement and have knowledge on how to better manage their wealth, they may be 
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vulnerable to poverty in old age (Crossan et al., 2011). The thesis’s research philosophy, 
methods for data collection and analysis are presented in sections 1.5.1 to 1.5.3.  
1.5.1. Research Philosophy and Method  
This thesis follows an objectivism ontology and a positivist epistemology, using 
quantitative research methods and a deductive strategy. The ontological philosophy 
applied in this thesis is objectivism because the data used from SoFIE and the survey data 
collected by the author are assumed to be objective (Easterby-Smith and Thorpe, 2002). 
The epistemological assumption of this thesis is positivism. Using a positivist approach, 
the author suggests that she conducts unbiased research, does not manipulate the data 
collection process nor seeks to alter any findings (Tashakkori et al., 1998). The author 
applies quantitative methods in data analysis in establishing relationships between 
dependent and independent variables. The proposed relationships between the variables 
tested are based on theoretical and empirical evidence from previous studies. This thesis 
follows Creswell (2012), who suggests that for research using a quantitative method, 
applying objective facts and statistical methods would be most fitting. The author applies 
a deductive approach, as the thesis investigates the financial adequacy, optimal 
consumption and financial literacy of NZ retirees that may have an effect on wellbeing. 
Following Creswell and Tashakkori (2007), a deductive approach is used to investigate 
the relationships between concepts based on existing theory.  
The research philosophy dictates the choice for the most appropriate data 
collection and analysis methods. Accordingly, quantitative data collection and analysis 
methods are applied in this thesis. The analysis draws upon both secondary data from 
SoFIE (Chapter 2) and primary data from an online survey (Chapter 4). The SoFIE 
database is maintained by Statistics New Zealand and requires secure access through its 
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internal database. The author received access to SOFIE via Statistics NZ’s Integrated 
Data Infrastructure after going through the application, subscription and confidentiality 
training from Statistics NZ.  
Chapter 3 does not involve a data collection method, as it develops a program that 
can estimate optimal choices based on simulated data. Chapter 4 uses primary data from 
an online survey designed by the author. The survey consists of two parts: one to measure 
financial literacy and demographic information that uses ‘Wufoo’ as its platform, and the 
other measures spending preferences by using the 1000Minds survey platform. The data 
were collected working together with Research Now (later renamed Dynata), a well-
established global survey company.33 Responses to the online survey were carefully 
monitored as the survey was administered. This was to ensure that the response 
distribution was similar to the sample target distribution. Correspondence with Research 
Now enabled shortages or oversampling corrections of certain subsamples. For example, 
initially there were more male samples than targeted, so Research Now subsequently 
limited the number of additional survey invitations for males and sent out additional 
invitations for females.  
The survey was conducted twice, with the first wave giving 966 responses, which 
was proportional to the NZ population by gender but was disproportionately dominated 
by NZ European (Pākehā) respondents. Therefore, a second survey roll-out in April–
May 2019 was conducted to collect additional responses from the Māori and Pacific 
Island community. The final combined sample of 1,191 closely resembled the 
distribution of the NZ population based on gender and ethnicity.  
                                                          
33 See https://www.dynata.com/ for more information. 
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The thesis uses several methods of data analysis. Neuman (2006) states the stages 
for data analysis as 1) coding, 2) inputting data into a code sheet and 3) accuracy checking 
or data cleaning. These data collected from SoFIE were initially extracted from Statistics 
NZ’s Integrated Data Infrastructure server and were coded. Merging relevant data from 
different sets of SoFIE files arising from different sections of the survey was then carried 
out. Checks for accuracy and consistency were conducted prior to running further 
analysis. Chapter 2 shows descriptive findings from the financial adequacy level 
measurements. Financial adequacy is measured using the replacement rate and poverty 
line (PL) method. These are calibrated as the percentage of the sample that meets the 
adequacy thresholds for each measure.  
Chapter 4 applies descriptive and inferential quantitative analysis (Tashakkori et 
al., 1998). The primary data from an online survey were captured using Wufoo and 
1000Minds, two online platforms. The datasets were matched by respondents’ ID. The 
analysis uses an Ordinal Logistic Regression to investigate the relationship between 
financial literacy and demographic factors, financial literacy and debt, financial literacy 
and risk attitude and finally financial literacy, debt, risk attitude and retirement spending 
choices. A Fractional Multinomial Logistic Regression is estimated to examine the nature 
of the relationship between financial literacy, debt, risk attitude and demographic factors 
on different spending alternatives. Finally, Structural Equation Modelling is used to 
further investigate the complex relationships between financial literacy, debt, risk 
attitude and retirement choices. Details of the data analysis methods are presented in 
Chapters 2–4. 




2 Financial Adequacy of Retirees in New Zealand: The 
Role of Housing34 
2.1. Introduction 
This study examines financial adequacy and the importance of housing and asset 
liquidity to retirement in New Zealand (NZ). In particular, it investigates the effect of 
housing wealth to (i) support consumption and (ii) impact public provisions for retirees 
(Stebbing and Spies-Butcher, 2016). The findings from this research contribute to 
informing retirement saving, planning and policy in NZ and countries with similar 
retirement features. The study also spotlights groups that are marginalised by society due 
to income and housing wealth gaps. These people are possibly at risk of poorer quality 
of life, reduced wellness, greater exposure to crime, overcrowding and generational 
financial inadequacy. The results indicate that housing plays a substantial role in financial 
adequacy in retirement and place attention on the importance of the social value of 
housing. Given that the NZS35 provision level assumes homeownership, it suggests that 
the NZ government may need to improve provisions of affordable public housing and 
                                                          
34 Statistics NZ Integrated Data Infrastructure Disclaimer:  
The result of this presentation are not official statistics, they have been created for research purposes from 
the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI), managed by Statistics NZ. The opinions, findings, 
recommendations, and conclusions expressed in this presentation are those of the authors, not Statistics 
NZ. Access to the anonymised data used in this study was provided by Statistics NZ in accordance w ith 
security and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. Only people authorised by the Statistics 
Act 1975 are allowed to see data about a particular person, household, business, or organisation, and the 
result on this presentation have been confidentialised to protect these groups from identification. Careful 
consideration has been given to the privacy, security, and confidentiality issues associated with using 
administrative and survey data in the IDI. Further detail can be found in the Privacy impact assessment for 
the Integrated Data Infrastructure available from www.stats.govt.nz. Access to the data presented was 
managed by Statistics NZ under strict micro-data access protocols and in accordance with the security and 
confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. Our findings are not Official Statistics. The opinions, 
findings, recommendations, and conclusions expressed are those of the authors, not Statistics NZ.  
35 New Zealand Superannuation. Refer to section 1.4.1.1 for further information. 
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address rising housing prices and rental costs in order to help retirees achieve financial 
adequacy.  
Like other westernised countries, NZ has a growing number of retirees who are 
living longer and are increasingly required to take responsibility for their own financial 
provision (Bardasi et al., 2002). However, retirement saving in NZ demonstrates four 
unique features that separate it from other developed countries. First, the NZ government 
provides a non-means-tested basic pension to all qualifying residents 65 years or over 
(NZS). Second, NZ does not have a compulsory state-run contributory superannuation 
scheme, nor is the government heavily involved in private superannuation schemes 
(Marriott, 2009). Third, the government promotes a voluntary contributory retirement 
savings scheme, ‘KiwiSaver’, which is partially taxed. Retirement saving is taxed 
similarly to other investment products. Fourth, the lack of a capital gains tax on property 
means New Zealanders tend to save for retirement by investing in housing. 
The existing literature on the financial adequacy of individuals’ provision for 
retirement is both mixed and country specific. Differences between national pension and 
retirement savings policies make cross-country inferences difficult (OECD, 2015). 
Although there is an emerging literature on NZ retirement saving (Law and Scobie, 2014; 
Le et al., 2012; Le et al., 2009; Scobie and Henderson, 2009), there has been no 
investigation of housing asset liquidity on the adequacy of New Zealanders’ financial 
provision for retirement. This study contributes to the literature with four important 
results. First, the chapter analyses financial adequacy with a focus on the role of 
residential housing as a retirement asset. NZS payments are set based on the assumption 
that the retiree is a homeowner. Therefore, the value of housing liquidation options in 
retirement is critical to individual financial adequacy. Analysing eight years of data from 
the unique SoFIE database, the chapter investigates New Zealanders’ financial adequacy 
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using baseline wealth, rent imputation and considering seven possible housing 
liquidation options.36 Imputed rent, despite its contribution to retirement wellbeing, has 
been ignored by prior studies (Knoef et al., 2016; Munnell and Soto, 2005). Second, it 
considers the impact of the cost of rental payments on financial adequacy when housing 
is liquidated. Third, it investigates and compares financial adequacy using three different 
measures. Finally, the results highlight the risk of financial inadequacy to the most 
financially vulnerable. As rising house prices and growing rental costs may diminish the 
ability of low-income individuals to purchase a home, the government’s responsibility to 
make financial provision for NZ’s aging population could become an increasingly 
significant policy concern. 
The findings show that for the most vulnerable individuals in retirement, financial 
adequacy is lower for females, Māori, renters and those living in multi-dwelling 
occupancies. The difference is driven by an income gap that reduces financial adequacy 
markedly if an individual chooses to rent. In contrast, males, Pākehā and Asians, 
homeowners and individuals living alone attain higher financial adequacy after adjusting 
for imputed rent.  
The seven residential housing liquidation options result in significantly different 
financial adequacy outcomes. Adequacy is highest when owners can sell their home and 
live with family members, whereas retirees who sell and rent are the worst off. The 
chapter also reports that homeowners who choose to stay in their house or take up a 
reverse mortgage (also known as reverse equity mortgages) have higher adequacy due to 
the benefit of imputed rent. The equal sharing of matrimonial assets means that the 
financial adequacy of married males and females only vary by life expectancy. Pākehā 
and Asians have the greatest proportion of financially adequate individuals, while Māori 
                                                          
36 Imputed rent should be included, as it is a form of return on investment (Venti and Wise, 2004). 
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and Pacific Islanders have the lowest proportion. Auckland reports lower proportions of 
financially adequate individuals and Wellington has fewer financially adequate married 
or partnered individuals compared with other regions. Single renters who earn less than 
half the annual median income in any year of the study have the lowest adequacy rates.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the literature on 
financial adequacy and liquidity and describes the NZ retirement saving context in more 
detail. Section 2.3 describes the method, and section 2.4 presents the results. The final 
section 2.5 discusses the results and makes recommendations for NZ policymakers. 
2.2. Literature Review 
2.2.1. Financial Adequacy in Retirement 
Research examining the adequacy of wealth for citizens in the United States (US) 
and the United Kingdom (UK) include the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) 
2002–2003 and an economic model of consumption for those near retirement (Crawford 
and O'Dea, 2016). Results indicate that 92% of households accumulate more wealth than 
a suggested optimal savings level. When excluding housing, this falls to 75% (Crawford 
and O'Dea, 2016). The result is consistent with Crawford and O'Dea (2012), who use the 
replacement income method as an alternative measure of financial adequacy and whose 
findings support the average replacement rates of 80% reported in Bardasi et al. (2002) 
and Blundell and Smith (1999). Short data periods and subjectivity of assumptions for 
the optimality estimations limit the applicability of these results. Crawford and O'Dea 
(2016) only consider the outright sale of residential housing in retirement. This does not 
account for household heterogeneity, as suggested by Poterba (2015).  
Studies using US data find that most households have saved enough for retirement 
(Skinner, 2007; Scholz et al., 2006). However, after considering out-of-pocket medical 
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expenses, the evidence suggests that Americans do not have adequate retirement 
provisions (Skinner, 2007; De Nardi et al., 2010). Further evidence that Americans are 
not financially prepared for retirement (Bajtelsmit et al., 2013; Benartzi, 2012; Pang and 
Warshawsky, 2014) highlights differences in the existing literature concerning the 
liquidation of housing wealth to measure financial adequacy (Engen et al., 2000).  
While existing research supports the inclusion of full housing asset liquidation, 
these studies view housing as purely financial assets.37 They fail to acknowledge the 
importance of home ownership in the social cement of contemporary capitalism (Forrest 
and Hirayama, 2015). The commodification of housing has undermined the social project 
of home ownership giving housing assets a role in the social protection of the aged 
(Castles, 1998).  In a study of “asset-based welfare”, O’Mahony and Overton (2015) 
examine decisions by ageing homeowners to stay in their home. Choices motivated by 
important associations with family, friends, amenities, safety, security and familiarity all 
endorse the lived experience of home ownership compared with the home as a form of 
financial asset (Forrest and Hiramaya, 2015). 
 Munnell et al. (2012) find that reverse mortgages have little contribution to the 
importance of asset allocation in retirement. Poterba (2015) suggests that individuals can 
downsize and release some of their housing wealth by moving to another house of smaller 
value, although the study does not provide evidence to support this claim.  
Much of the housing literature considers poverty or inequality ‘after housing 
costs’ rather than financial adequacy explicitly. While asset-based welfare has the 
potential to ease the state’s fiscal constraints, older households that are not homeowners 
have lower non-housing wealth, lower disposable income and higher housing costs in 
                                                          
37 See Baldwin et al., 2012; Crawford and O'Dea, 2016; Knoef et al., 2016; Munnell and Soto, 2005. 
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retirement than homeowners and significantly higher poverty rates (Yates and Bradbury, 
2010). 
Finally, a critical intergenerational conflict arises between housing as a financial 
asset and welfare support in terms of adequacy and sustainability. Higher house prices 
lead to increased welfare benefits for older, established homeowners in contrast to less 
wealthy, younger non-homeowners (Ronald and Doling, 2012). This study seeks to 
bridge the literature that addresses the ‘use value’ of housing, and the recent transition to 
a financialised model of home ownership. This chapter highlights the importance of 
housing as a financial asset in measures of adequacy. 
2.2.2. NZ Retirement System 
2.2.2.1. NZ Superannuation (NZS)38 
 St. John (2001) compares public pension provision to primary education in 
assessing adequacy. She states that the level of primary education for someone with lower 
income may not seem attractive for those with higher income. On the other hand, the cost 
of primary education for the wealthy will be too costly for the government to provide and 
so, nevertheless, the government still provides all citizens with primary education. 
Individuals who wish to opt for private schooling or higher education or those without 
children, do not receive rebates from the government. This applies similarly to a public 
pension, as it should be available for all of the older generation but at a basic level or 
enough to provide basic means.  
There is limited literature on the adequacy level of NZS among older New 
Zealanders. For New Zealanders with modest earnings, the NZS provides a replacement 
rate that is sufficient to provide means to prevent them from entering poverty (St. John, 
                                                          
38 See section 1.4.1.1 for further information on NZS. 
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2007). St. John (2007), using data from the Ministry of Social Development 2005, 
suggests that of the 50% of households supported by an income-tested benefit, only 7.6% 
are reliant on the NZS. They suggest that poverty rates are lower in the older generation 
of New Zealanders than for the rest of the population. Their proposal may be misleading 
when measuring retirees’ wellbeing. The gross current NZS level (at April 1, 2019) is at 
33.6–46.8% of median weekly earnings.39 If only viewing wellbeing from a PL 
benchmark, their findings imply that retirees can have an adequate standard of living 
whilst being in the lowest end of the income spectrum.  
 Scobie et al. (2004) and Le et al. (2009) suggest that NZS values represent a very 
significant part of retirement accumulation for all age groups and across income cohorts. 
Using the two surveys, Household Saving Survey (HSS) 2001 and SoFIE 2002, both 
studies include the NZS as part of retirement wealth in assessing adequacy levels in 
retirement, using replacement rates and jointly prescribed savings. These studies focus 
on the total adequacy level, including values of housing wealth, financial wealth, pension 
wealth and NZS. There is limited literature on the adequacy levels of the NZS. The annual 
OECD reports are the only studies that investigate the adequacy levels of public pensions 
around the world, including that of NZ’s. Most NZ studies on retirement wealth or 
income adequacy have included NZS as part of their study (Carter, et al., 2009; Gibson, 
et al., 2010; Le et al., 2012; Le et al., 2009; Scobie et al., 2004; Scobie and Henderson, 
2009), but only Scobie et al. (2004) report specifically on the adequacy level of NZS for 
retirees, while the others only present findings at the total retirement wealth or income 
level.  
                                                          




 The OECD (2015) presents comparisons of public pension adequacy levels 
among OECD countries. The study uses a replacement rate measure of adequacy and 
finds that although NZ has one of the highest coverage rates, it has one of the lowest 
replacement rates (OECD, 2015). The study, however, does not consider the different 
pension policies applied in different countries. The use of the income replacement rate 
also poses problems, as it is based on the average income of each country. Countries with 
high income inequality will present skewed levels of average income that may distort 
replacement rates. Choosing the most appropriate measure of financial adequacy is 
crucial when assessing adequacy levels. 
The majority of developed and some developing countries provide basic public 
pension provision for their older generations (OECD, 2015). Literature suggests that 
some pension objectives include consumption smoothing (the consumption transfer when 
reaching retirement), minimising longevity (people outliving their retirement wealth), 
poverty relief among retirees and redistribution (where high earners will partially support 
those at the lower end) (Barr, 2009). Some believe that it is the responsibility of the 
government to provide an income floor for retirees to maintain their living standard to 
relieve poverty and as a means for redistribution (Barr, 2009; St. John, 2001). St. John 
(2001) mentions that the NZS is successful as it “ensured a stable and adequate retirement 
income for all citizens, moderation income inequality in retirement and protecting all 
older citizens from uncertainty” (St. John, 2001, p. 1291). The stability matter can be 
true, as the level of NZS provision is linked to the growth of Average Weekly Earnings 
(AWE).40 This suggests that the level of provision will not be eroded over time due to 
                                                          
40 See section 1.4.1.1 for the NZS weekly provision information. 
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inflation, if the wage growth is in accordance to inflation levels. The issue of adequacy, 
on the other hand, can be of greater debate.41  
The universal nature of NZ’s public pension provision strengthens its ability to 
“moderate income inequality” (St. John, 2001, p. 1291).42 The NZS does not discriminate 
against individuals based on income or assets (the lack of means testing), tax 
contributions during their working life (this is in contrast to UK’s number of contribution 
years) and gender.43 The absence of a link between work and income during one’s 
working life and NZS eligibility reinforces women’s inclusion rate. A vast literature 
suggests gender differences in wages and also that women typically work fewer hours in 
paid work than their male counterparts (Blau and Kahn, 1992, 1996, 2000; Loprest, 
1992). If public pensions were based on income and contribution years, then there would 
be higher exclusion rates of women eligible for a public pension (St. John, 2001). With 
one of the highest coverage rates among OECD countries (OECD, 2015), NZS allows all 
New Zealanders of retirement age to have access to basic pension provision. 
New Zealanders are at risk of old-age poverty if they do not have additional wealth 
for consumption in retirement other than their NZ superannuation (OECD, 2015).44 The 
Life-Cycle theory suggests that people put aside savings during their working age for 
days of unanticipated change in income, such as unemployment, and for anticipated 
income change in retirement (Coleman, 1998). Retirement is perceived as an expected 
income shock, and individuals are assumed to anticipate that they will leave the work 
force. Retired individuals can sustain their consumption from their savings and 
accumulated wealth if they do not choose to continue to work past retirement age. New 
                                                          
41 See section 1.4.1.1.1 for OECD coverage of pension in NZ. 
42 See section 1.4.1.1 for the NZS universal cover information. 
43 From https://www.gov.uk/state-pension 




Zealanders with lower public pension provision are expected to take on greater 
responsibility to accumulate wealth on their own volition with the absence of a 
mandatory contributory retirement savings in place.  
2.2.2.2. KiwiSaver 
KiwiSaver, a voluntary contribution retirement savings scheme established in 
2007, is the only government-backed scheme to provide additional retirement support for 
New Zealanders.45 In recent years, there has been a growing ‘paradigm shift’ from public 
pension reliance to more self-sufficient citizens among developed countries, such as the 
UK and Australia (Zelinsky, 2004). The UK and Australian governments have been 
cutting back public pension provision, but to maintain retirees’ welfare, there have been 
policies towards mandatory saving for retirement that can be withdrawn as pensions or 
partial lump sums. Gustman et al. (1994) suggest employees would benefit from pension 
plans by tax savings, avoiding longevity problems and maintaining retirement welfare 
and a pension’s economics of scale (pooling of pension funds), which would be more 
cost efficient than individual investments. They suggest that there are many benefits of 
saving for retirement into a pooled fund and rational individuals are likely to do so. 
KiwiSaver, too, can benefit from fund pooling; however, there are some concerns with 
KiwiSaver policies.46 The flexibility KiwiSaver offers creates greater pressure on 
individuals to plan and manage their savings in order to avoid the risk of longevity and 
outliving their asset.  
2.2.2.3. Financial Adequacy in Retirement Among New Zealanders 
The majority of the literature suggests that New Zealanders’ retirement wealth is 
adequate in providing means for maintaining consumption after retirement (Engen,  et 
                                                          
45 See section 1.4.1.2 for information on KiwiSaver. 
46 See section 2.2.2.2 for limitations of KiwiSaver. 
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al., 2005; Law and Scobie, 2014; Le et al., 2012; Le, et al., 2009; Scobie et al., 2004; 
Scobie and Henderson, 2009). The literature that finds sufficient adequacy levels of 
wealth uses measures of the total value of wealth at retirement, life expectancy levels and 
a measure for an ‘adequate’ level of income in retirement. These studies assume that all 
New Zealanders will run down or liquidate all their asset value as a means to provide 
retirement income. They conclude that New Zealanders are adequately prepared for 
retirement in terms of retirement wealth values. The method applied in the literature looks 
at retirement wealth as a whole, regardless of the difference in liquidity levels of each 
asset type. Furthermore, the assumption held by the studies that retirees will liquidate 
their entire asset to provide means for retirement income is questionable, given that 
retirees are reluctant to liquidate their homes (Moore and Mitchell, 1997; Poterba et al., 
2011; Telyukova and Nakajima, 2011; Venti and Wise, 1989, 2004).  
Contrary findings by Enright and Scobie (2010) propose that New Zealanders 
over 65 are “asset rich but cash poor”. Their study finds that New Zealanders are not 
adequately financially prepared for retirement. Even with the inclusion of KiwiSaver 
projections, MacDonald et al. (2012) also suggest that New Zealanders are not adequately 
prepared financially for retirement. Their findings are similar to Moore and Mitchell 
(1997) in the case of the United States. Enright and Scobie (2010) point out the problem 
of significant retirement income drops and how assets are not “run down” fast enough. 
This study supports the concern that different asset types that contribute to retirement 
wealth may or may not play a significant role in providing retirement income for retirees. 
As previously mentioned, the majority of the literature assumes that all of the 
accumulated retirement wealth is liquidated to provide a stream of retirement income 
(Engen et al., 2005; Law and Scobie, 2014; Le et al., 2012; Le et al., 2009; Scobie et al., 
2004; Scobie and Henderson, 2009).  
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Le et al. (2009) support findings of inadequacy suggested by Enright and Scobie 
(2010). They propose that only one-eighth to one-third of individuals of pre-retirement 
age are saving inadequately for retirement, if including all asset types except residential 
housing and household items. Their exclusion of housing may shed light on the argument 
of individuals’ reluctance to liquidate housing (Moore and Mitchell, 1997; Poterba et al., 
2011; Telyukova and Nakajima, 2011; Venti and Wise, 1989, 2004), but full exclusion 
of housing also undermines the role housing plays in retirement. Total accumulated 
wealth during an individual’s working life can potentially be liquidated to provide 
additional support in retirement to improve wellbeing. However, as Enright and Scobie 
(2010) have pointed out, individuals may not liquidate their assets in ways that the 
majority of the literature suggests.  
There are two main reasons for the asset liquidation differences. First, the different 
liquidity levels that each asset type has in comparison with each other. For example, cash 
deposits are considered very liquid compared with less liquid assets, such as stocks or 
bonds. This notion is also supported by Moore and Mitchell (1997), who point out that 
in reality there are liquidity constraints that cause the problem of not having immediate 
resources available for consumption. For example, housing, the highest wealth 
contributor to individuals in all countries (Poterba et al., 2011), may not necessarily be 
liquidated to provide additional retirement income unless there are extreme shocks, such 
as health shocks or spousal deaths (Moore and Mitchell, 1997; Poterba et al., 2011; 
Telyukova and Nakajima, 2011; Venti and Wise, 1989, 2004). The unlikelihood of 
housing liquidation is also supported by Moore and Mitchell (1997) in the case of the 




Second, due to precautionary motives, individuals run down assets at a slower rate 
than suggested in the adequacy literature. Using a data set from the United States, 
Benartzi et al. (2011) note that retirees draw only 2% yearly from their assets to provide 
additional support for retirement income, and this suggests that retirees actually draw 
down their assets at a slower rate than is assumed by the literature on adequacy. This 
finding is similar to that of De Nardi et al. (2009), who also propose that the reason for a 
slower drawdown rate is due to precautionary measures for medical expenses and life 
span uncertainty. Conversely, Poterba et al. (2011) propose that income cohorts consume 
their wealth at different rates, with the richer being more conservative and slower in 
liquidating their assets than the lower-income cohort. The Life-Cycle theory states that 
individuals take precautionary actions to protect themselves from unanticipated losses. 
The major events that most retirees prepare for financially the most are health shocks, 
death of spouses and preparation for retirement homes (Poterba et al., 2011; Telyukova 
and Nakajima, 2011). This implies that, although individuals can run down their assets 
to provide adequate financial support to maintain their consumption, they may choose 
not to do so for precautionary reasons. This notion contrasts with the assumptions in the 
majority of the retirement wealth adequacy literature.  
Findings on financial adequacy in other countries also suggest that retirees’ wealth 
is not adequate for retirement. Assessing Singapore’s Singaporean Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) and housing programs, McCarthy et al. (2002) find that Singaporeans are 
‘asset rich but cash poor’. Poor liquidity of their assets suggests “they are vulnerable to 
inadequate income in old age” (McCarthy et al. 2002, p. 212).  Evidence from East Asia 
documents the pressure to sell housing assets is greatest for those with the least housing 
wealth, leaving them far less to draw upon in the future (Ronald and Doling, 2012).  
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2.2.3. Variability in Financial Adequacy Findings 
Several reasons have been proposed for the variation in findings on financial 
adequacy in retirement. First, the range of methods used, which is often in response to 
the information needs of a variety of stakeholders (Aguiar and Hurst, 2013). Employers, 
policymakers and the financial service industry demand a ‘one-size-fits-all’ evaluation 
on financial adequacy that disregards individual characteristics and preferences 
(Bajtelsmit et al., 2013). Second, financial planners and individuals expect their personal 
preferences, risk assessments and circumstances to be considered (Bajtelsmit et al., 
2013). The most common measure of adequacy is the replacement rate ratio (Benartzi, 
2012; Binswanger and Schunk, 2012; Crawford and O'Dea, 2012; Scholz and Seshadri, 
2009) because it is easily applied as an average assessment and is comparable across 
countries. However, the ratio has been criticised for its lack of concern for household 
heterogeneity (Bajtelsmit et al., 2013). Much of the housing literature has ignored the 
equity implications of a greater reliance on more asset-based welfare (Yates and 
Bradbury, 2010). This study adopts the replacement rate method as a baseline measure 
of financial adequacy. However, the chapter calculates two other financial adequacy 
measures labelled the PL and Relative Adequacy (RA) to address problems associated 
with replacement rate ratios (Jefferson, 2009).   
Choices concerning income and wealth inclusion in financial adequacy measures 
also cause results variability (Aguiar and Hurst, 2013). Most prior studies include all 
asset classes owned by individuals other than household items (Baldwin, 2012; Crawford 
and O'Dea, 2016; Knoef et al., 2016; Le et al., 2009), treating all assets as equally liquid. 
In contrast, De Nardi et al. (2009), Telyukova and Nakajima (2011) and Venti and Wise 
(2004) argue that housing assets are only liquidated in extreme cases, implying that 
individuals have an asset liquidation preference or pecking order. This study contributes 
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to the existing literature by examining asset liquidity in providing a source of retirement 
income and an asset pecking order. The liquidity concept is one explanation of why 
different asset class inclusion (or exclusion) results in inconsistent financial adequacy 
findings (Aguiar and Hurst, 2013). 
Poterba (2015) suggests that the variability of financial adequacy findings is due 
to the heterogeneity of household circumstances. Housing liquidation and living 
arrangements are two factors that contribute to this heterogeneity.47 Poterba (2015) notes 
that financial adequacy studies use simplifying assumptions because accounting for all 
heterogeneity nationally and between countries is difficult. Housing liquidation is 
commonly adopted in most studies (Baldwin et al., 2012; Crawford and O'Dea, 2016; 
Knoef et al., 2016; Munnell and Soto, 2005).   
2.3. Residential Housing Liquidity  
Much of the literature on retirement wealth has included housing wealth when 
assessing adequacy levels of saving for retirement. The literature presents cases of the 
inclusion of housing wealth as part of retirement wealth to support retirement income in 
the case of the US (Engen et al., 2000; Engen et al., 2005; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007) 
and Singapore (McCarthy et al., 2002). The literature also presents the approach for NZ 
(Bascand et al., 2006; Enright and Scobie, 2010; Law and Scobie, 2014; Le et al., 2012; 
Le et al., 2009; Scobie et al., 2004; Scobie and Henderson, 2009; Scobie et al., 2006).  
Engen et al. (2000) suggest reasons housing wealth is treated the same way as any 
other retirement wealth in the US. First, housing wealth may be consumed after the 
consumption of other assets due to illiquidity and policies that support housing tax 
                                                          
47 The other 11 reasons for heterogeneity are life expectancy, health levels of retirees, retirement timing, 
lifestyle choice in retirement, inter-generational support, bequest motives, private pension benefits, 
financial net worth, public pension benefits, health insurance and health care in retirement, financing long-
term care and living arrangements (Poterba, 2015).  
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incentives. This suggests that although housing may not be the first to be consumed, 
especially in the early years of retirement, eventually it will be consumed in the same 
way as other retirement wealth. Second, housing was a highly profitable investment up 
until the 1980s in the US before it started to slow down in the 1990s. Third, the prediction 
of preference towards precautionary stock of wealth. Different generations observe 
different preferences in holding a precautionary stock of wealth. Housing’s popularity as 
an investment option may change in the future, but its exclusion is overly pessimistic due 
to rising house prices worldwide (OECD, 2020). Fourth, housing provides consumption 
services and is considered part of wealth, also referred to as the “duality function” (Yao 
and Zhang, 2005). Failure to consider housing in the determination of retirement wealth 
suggests that two identical households would be equally well-off in retirement, even 
though one owns a house and the other pays rent. While housing liquidation provides 
retirement income, housing assets still provide a form of return investment in the form 
of services and rent avoidance (or imputed rent). Engen et al. (2000), however, propose 
that not all of the value of housing equity is available for liquidation to provide additional 
support for retirement due to the transaction costs of selling a house. 
In the context of NZ, applicable reasons are (i) the eventuality of consumption of 
housing wealth, (ii) the difficulty in estimating precautionary stock preference levels, (iii) 
the absence of a capital gains tax and (iv) the matter of housing as a provider of 
consumption services. However, NZ has yet to experience falling housing prices. It is 
still experiencing rising housing prices that may encourage individuals to hold on to 
existing housing assets or to invest further in the housing market.48 This suggests that 
                                                          
48 OECD (2020) findings from comparing nominal house price changes from 1999–2018 of Australia, 
Canada, China, NZ, the United Kingdom and the United States suggest that NZ and house prices caught 
up with other countries in 2004, and went above most countries (except the United Kingdom) in 2004-
2008 and from 2015 onwards (except for China and Canada). The mortgage rates in NZ have been falling 
since 2015 (Reserve Bank NZ, 2020) and they do not contribute to housing unaffordability in NZ. 
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housing equity should be included as part of retirement wealth, but the liquidation of 
housing may not occur until later in retirement or in the event of drastic changes. The 
exclusion of housing assets would offer results that are comparable with findings using 
the flow approach49 (Scobie and Henderson, 2009). However, the full exclusion of 
housing wealth generates results that may not be relevant in a real-world context because 
of the exclusion of precautionary wealth stock (Engen et al., 2000) and no uncertainties 
in health, as housing is liquidated in extreme events of spousal deaths and health shocks 
(Moore and Mitchell, 1997; Poterba et al., 2011; Telyukova and Nakajima, 2011; Venti 
and Wise, 1989, 2004). Thus, the full exclusion of housing wealth from retirement wealth 
is not possible.  
Despite the arguments by Engen et al. (2000) and Poterba (2015) for housing 
liquidation heterogeneity, most retirement financial adequacy studies apply a simplified 
housing liquidation treatment.50 This treatment ignores individuals who choose not to 
leave their homes (Venti and Wise, 2004) and usually only liquidate their homes when 
faced with extreme circumstances, such as spousal deaths, rapid decline of health or 
moving to a rest home (De Nardi et al., 2009; Telyukova and Nakajima, 2011). Housing 
liquidation is often simplified due to the difficulty of estimating different liquidation 
scenarios because of personal preference and the range of financial products available 
for housing equity withdrawal (Engen et al., 2000).  
The majority of the literature on adequacy levels in retirement that has included 
housing as part of retirement wealth has not taken into account liquidity levels and timing 
of liquidation of housing assets (Gibson et al., 2010; Le et al., 2012; Le et al., 2009; 
Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; McCarthy et al., 2002; Moore and Mitchell, 1997; Scobie et 
                                                          
49 The flow approach is when savings is measured as the difference between income and consumption 
expenditure (Scobie and Henderson, 2009). 
50 Baldwin et al., (2012); Crawford and O'Dea, (2016); Knoef et al., (2016); Munnell and Soto, (2005). 
45 
 
al., 2004; Scobie and Henderson, 2009). The exclusion of liquidity levels and timing of 
liquidation assumes that housing wealth will be run down and consumed in the exact 
same way as any other retirement assets. These assumptions are not supported by the 
notion that housing equity is not liquidated to provide support for general non-housing 
consumption needs, as is the case for other asset types (Venti and Wise, 2004). The 
treatment of housing wealth liquidity in the same way as liquidating other retirement 
asset types indicates an overestimation of adequacy levels among retirees.  There is 
support in the literature for the possibility of partial housing wealth liquidation by 
simulating proportional liquidation ranging from zero to 50%, as well as full liquidation. 
Under this scenario, adequacy levels are assessed relative to each liquidation option 
(Engen et al., 2000; Gustman et al., 1994). Results from partial housing liquidation are 
more relevant in the real-world context, as most individuals have access to a diversity of 
housing liquidation choices. The option to borrow against housing equity implies partial 
liquidation of home values. 
2.3.1. Differentiating Residential Housing and Investment Properties 
The academic literature needs to differentiate the effects of liquidity and timing 
of liquidation between residential housing and investment properties. However, the 
majority of retirement adequacy research has treated residential housing as being similar 
to investment property and liquidated like other retirement assets (Engelhardt and 
Kumar, 2011; Gibson et al., 2010; Le et al., 2012; Le et al., 2009; Lusardi and Mitchell, 
2007; Moore and Mitchell, 1997; Munnell and Soto, 2005; Scobie and Henderson, 2009; 
Scobie et al., 2006). Some studies suggest that residential housing should be treated 
differently to investment properties (Engen et al., 2000; Engen et al., 2005; Poterba et 
al., 2011; Venti and Wise, 1989, 2004). Previous research proposes that the option of 
housing liquidation later in retirement or due to extreme events, such as health shocks 
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and spousal deaths (Moore and Mitchell, 1997; Poterba et al., 2011; Telyukova and 
Nakajima, 2011; Venti and Wise, 1989, 2004), should only apply to residential housing 
and not to investment properties. Specifically, the liquidation of secondary properties 
does not affect retiree living arrangements. 
The main contribution of this chapter is to measure household heterogeneity using 
different housing liquidation options and investigating their impact on retirement 
financial adequacy. The amount of retirement wealth varies according to the residential 
housing liquidation scenario as outlined below. 
2.3.2. Full Liquidation of Residential Homes (Selling Outright)  
Full liquidation refers to the selling of residential homes outright. Homeowners 
either then i) move to a rental or ii) live with their adult child’s home. Of the five 
alternatives discussed here,51 full liquidation provides the highest wealth available in 
retirement with the total value of house sale. Full liquidation is also the most common 
method applied by previous studies.52 However, in the event that the homeowner 
subsequently becomes a renter, it may be the worst possible option.53  
2.3.3. Downsizing  
Downsizing refers to moving to a smaller home or to a less expensive location. It 
releases a homeowner’s equity equal to the difference between the value of the old and 
the new lower-value home. The main benefit of downsizing compared with selling the 
home outright or obtaining a reverse mortgage is that homeowners still maintain some of 
their housing wealth for bequest opportunities or as precautionary stock, as well as 
                                                          
51 The five alternative scenarios are i) sell and live with family, ii) sell and move to a rental, iii) downsize 
and stay in the same region, iv) downsize and move to a cheaper region and v) take up a reverse mortgage.  
52 Gibson et al., (2010); Le et al., (2012); Le et al., (2009); Lusardi and Mitchell, (2007); McCarthy et al., 
(2002); Moore and Mitchell, (1997); Scobie et al., (2004); Scobie and Henderson, (2009). 




benefiting from imputed rent. This chapter only analyses downsizing as a source of 
retirement wealth, and does not consider the readiness of older individuals to leave their 
homes or move to other cheaper residences, as suggested by Poterba (2015). This chapter 
uses the term downsizing to refer to selling a house and moving to a house of regional 
median value or moving to a region with a cheaper regional median value.54 
2.3.4. Reverse Mortgage and Reversionary Home Loan55 
Johnson et al. (2015) define a reverse mortgage as a form of equity release from 
one’s home. It allows homeowners to remain in their own homes and receive a fraction 
of their home’s equity in the form of a loan.56 The size of the fraction depends on the 
financial institution’s policy and the terms of agreement between homeowners and 
financial institutions. Homeowners can receive monthly payments for a specified period 
or over their lifetime or a lump sum payment. Engen et al. (2000) incorporate different 
housing liquidation options by applying partial housing equity liquidation through 
reverse mortgages of 0%, 50% and 100% in their assessment of financial adequacy.  
2.4. Imputed Rent 
Imputed rent is the financial return a homeowner receives from owning a house 
in the form of the opportunity cost of not paying rent. Imputed rent inclusion in financial 
adequacy assessment is important because most retirees have their wealth in homes 
                                                          
54 Saville-Smith et al. (2016) conducted a survey in NZ and find that 23% of movers among the older 
occupiers purposely seek to release equity from their move. Large proportions of those seeking to release 
equity make less than $50,000 from the transaction. In a different survey by Britannia financial services of 
2,200 people, they find that the average outcome of downsizing their homes only gave them 3.3 years 
(Britannia, 2018). There is potential for downsizing but with newer and better-quality homes becoming 
more expensive relative to their size, if retirees wish to downsize from their larger older homes to a smaller 
better-quality or newer-built home that would require less maintenance and care, then downsizing to a 
house of value lower than the regional median may not be beneficial for their wellbeing in the long term. 
55 The Commission for Financial Capability (CFFC) NZ states that home reversion is a form of home 
equity release. Unlike a reverse mortgage where an interest-bearing loan is taken on housing asset, a 
reversion home loan involves ownership rights to the fund provider but allows the seller to occupy the 
house for life (sometimes paying rent). 
56 The home is used as collateral and ownership transfers to the financial institution at the end of the 
specified period or at the end of the borrower’s lifetime. 
48 
 
(Engen et al., 2000) and to disregard it understates total income. Imputed rent can be 
classified similarly to any other return on investment, such as dividends and bond interest 
(Munnell and Soto, 2005; Venti and Wise, 2004). However, previous studies have 
ignored imputed rent because rent values are property and region specific and affected 
by perceptions and expectations of the homeowners (Munnell and Soto, 2005). This study 
includes imputed rent estimated from average regional rental values, reducing income 
undervaluation.  
2.5. The Case of NZ 
“NZ and Ireland are the only two countries in the OECD that do not have 
contributory or compulsory state retirement schemes and extensive state involvement in 
private superannuation arrangements” (Marriott, 2009, p. 479). NZ offers a basic non-
means-tested state pension, the NZ Superannuation (NZS),57 and a voluntary 
contributory retirement savings scheme, KiwiSaver.58 The lack of a compulsory saving 
scheme in NZ, as well as minimal incentives to invest in retirement savings and limited 
provision from the state pension, puts greater pressure on individual savings and 
planning.  
NZ adopts ‘a tax neutrality’ policy where there are no tax incentives for different 
investment types (St John, 2007, p. 532).59 NZ’s lack of a retirement saving tax incentive 
makes retirement saving a less attractive investment option (Whitehouse, 1999). Also, 
compared with countries such as the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, 
the financial market for investment products and annuities is much smaller. Further, the 
uptake of annuities by New Zealanders is limited.  
                                                          
57 See section 1.4.1.1 for NZS information. 
58 See section 1.4.1.2 for KiwiSaver information. 
59 See section 1.4.2 for NZ’s taxation system information. 
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Currently, house price increases in NZ are greater than anywhere else in the world 
(The Economist, 2017). Government’s decision to not levy capital gains taxes on 
residential homes whilst taxing retirement savings funds (Inland Revenue Department, 
2017) has contributed to housing price increases and to high levels of individual wealth 
investment in property compared with other investments (Coleman, 1998; Gibson et al., 
2010; Le et al., 2012; Le et al., 2009; Scobie et al., 2006). “At present 70% of NZ’s 
750,000 over-65s own their own home” (Martin, 2018, p.24)60 but younger New 
Zealanders are finding it increasingly difficult to get into the housing market. There are 
ethnic differences in home ownership levels in the general population – 57% for Pākehā, 
35% for Asian, 28% for Māori and 19% for Pacific Islanders – and Married/Partnered 
individuals have much higher levels of home ownership (67% and 75%, respectively) 
than those not partnered/never partnered (26% and 12%, respectively) (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2014).61 Home ownership relates to income levels. Data from the 2013 census 
show that Māori and Pacific Island median personal income levels were $6,000 and 
$8,800, respectively, lower than the national median income of $28,500. Data from the 
Household Economic Survey for 2013 for equivalent disposable household income 
reports that 33% of Pākehā are in the bottom two income quintiles.62 This compares with 
54% of Māori and 62% of Pacific people.63 Research also documents a gender pay gap, 
based on mean average hourly earnings, of 13% over the sample period (Dixon, 2003; 
Pacheo et al., 2017). 
                                                          
60 Martin, R (2018) Warnings of coming housing crisis for the over-65 bracket, Otago Daily Times, 7 
August, p.24. Stated by Retirement Commissioner Diane Maxwell. 
61 http://archive.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/quickstats-about-
housing/home-ownership-individuals.aspx. 
62 See page 28 of the Household Economic Survey 
http://archive.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_and_communities/Households/HouseholdNetWorth
Statistics_HOTPYeJun15/Tables.aspx. 
63 Real equivalent median household income in 2013 was $38,500 (Pākehā), $28,500 (Māori) and 
$27,500 (Pacific).  
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Financial adequacy in retirement also relates to the length of the time the 
individual is retired, and in NZ this varies by gender and ethnicity. The life expectancy 
for Māori males and females is 73 and 77.1 years, respectively. This compares to 80.3 
and 83.9 years for non-Māori men and women, respectively.64 Pacific males’ and 
females’ life expectancies are 74.5 and 78.8 years, respectively.65 
2.6. Research Motivation and Research Questions 
The reasons outlined above make NZ an ideal country for an assessment of 
financial adequacy. New Zealanders appear more vulnerable to inadequate financial 
reserves for retirement due to the low level of coverage from the NZS (OECD, 2015); 
the lack of compulsory saving and retirement saving incentives; the favourable effect on 
housing acquisition due to taxation policies and rising house prices, resulting in falling 
house affordability for future generations; and the identification of potentially vulnerable 
groups by gender, ethnicity and low income. This study focuses on the role of residential 
housing for retirement security. By proposing alternative means of releasing equity from 
housing, the study presents findings on retirement financial adequacy that accounts for 
heterogeneity in housing liquidation preferences to answer the following research 
questions: 
Are older New Zealanders financially adequate in retirement? 
What is the role of housing assets in retiree wealth? 
Does housing liquidation improve financial adequacy? 
What housing liquidation options are preferable to improve financial adequacy?  
                                                          
64 https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/new-zealand-period-life-tables-2012-14. 
65 SoFIE does have a set of questions on health habits that may affect life expectancy. This chapter uses 
only gender- and ethnicity-based life expectancy because the focus of the paper is the role of housing and 
various possible housing tenure options to support retirement funding. Unobserved information on life 
expectancy may affect the findings of this chapter. Future studies may include other considerations for life 
expectancy measurements and health habits as examples of a best- or worst-case scenario. 
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Which housing liquidation option is least preferred? 
Who are more vulnerable to financial inadequacy in retirement? 
2.7. Methodology and Data 
2.7.1. Data 
The primary data source is the panel dataset SoFIE, collected by Statistics NZ in 
eight waves from 2002 to 2009. SoFIE captures information on income and wealth types 
at the household and individual levels, as well as information on employment, health, 
family composition and other demographic factors. The survey initially consisted of 
26,339 individuals from 12,244 households representing 3,771,864 New Zealanders in 
2002. The retention rate of 75% between SoFIE waves means individuals’ information 
can be traced over several years. 
The sample consists of 1,341 individuals with 2,552 observations representing 
16,856 weighted observations. Individuals who reach the retirement age of 65 between 
the years 2002 and 2008 are selected for the study. In order to measure financial adequacy 
using the replacement rate, sample participants must make at least one pre-retirement 
income disclosure and at least one post-retirement income and/or asset disclosure.66 Pre-
retirement income is measured as the average of inflation-adjusted reported income. 
Individuals with reported annual post-retirement income of below $10,000 and pre-
retirement income below $1,000 are also removed to minimise bias in the findings from 
                                                          
66 Due to the eight-year window of SoFIE, individuals of age 73 or older will not have information on their 
pre-retirement income. Information on income is available yearly but data on wealth are present in even-
numbered waves (2, 4, 6 and 8). Personal income in SoFIE includes employment income and non -




underreported income.67 Wealth is divided into nine categories based on liquidity 
levels.68 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The chapter uses life expectancy numbers from Statistics NZ in the year 2002 
based on gender and ethnicity.69,70 The sample design measures financial adequacy using 
the income replacement rate, the PL and the relative replacement rate. 
The study uses median rent information from the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment for imputed rent and rental price. Growth rates for housing value and 
other asset types during 2002–2009 are estimated from changes in the Housing Price 
Index (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2016) and the Consumer Price Index (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2016), respectively. Median regional house price data are sourced from 
the Real Estate Institute NZ, 2002–2009. 
The study splits the sample into three subsamples: Singles, Married/Partnered 
(both individuals in a couple are survey participants), and Divorced/Widowed. 
Consistent with the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 1C, 1M,71 assets for the married 
or partnered subsample are allocated equally between the two individuals.72 Limitations 
                                                          
67 The dropped sample with reported pre-retirement income below $1,000 is less than 10 each (less than 
1% and 4.9%) for Married/Partnered and Single, respectively. The dropped sample with reported post -
retirement income below $10,000 is 57 and 9 (7% and 8%) for Married/Partnered and Single, respectively. 
The minimum universal NZS provision is above $15,000 so reports of post -retirement income of below 
$10,000 would suggest inaccurate reporting. Reported pre-retirement income below $1,000 is dropped due 
to inaccurate reporting because the lowest net unemployment benefit in 2013 provision is $137.47 or an 
annual equivalent of at least $7,600. These low reported figures may be due to unwillingness to report 
income accurately. 
68 Liquidity level is defined as the easiness to convert to cash in terms of timing and likelihood of 
liquidation. 
69 Pākehā/Asian, Māori and Pacific Island. 
70 SoFIE does have a set of questions on health habits that may affect life expectancy. This chapter uses 
only gender- and ethnicity-based life expectancy because the focus of the paper is the role of housing and 
various possible housing tenure options to support retirement funding. Unobserved information on life 
expectancy may affect the findings of this chapter. Future studies may include other considerations for life 
expectancy measurements and health habits as examples of a best- or worst-case scenario. 
71 NZ law recognises equal contributions of both partners to their relationship and that in the event of break-
up, divorce or death assets are equally distributed between individuals.  
72 Adequacy rates for Singles cannot be directly compared with married or partnered individuals because 
the study does not account for the economies of scale and scope that lower living expenses for couples 
achieve. The consideration for this assumption is to account for potential future union dissolution or 
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in the SoFIE dataset (Le et al., 2009) require that the value of a house is split evenly 
amongst the number of owners after subtracting the mortgage from the house value. 
2.7.2. Methodology 
2.7.2.1. Measurement of Financial Adequacy 
2.7.2.1.1. Income Replacement Rates  
Income replacement rate method is defined as follows.73   
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥
𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥
∗ 100% 
In order to measure post-retirement income, the chapter applies the concept of 
“potential income” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 6). Baldwin argues for the inclusion of 
potential income from wealth in assessing financial adequacy because individuals have 
the power to convert their assets to cash or more liquid investments to provide retirement 
income.74 
The replacement rate method is simple and is best suited to measure adequacy 
levels at the national level (Bajtelsmit et al., 2013). Limitations of the SoFIE database 
(e.g. no household expenditure data) preclude the use of the alternative consumption 
method, which some authors argue is a more valid method because of changes in lifestyle 
and budgeting in retirement. Munnell and Soto (2005) note that retirees may require less 
than their full pre-retirement income to achieve a similar standard of living in retirement 
because post-retirement income is taxed at a lower rate, retirees have less need to save 
and have no work-related expenses. The income replacement rate posits an acceptable 
                                                          
widowhood by applying NZ’s equal asset split, and that individuals in a couple are treated as any other 
individual. The equal split assumption is a more conservative approach to financial adequacy of individuals 
in a couple. The findings only reflect the issue on longevity difference between genders in a couple. This 
is a limitation of the chapter and of the published paper that is acknowledged. 
73 This method has been adopted in previous studies (Benartzi, 2012; Binswanger and Schunk, 2012; 
Crawford and O'Dea, 2012; Scholz and Seshadri, 2009). 
74 Baldwin et al. (2012) define potential income as the income available from the selling of assets and 
converting them to a stream of income. 
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drop in post-retirement income compared with pre-retirement without neglecting 
maintenance of living standards. Bequest motives also contribute to individual asset 
accumulation in retirement.75  
Generally accepted income replacement rates range between 65% and 85% 
(Binswanger and Schunk, 2012). Crawford and O'Dea (2016) report that individuals 
living in the United Kingdom with pre-retirement incomes of £40,000 are financially 
adequate with a 50% replacement rate. However, an individual with income of £10,000 
must have a replacement rate of 80% to be financially adequate in retirement. There is 
no ‘one-size-fits-all’ replacement rate. Crawford and O’Dea (2016) claim that different 
income levels are financially adequate at different income replacement rates.  
Adequacy measured as a 70% income Replacement Rate (70RR) is also 
reported.76 In the 70RR method, individuals that achieve the minimum 70% replacement 
rate are deemed financially adequate, and those below the 70% mark are considered 
financially inadequate. The 70RR method is a measure of adequacy based on each 
individual’s pre-retirement income as a standard to maintain. 
2.7.2.1.2. Poverty Line 
The chapter uses the PL as defined by the OECD77 as a measure of adequacy in 
retirement. The PL is calculated as half of the median income for each year of the sample, 
respectively. The PL focuses on a general minimum wellbeing requirement, whereas the 
income replacement rate measures adequacy as an individual-subjective requirement. 
Individuals who have income above the PL are deemed to have adequate income to fulfil 
                                                          
75 Following Hurd (1987), bequests are treated as unintentional in this study. 
76 A replacement rate of 80% is common for studies based in the United States (Binswanger and Schunk, 
2012). The chapter has conducted robustness tests using 60% and 80% replacement rates and find that the 




a minimal standard of living in OECD standards. The PL method is a measure of 
adequacy based on a minimal standardised benchmark comparable between countries. 
2.7.2.1.3. Relative Adequacy 
The chapter also applies a ‘no-one-size-fits-all’ concept suggested by Crawford 
and O’Dea (2016). The relative adequacy (RA) approach refers to achievement of a 
certain proportion of pre-retirement income based on population quartile. An individual 
whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount 
post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement income between the 25th and 75th 
percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; and an individual whose 
pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount post-
retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy 
requirement. This method complements the 70RR and the PL method. RA mitigates 
issues from the 70RR method that do not account for a range of income replacement 
requirements across different income groups. RA also considers the issue from the PL 
method of having too low of an adequate standard for someone in the middle- and upper-
income groups. 
2.7.2.2. Wealth Estimation   
Individuals’ wealth is estimated using inflation-adjusted self-reported values of 
asset types from SoFIE. Asset liquidity and the likelihood of liquidation to provide 
retirement income are both used to categorise assets. The classification from most to least 
liquid is (i) current assets (cash and bank balance); (ii) financial assets; (iii) investment 
property; (iv) inheritance, collectible art, non-NZ superannuation (NZS) pension, 
insurance; (v) vehicles and sporting goods; (vi) household items and other illiquid assets; 
(vii) residential housing; (viii) business investments; and (ix) assets held in trust. The 
accumulated wealth to be annuitized is separated into non-housing wealth, investment 
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housing and residential housing wealth. Non-housing wealth includes (i) current assets 
(cash and bank balance); (ii) financial assets; (iii) investment property; and (iv) 
inheritance, collectible art, non-NZ superannuation (NZS) pension, insurance. 
Household items, illiquid assets, vehicles and sporting goods are excluded due to their 
unlikelihood of liquidation.  Business investments and assets are separated from personal 
wealth. 
2.7.2.3. Wealth Annuitisation  
Most studies on financial adequacy apply the potential income concept in the form 
of annuitisation (Baldwin et al., 2012; Crawford and O'Dea, 2012; Engen et al., 2000; 
Knoef et al., 2016; Le et al., 2009; Munnell and Soto, 2005). The estimates ignore 
transaction costs and the higher interest rates used in annuitisation given the small size 
of the annuity market in NZ.78  
Income from wealth annuitisation is classified as (i) the annuitisation of non-
housing wealth or (ii) the annuitisation of investment housing or (iii) the annuitisation of 
residential housing. Non-housing wealth is given by the sum of current assets, financial 
assets, inheritance, collectible art, non-NZS pension and insurance. Following previous 
studies, the chapter excludes household items (Baldwin et al., 2012; Crawford and O'Dea, 
2016; Knoef et al., 2016; Le et al., 2009; Munnell and Soto, 2005).79  Non-housing wealth 
and investment housing are fully annuitised according to the individual’s life expectancy 
based on gender and ethnicity. Available wealth for annuitisation from residential 
housing depends on five alternative options based upon full liquidation, downsizing and 
                                                          
78 The study has conducted a 10% transaction cost of the selling of a house as a robustness test and found 
that it does not change the findings. 
79 Less liquid assets, such as business investments and assets held in trust, are excluded because of the 
complexity and time-consuming nature of liquidating such assets. Vehicles are not included because 
retirees may use their vehicles for transportation. Similar to household goods, sporting goods are excluded 
because their value drops significantly when sold. 
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reverse mortgage.80 Annuitisation rates for non-housing wealth use NZ 10-year 
government bond rates, whereas investment and residential housing use annual rates 
derived from changes in the Housing Price Index and life expectancy to estimate 
individual annuities.  
The available wealth from the sale of a housing asset is the reported value of the 
residence.  This amount is halved when the house is owned by couples. The wealth 
generated by downsizing is the difference between the sale of an existing house and the 
purchase of a new house. Downsizing is only available for individuals whose house value 
exceeds the regional median, supporting a move to a house of median value. 
Wealth available from the reverse mortgage option is estimated at 25% of house 
value.81 This study applies the consensus of a maximum loan of 25% of the house value 
and sets the lowest house value threshold for possible borrowing among NZ banks or 
institutions to minimize the underestimation of income from a reverse mortgage 
(consumer.org.nz).82 
2.7.2.4. Income Estimation   
Pre-retirement income is measured as the inflation-adjusted average of reported 
before-tax annual income prior to retirement for up to five years prior to the retirement 
age of 65.83 The sample of individuals aged 65–72 includes at least one period of pre-
                                                          
80 The five liquidation options are selling and living with family, selling and moving to a rental, downsizing 
and staying in the same region, downsizing and moving to cheaper region and reverse mortgage.  
81 25% is based on the information gathered by the author for NZ banks and institutions that offer reverse 
mortgages from consumer.org.nz. 
82 Access date 26/04/2019. 
83 This chapter has not accounted for early retirees due to data limitations. Using data from the Linked 
Employer-Employee Dataset (LEED) on New Zealanders aged in their 60s between 1999 and 2007, Dixon 
and Hyslop (2008) find that those who leave employment early were disproportionately drawn from the 
poorest and richest wealth quintiles (Dixon & Hyslop, 2008). They find that the total employment rate fell 
from 69% to 49% for males and from 48% to 30% for females when age increases from 60 to 65. They 
show early retirement rate was 20% for employed males and 18% for employed females. Similar trends 
were found among the self-employed. The possibility of early retirement may have caused the findings in 
this chapter to be overoptimistic if individuals’ last employment income was not captured by the pre -
retirement income estimation of up to five years prior the retirement age 65. 
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retirement income reported within the years 2002–2009 for each individual. Following 
the four alternative measures for retirement income by Biggs and Springstead (2008), the 
chapter applies the average of inflation-adjusted earnings prior to retirement instead of 
wage-indexed earnings to ease comparison with post-retirement income, including 
income from asset liquidation. Lifetime earnings is not used due to limited data.  
2.7.2.5. Post-Retirement Income  
Post-retirement income is the sum of self-reported non-employment income, 
income from the annuitisation of non-housing wealth, investment housing and residential 
housing, all of which are sourced from SoFIE. Each year of post-retirement income is 
adjusted for inflation. The chapter accounts for falling health and mobility levels related 
with old age in retirement by excluding employment income in retirement to focus on 
accumulating wealth in working age and decumulating wealth in retirement, as suggested 
by the Life-Cycle theory (Modigliani, 1986). 
2.7.2.6. Imputed Rent 
Imputed rent is estimated using the median rent price for each region and is 
incorporated to capture the opportunity cost saved from home ownership. The estimation 
of imputed rent is proportionately adjusted for downsizing by the equity released. 
Individuals who downsize would benefit from imputed rent by the proportionate share of 
imputed rent based on the value their original home compared with the value of the 
regional median house. For example, individuals who downsize from a $500,000 to a 
$300,000 house (a reduction of $200,000, equivalent to a 40% change in the value of 
housing equity) would receive imputed rent of the value of 60% of their initial imputed 
rent from the original house.84 Imputed rent estimation does not include any housing 
                                                          
84 Due to data limitations, this chapter only uses regional median rent price to measure imputed rent. Future 
studies could include more accurate estimations of imputed rent, such as measures for housing services.  
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costs (e.g. property tax, insurance, maintenance), but a robustness test is conducted to 
account for some housing costs. 
2.8. Results 
2.8.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 2.2 displays the demographic information of the sample. There are slightly 
more women than men, most of the respondents are closer to age 65, Pākehā and Asian 
ethnicities outnumber Māori or Pacific Island, more respondents live in the North Island 
(particularly Auckland) than the South Island and the majority are partnered or married 
and Divorced/Widowed as the second greatest. 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
[Insert Figure 2.1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2.2 here] 
Figures 2.1–2.5 illustrate the mean distribution of retirement wealth across NZ by 
the demographic information (gender, age, ethnicity and geographic location). As shown 
in Figure 2.1, residential housing constitutes most of the wealth for individuals over 65, 
concurring with the findings of Coleman (1998), Gibson et al. (2010), Le et al. (2012), 
Le et al. (2009) and Scobie et al. (2006). There is also a significant amount of value held 
in less liquid assets.85 The median value of asset distribution in Figure 2.2 also shows the 
dominance of residential housing. Figure 2.2 points out how illiquid assets of business 
investments and assets in trusts and investment properties are owned by individuals in 
the highest-income quartile. While most studies assess financial adequacy using all asset 
classes except household items (e.g., Crawford and O'Dea, 2016), this chapter proposes 
                                                          
85 Household items and illiquid assets, business investment/assets and assets in trust. 
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that excluding less liquid asset types may result in a change in financial adequacy 
findings.  
The chapter compares the five housing scenarios and reports results for both the 
inclusion and exclusion of housing and applicable imputed rent, respectively. Figure 2.3 
shows that men have greater total wealth than women. However, this difference narrows 
when less liquid asset types are removed.86 Men also have more money invested in 
financial assets compared with women. Housing wealth is the largest contributor to 
retirement wealth across gender and age. 
[Insert Figure 2.3 here] 
[Insert Figure 2.4 here] 
Wealth distribution by ethnicity in Figure 2.4 shows that Pākehā and Asian ethnic 
groups accumulate the most retirement wealth. Although Māori average wealth is lower, 
Māori accumulate much greater wealth than the Pacific Island group. Figure 2.4 also 
shows that women generally have lower wealth than men. However, the gender 
difference for Pākehā and Asian is much lower than that of Māori or Pacific Island 
ethnicities. Comparing Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4, male dominance in less liquid asset 
ownership is predominantly from the Pākehā/Asian, Pākehā/ Māori and Asian/ Māori 
mixed ethnic groups. However, Māori and Pacific Island men own very few assets other 
than residential housing. 
Figure 2.5 displays regional differences in the level of retirement wealth and 
investment preference in NZ. Holdings of less liquid asset types are highest in Auckland, 
Waikato and Canterbury. Male financial investment wealth is also highest in Auckland, 
Waikato and Canterbury, and significantly lower in ‘Rest of North Island’ and 
Wellington. The wealth value variation of men across regions is much more distinct than 
                                                          
86 Business investment/assets and assets in trust. 
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that of women. Women show a generally equal distribution of wealth across regions, 
with housing as the main source of retirement wealth, except for lower values in ‘Rest of 
South Island’.87 
[Insert Figure 2.5 here] 
The split between female and male divorcees/widow(er)s are unequal. Females 
make up at least 70% of the Divorced/Widowed sample. The percentage of 
Divorced/Widowed is only less than 15% of the total of the male sample; meanwhile, it 
makes up 30% of the total female sample.  
2.8.2. Financial Adequacy Analysis  
The analysis dividing Single versus married/partnered and divorced/widowed is 
reported as a separate section. Singles are compared with married individuals whose 
partners are also in the sample. The chapter has removed married individuals whose 
partners are not in the sample to mitigate asset-split inaccuracies from incomplete 
information. Divorced/Widowed are analysed separately due to possible asset transfer 
due to divorces or bequests from partners’ passing. 
2.8.2.1. Single Versus Married/Partnered 
2.8.2.1.1. Gender Differences 
Table 2.3 presents financial adequacy measured using the 70% replacement rate 
(70RR), the PL and RA by gender for singles and married/partnered. Adequacy is 
calculated for (i) baseline wealth (housing assets are excluded from retirement income), 
(ii) baseline wealth adjusted for imputed rent (captures rental savings for home owners) 
and (iii) across each of five possible housing asset options. Individuals may choose to 
sell their residential housing (and either live with family or rent), downsize (and either 
                                                          
87 The lower wealth among women in the ‘Rest of South Island’ is mainly due to the lower housing prices 
in this region (based on median house price information from the Real Estate Institute of NZ). 
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stay in the same region or move to a cheaper region) or take a reverse mortgage. Financial 
adequacy is reported for each year that data are available.  
The baseline wealth results for male and female Singles show that more females 
are financially adequate than males under the 70RR method. However, after adjusting 
for imputed rent, male adequacy increases by more than female adequacy. The increase 
in Single male adequacy shows that males benefit more from imputed rent. This is 
explained by the wealth effect due to Single males owning more housing assets than 
Single females. The higher percentage of financially adequate Single females in the 
70RR method may be due to lower pre-retirement income than their male counterparts. 
Under the PL method, it appears that more Single females display financial adequacy 
than males in 2005 and 2007, but the trend flipped in 2009. The RA method also shows 
Single females to be as financially adequate as Single males. Full liquidation and 
subsequently living with family releases the highest value of wealth from housing, 
consistent with Le et al. (2009) and Le et al. (2012). Full liquidation is the most 
commonly reported assumption behind adequacy measures in the literature; however, it 
is also the most optimistic and relies on the willingness and availability of extended 
family to support elders in old age (Nelson, 2002).88    
There is a substantial decrease in financial adequacy for all individuals when 
moving from selling their house and living with family to selling and renting. The 
reduction in adequacy is most marked for Single females. While a higher proportion of 
females achieve financial adequacy (70RR, PL and RA) at baseline wealth post 
retirement, nominally their earnings are lower and fewer Single females can afford to pay 
rent when compared with their Single male counterparts.  
                                                          
88 See pages 295–309. 
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The financial adequacy of a reverse mortgage is similar to downsizing, and both 
options provide a higher proportion of financially adequate retirees compared with full 
liquidation when accounting for rental payments. Previous studies have yet to consider 
that when individuals liquidate their homes and do not live with extended family, they 
need to rent their accommodation. When including downsizing and reverse mortgage 
liquidation options, the results suggest that there could be more financially inadequate 
individuals compared with previous studies. This can be seen from the lower proportion 
of individuals achieving adequacy for each of the 70RR, PL and RA criteria. The similar 
results for downsizing and reverse mortgage may suggest that downsizing is preferable 
due to the potential bequest from a smaller house than none from a reverse mortgage.  
The results for the Married/Partnered group report similar adequacy across males 
and females as housing assets are shared. Selling and renting together with downsizing 
are both less financially adequate options for Married/Partnered males and females. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2.13 reports the financial adequacy of Singles and individuals who are 
married or partnered by gender after deflating male pre-retirement income to account for 
the fact that men earn 13% more, on average, than women (Pacheo, et al., 2017). The RA 
of Single males increases and is higher than that for females in 2007 and 2009 for all the 
housing asset options.89   
2.8.2.1.2. Ethnicity Differences 
Prior studies suggest that financial adequacy varies by ethnicity. Non-white 
ethnicities (black and Hispanic) are worse off with regard to financial adequacy than their 
white counterparts (Engen et al., 2005; Knoef et al., 2016; Scholz et al., 2006).  
                                                          
89 81% of males in the study are married; 60% of females are married. The partnered or married individuals 
equally split housing assets for income determination, resulting in similar adequacy rates for both genders. 
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[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
In terms of NZ ethnic data, RA adequacy reported in Table 2.4 during 2007 and 
2009 is much lower under each of the housing asset options for Māori Singles compared 
with Pākehā and Asian Singles. The 100% of Māori Singles in 2005 is misleading due 
to the small number of Māori Singles in that period that is not representative of the 
population. Māori married or partnered individuals also report lower RA than their 
Pākehā and Asian counterparts for both the downsizing and reverse mortgage options in 
2007 and 2009. The decline may be attributed in part to the declining home ownership 
rates for Māori and Pacific Islanders as well as the poor quality of their housing.90 Lower 
house value limits the ability to downsize. The reduction in RA between 2005 and 2009 
is particularly high for Single Māori. The PL and RA rates for Pacific Islanders in 2007 
are particularly low, and in the case of 0% adequacy given housing liquidation, indicate 
that families cannot afford to pass on their housing estate to the next generation without 
harming their own wellbeing. Similar trends are also found in the 70RR method in Table 
2.14. 
Table 2.15 reports the RA metric recalibrated to adjust the life expectancy for the 
Pākehā/Asian and Māori subsamples to be equivalent to the life expectancy for a Pacific 
Island person. Overall, the findings are relatively unchanged.  Adequacy is highest for 
all groups when individuals sell their house and live with family. It is lowest when an 
individual sells and rents.  
[Insert Table 2.5 here] 





2.8.2.1.3. Home Ownership 
Next, the chapter considers how home ownership impacts financial adequacy in 
retirement, as reported in Table 2.5.91 Both the PL and RA measures show quite clearly 
that regardless of marital status, homeowners achieve much higher levels of financial 
adequacy than renters. In particular, the decrease in adequacy for Single renters when 
shifting from living with family to renting on their own is substantial. Single renters are 
very exposed to declines in adequacy following increases in housing prices and rental 
costs. This is particularly concerning, given that the NZ government already pays low-
income earners an accommodation supplement to make rental housing more affordable 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2017). Overall, the results highlight the disparity in 
financial adequacy between homeowners and renters. Homeowners accumulate greater 
wealth and subsequent financial adequacy than non-owners (Le et al., 2012). 
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
2.8.2.1.4. Living Arrangements 
Table 2.6 examines the importance of living arrangements on financial 
adequacy.92 Even though individuals in single dwellings appear to be less financially 
adequate than those in multiple dwellings, they are actually better off after adjusting for 
rent. Selling and renting reduces financial adequacy for single-dwelling owners, and this 
is also true for the downsizing and reverse mortgage options. Double and multi-dwellers 
are worse off than Single dwellers when accounting for renting. This finding suggests 
that these multi-dwellers live with more people because they cannot afford their own 
home, not necessarily due to choice. House-sharing and the ‘social project’ model of 
home ownership captures those individuals who cannot afford to live alone and are 
                                                          
91 Table 2.16 shows the equivalent adequacy measures using 70RR. 
92 Table 2.17 reports the equivalent results for 70RR. 
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vulnerable to higher housing costs. Examples include those caring for dependent 
children, disabled family members or aging parents. These groups of individuals are at 
greater risk of reduced financial adequacy in retirement.   
Married/Partnered individuals achieve lower financial adequacy rates post-
retirement in multi-dwelling living arrangements. RA is lowest for the downsizing 
option. In contrast to Pang and Warshawsky (2014), the results show the importance of 
considering different measures of financial adequacy as well as housing asset options.  
The lower proportion of financial adequacy is also associated with NZS payments 
because couples’ superannuation provision is less than the sum paid for two Single 
dwellers. These findings also illustrate the possible effects of differing elder living 
arrangements across ethnicities. Most multi-dwellers are of Māori and Pacific Island 
ethnicity. It is more common for these ethnic groups to have older parents living in their 
adult children’s homes (Statistics NZ, 2012).  
2.8.2.1.5. Regional Differences 
[Insert Table 2.7 here] 
The unequal distribution of house price increases throughout NZ make regional 
differences quite important (Quotation Value NZ, 2017; Crawford and O'Dea, 2016). The 
largest city, Auckland, has higher costs of housing and higher pre-retirement income 
levels, whereas Canterbury is a province with a smaller population and lower housing 
and overall cost of living.93 Table 2.7 reports RA for the six regions of NZ, highlighting 
considerable difference in financial adequacy based on location. Higher pre-retirement 
income in Auckland makes it harder to maintain income levels post-retirement unless 
individuals sell and live with extended family. Singles across NZ are worse off than 
                                                          





married individuals when selling and renting. The case for selling and renting for Singles 
also worsens from 2005 to 2009 in Auckland and Wellington than other parts of NZ, 
pointing out their least renting affordability. The option of moving to cheaper regions is 
only beneficial for those moving away from Auckland. 
2.8.2.2. Divorced/Widowed 
2.8.2.2.1. Gender Differences 
[Insert Table 2.8 here] 
Table 2.8 shows a comparable share of Divorced/Widowed males and females 
financially adequate in the 70RR method across different housing liquidation options. 
Divorced/Widowed females fare better when selling and renting under 70RR and PL, 
though it is still the least desirable choice. The PL method shows higher rates of financial 
adequacy than 70RR and RA. More male Divorced/Widowed have the option to 
downsize and move to a cheaper region, suggesting that more of them live in regions of 
higher housing prices, such as Auckland. The share of financially adequate 
Divorced/Widowed males is consistent across 2005–2009, but the share of those 
financially adequate from selling and renting increases in recent years. The increase is 
less visible among Divorced/Widowed females from 2005 to 2007 and even falling in 
2009. The fall in share of financially adequate Divorced/Widowed when renting suggests 
that they are more vulnerable to the trend in rising rent prices. Deflating 
Divorced/Widowed male pre-retirement income shown in table 2.18 increases the share 
of financially adequate males. Adjusting for gender income-gap in pre-retirement results 
in a higher share of financially adequate Divorced/Widowed males than females.  
2.8.2.2.2. Ethnicity Differences 
[Insert Table 2.9 here] 
Commented [ML1]: or "their"? 
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Pākehā/Asian have the highest share of financially adequate Divorced/Widowed 
individuals compared with Māori and Pacific Island across all housing liquidation 
scenarios and across most adequacy tests (70RR, PL, and RA).94 The selling and rent 
scenario causes a substantial drop in the share of financially adequate divorced/widowed 
individuals especially for divorced/widowed Māori and Pacific. RA is lowest for 
divorced/widowed Pacific Island, which suggests that they are more vulnerable to 
financially inadequacy within their respective income quartiles. The option to downsize 
or secure a reverse mortgage also does not benefit the divorced/widowed Māori and 
Pacific Island as much as it does Pākehā/Asian due to divorced/widowed Māori and 
Pacific Islanders potentially having lower-value homes. Pākehā/Asian makes up 60% of 
the divorced/widowed population compared with only 20% Māori and less than 10%  
Pacific Island. 
2.8.2.2.3. Home Ownership 
[Insert Table 2.10 here] 
Similar to findings among singles and married/partnered, there is a greater share 
of financially adequate divorced/widowed homeowners than there are renters across each 
period. Divorced/Widowed renters are more substantially worse off after accounting for 
rent payments than when divorced/widowed homeowners sell and rent. Due to the 
limitation that divorced/widowed renters have, they are unable to access the options that 
homeowners have in terms of housing liquidation. 
2.8.2.2.4. Living Arrangements 
[Insert Table 2.11 here] 
                                                          
94 See Table 2.19 for 70RR results. 
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Table 2.11 shows that a greater share of divorced/widowed individuals living in a 
single dwelling are financially adequate than those living in double dwellings or multi-
dwellings. A possible explanation is that there is asset transfer in the form of non-housing 
or housing asset among divorced/widowed that allows them to live in their own single 
dweller home. Similar to findings in living arrangements of singles and 
married/partnered, multi-dwellers may be living in such an arrangement not by choice 
but due to financial limitations. Multi-dwellers are also most vulnerable to financial 
inadequacy among all housing scenarios, but more prominently when accounting for rent 
payments. 
2.8.2.2.5. Regional Differences 
[Insert Table 2.12 here] 
Fewer divorced/widowed living in Auckland, Waikato and Wellington in 2005 
are financially adequate under the RA method shown in Table 2.12. These numbers 
increase in 2007 but fall again in 2009, and are still less than the share of 
divorced/widowed living in Canterbury and the Rest of South Island. Sell and rent also 
continues to be the least preferable option as the share of financially adequate 
divorced/widowed across the country has fallen from 2005 to 2009. Downsizing is more 
beneficial for divorced/widowed living in Auckland, Waikato and Wellington. This is 
due to the much higher average house prices in the North Island. Divorced/Widowed 
living in those regions also benefit from the possibility of moving to cheaper regions; 
however, this option is not relevant to the divorced/widowed living in the South Island. 
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2.8.3. Robustness Checks 
2.8.3.1. Self-Reported House Price Check   
Comparing the regional median self-reported value of housing with the median 
regional house price from Real Estate Institute NZ (2002 to 2009), the chapter finds that 
adjusting for a 10% average under-reporting level does not change financial adequacy 
rates by more than 1%–2%. Therefore, the original value of self-reported housing is used. 
2.8.3.2. Self-Reported Non-Employment Income   
To address under- or over-reporting of non-employment income in retirement (Le 
et al., 2009), the chapter compares non-employment income with the net minimum value 
of NZS provision, taking into account marital status and living arrangements and 
including a 10% tax rate.95 The study finds evidence of under-reporting. SoFIE does not 
supply information on individual tax rates, so no adjustments have been made. However, 
any adjustment for under-reporting on non-employment should improve financial 
adequacy rates, as post-retirement income would increase. Further research could 
investigate the possibility of non-employment income adjustments. 
2.8.3.3. Transaction Costs 
The chapter applies a 10% transaction cost to the house sale, and it does not 
change the findings. 
2.8.3.4. 60% and 80% Income Replacement Rates 
The chapter includes robustness tests using 60% and 80% replacement rates and 
finds that the results are similar to those reported earlier. 
                                                          
95 The 10% tax rate assumption is a conservative assumption based upon the 2009 income tax rate for the 
lowest income cohort of 13%. 
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2.8.3.5. Comparing Weighted and Unweighted Data   
The study applies longitudinal weights based on the population for each year of 
the panel data analyses.96 To address concerns regarding the use of either unweighted 
and weighted data, the study has conducted financial adequacy rate estimations using 
both weighted and unweighted data. The chapter reports similar findings for financial 
adequacy rates using both approaches.  
2.8.3.6. Downsizing and Imputed Rent 
The chapter includes an 80% regional median value home test for the option to 
downsize to a house value lower than the regional median. It finds that such changes do 
not significantly change the distribution pattern, though they increase the financial 
adequacy rate, in general. The study has conducted an 80% imputed rent estimation 
robustness check to account for some homeownership costs and finds that using 80% of 
imputed rent reduces the rate of financial adequacy, in general, but it does not change the 
distribution of financial adequacy. 
2.9. Discussion and Conclusion  
This study examines the impact of housing wealth on financial adequacy in 
retirement. Most financial adequacy studies assume full liquidation of residential homes 
(Baldwin et al., 2012; Crawford and O'Dea, 2016; Knoef et al., 2016; Munnell and Soto, 
2005). However, these studies fail to acknowledge that individuals view their home as a 
source of retirement income only in extreme circumstances (De Nardi et al., 2009; 
Telyukova and Nakajima, 2011; Venti and Wise, 2004). Poterba (2015) notes that the 
lack of housing liquidation consideration and living arrangement variability may explain 
                                                          
96 Le et al. (2012) utilise the SoFIE database in their study. They apply cross-sectional weighting for net 
worth analysis and longitudinal weighting for the saving analysis. 
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the variation in the financial adequacy literature. Poterba (2015) attributes this gap in the 
literature to the difficulty in measuring individual heterogeneity in housing liquidation 
and living arrangements. The inclusion of housing liquidation options and imputed rent 
addresses this gap. The study improves on the common practice of assuming full 
liquidation of housing assets and examines baseline wealth, imputed rent and five 
different housing asset options. Consideration of imputed rent captures living 
arrangement heterogeneity by differentiating homeowners and renters. The analysis 
incorporates three different measures of financial adequacy and documents variation 
across those measures. The study also examines financial adequacy for the most 
vulnerable members of society.  
The study documents differences in financial adequacy rates between all seven 
housing liquidation options.97 In particular, the findings note the decrease in financial 
adequacy of retired Single females who sell and rent. Findings in the study also document 
a general increase in financial adequacy rates after accounting for imputed rent when 
individuals do not liquidate their home or when they take up a reverse mortgage. The 
chapter refers to this as a wealth effect because this benefit is realised by house owners. 
The analysis shows that individuals who choose to fully liquidate their homes and live 
with family experience the greatest financial adequacy. However, this proportion drops 
dramatically given the option to liquidate and rent or if retirees have no home to liquidate. 
Downsizing or taking up a reverse mortgage may improve adequacy, but these options 
are generally less favourable than full liquidation and living with family. The study 
introduces downsizing as a means for partial liquidation and a reverse mortgage option 
that permits individuals who are unwilling to move but need money in retirement to 
                                                          
97 The seven housing liquidation options account for when housing is excluded, when housing is included 




withdraw equity from their homes. Both options integrate the social value of housing into 
the analysis, making it more realistic.  
This study has some important findings. First, the analysis shows that the 
treatment of housing assets has important implications for financial adequacy in 
retirement. While the findings demonstrate that selling and living with family is the best 
retirement option, this outcome is less achievable as families become more 
individualistic and less communitarian. Single females are exposed to large drops in 
adequacy if they choose to sell and rent. Similar to the results reported in Table 2, selling 
and renting yields very low adequacy rates for income earners below the PL.  
Second, the choice of financial adequacy measure has important implications. The 
proportion of individuals achieving adequacy depends on the definition used. This is 
important for policy decisions. The impact of changes to retirement income and support 
are subject to how financial adequacy is quantified. Third, rent imputation is important 
and should be included in the calibration of financial adequacy. Fourth, alternative 
housing liquidation options are still very limited in NZ, and reverse mortgages are not 
offered by many financial institutions.98 Despite the unpopular nature of reverse 
mortgages in the United States, due to inflexibility and unfair pricing, government 
intervention to insure reverse mortgages has successfully boosted reverse mortgage take-
ups (Mayer and Simons, 1994). This may be relevant to NZ if the government wants to 
facilitate housing liquidation. The availability of bridging loans for individuals who wish 
to downsize may also help.  
Fifth, the analysis highlights the need to give greater consideration to the welfare 
of those individuals who are the most vulnerable to financial inadequacy in retirement. 
                                                          
98 Based on interviews with NZ investment experts, it was ascertained that reverse mortgages are unpopular 
in NZ potentially due to a lack of interest, including the unawareness of a reverse mortgage option, and a 
misconception of the reverse mortgage that if the borrower dies before the reverse mortgage term ends, the 
bank would collect the remaining value of the house. Future research is required on its unpopularity in NZ. 
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Currently, the NZS is calculated assuming a person will own a house during their 
working life. As housing prices increase, this expectation is becoming more unrealistic. 
The government needs to review the amount paid to superannuitants and research the 
future cost of supporting retirees as the population ages and the proportion of individuals 
achieving financial adequacy decreases.99 Sixth, the findings also show that elimination 
of the gender gap in wages will improve the outlook for women. The current 
government’s focus on affordable housing may at least enable some people to get out of 
the renting trap. Indeed, as housing assets become less affordable, the most vulnerable 
groups (females, Māori, renters and double-dwelling housing) will be less able to 
purchase housing investments, relying more on NZS and other supplementary allowances 
in retirement. In addition, the study sheds new light on the aging problem. Older 
individuals who are rich in housing assets but poor in income need to make choices to 
optimally manage their wealth.100 This paper goes some way to investigating the financial 
adequacy implications of various options related to the liquidation of housing assets in 
retirement. 
The international implications of the NZ case from a housing perspective are 
compelling. This chapter underlines the importance of housing ownership and liquidity 
to financial adequacy in retirement. The findings can be translated to any group that faces 
financial vulnerability due to inadequate financial reserves or the inability to liquidate 
assets in retirement. Governments need to ensure that national retirement provisions are 
realistic and adequate. Government policy needs to mandate personal retirement savings 
plans, similar to those in Australia and the UK, that require compulsory contributions to 
retirement savings. 
                                                          
99 A 2017 survey by the Commission for Financial Capability found that while 51% of retirees were 
financially healthy, 35% were not in great shape and 13% were struggling. 




This study highlights the widening gap in financial adequacy between 
homeowners and renters. The chapter finds that housing affordability is a critical 
determinant of financial adequacy in retirement. Given that the New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZS) provision level assumes homeownership, it suggests that the New 
Zealand government may need to improve provisions of affordable public housing and 
address rising housing prices and rental costs in order to help retirees achieve financial 
adequacy. Otherwise, future generations of non-homeowners will be less able to achieve 
acceptable standards of living when they retire.  
The chapter acknowledges the limitations of the findings due to the nature of the 
survey data. The under-reporting of non-employment retirement income in SoFIE can be 
minimised by adjusting according to each individual’s provision from NZS. Because 
SoFIE is part of Statistic NZ’s Integrated Data Infrastructure, it may be possible to link 
SoFIE with Inland Revenue Department (IRD) data and adjust for income based on 
individual tax rates. Furthermore, linking IRD data with SoFIE would allow the capture 
of a full pre-retirement income history for better estimations of financial adequacy. These 





3. A Stochastic Approach to Optimal Consumption and 
the Role of Housing 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the effects of portfolio composition and asset liquidity on 
consumption and housing tenure options as individuals get older. It seeks to understand 
how the demand for an illiquid asset, housing in this case, is affected by the possibility 
of adverse health and income shocks, by the transaction costs associated with the sale of 
housing assets and by the desire to leave a bequest.  
The analytic tool used is a version of the Life-Cycle model, which is solved under 
the assumption that individuals are forward looking, rational and seek to maximise 
lifetime utility. The model incorporates uncertainty or shocks over a person’s health, 
income and time of death. The model is designed so that the probability of such shocks 
depends on their current and future changes in circumstances as they age. The model also 
incorporates uncertainty over house prices, so it is possible for a person to receive adverse 
health shocks at a time when the proceeds from the sale of a house are lower than normal. 
The households are assumed to choose the size and rental/ownership arrangements of 
their housing, the amount of maintenance they undertake, their consumption of medical 
care and other goods and services and finally the level of other liquid assets (debt 
instruments) that they hold. 
A key feature of the model is that individuals consider three different housing 
options each period: they can rent a house (“Rent”), they can stay in their existing house 
(“Stay”) or they can sell their house and purchase a different one (“Sell”). Individuals 
calculate the expected utility they gain from each of these three housing options, and 
choose the option providing them with the highest expected utility. The model is solved 
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using a mixture of analytical and numerical techniques, using constrained optimisation 
techniques (Lagrangians). The program is solved for different health, income and house 
price shocks, which are described by transition probability matrices. Two sets of 
transition probability matrices are considered. The study finds that when the probability 
of bad health is persistent, a change in health status often leads to changes in housing 
arrangements. Renting provides the most flexibility when dealing with health shocks, but 
since it provides less utility for people in good health, it is not the first choice for most 
households. “Sell/Buy” is an optimal choice for many different scenarios, but is also the 
most prone to utility drops in the event of a bad health shock. “Stay” is the option that 
straddles Renting and Sell/Buy, but it is not available for non-homeowners or when 
individuals do not have adequate income or non-housing wealth to support consumption 
smoothing without liquidating housing wealth. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explores the literature review on 
the optimization area. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 consist of the methodology used, as well as 
the results presented and discussed. Finally, section 3.5 concludes Chapter 3. 
3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Life-Cycle Consumption Theory 
The following section outlines the literature on the Life-Cycle theory, the 
development of the model through time and the contribution to the literature made by 
this chapter. The Life-Cycle theory, developed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), 
posits that individuals’ consumption decisions are determined by the available 
resources they have in their lifetime and are dependent on their stage in life. This paper 
proposes that individuals accumulate wealth at the beginning of their working lives and 
use that wealth to support them later in retirement. Samuelson (1975), Merton (1975) 
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and Yaari (1965) establish that the Life-Cycle theory of utility provides an 
understanding of how people behave financially (Ding, 2013). The application of the 
model can be seen in a wide range of topics, such as policy change assessments 
(Bateman et al., 2007; Kudrna and Woodland, 2008; Cho and Sane, 2013; Thorp et al., 
2013), financial planning of retirees (Kotlikoff, 2008) and the design of pension 
products (Ameriks et al., 2011). 
There are some drawbacks to the Life-Cycle theory. Attanasio and Weber (2010) 
list a few assumptions that may reduce the accuracy of the predictions made by the studies 
that apply the Life-Cycle theory. The first drawback is the utility maximisation 
assumption in the empirical and theoretical models. Behavioural economists’ studies 
contest the assumption that individuals maximise utility, and suggest that individuals can 
deviate from utility maximisation because they fail to understand the utility consequences 
of a choice (Loewenstein and Adler, 1995). Most studies using the Life-Cycle theory 
apply a utility maximisation assumption101 because their focus is not on questioning the 
utility maximisation assumption per se, but on the way different factors (e.g. health, 
income, and wealth) affect consumption over the life-cycle.  
Second, most Life-Cycle theory studies assume that preferences are additively 
separable102 over time (Attanasio and Weber, 2010). There are alternatives to the additive 
model, such as habit formation (Pollack, 1970), but the large population of heterogeneity 
in many stochastic models makes it impossible to distinguish each individual’s habit 
formation.103 
                                                          
101 For example, Attanasio and Weber (2010); Kraft et al. (2017); Kraft and Munk (2011). 
102 This implies that utility from different goods/services is estimated separately and the total utility is the 
total value of utility from different goods/services. 
103 Habit formation occurs when an individual becomes used to a certain good and thus imposes a greater 
utility on the consumption of that particular good compared with other goods (Kraft et al., 2017). 
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The third drawback is the assumption that utility can be estimated as a function of 
a single commodity (Attanasio and Weber, 2010).104 Bentham (1776) introduced the 
concept of utility as a measure of “greatest happiness principle”. Von Neumann et al. 
(2007) assume that individuals make choices by maximising their expected utility from 
probabilistic future outcomes. Debreu (1954) then developed utility into a concept with 
value in a decision-making process. A variety of universally accepted utility functions 
have been previously used to represent preferences.105 The range of utility functions used 
in the literature may account for the variety of findings that have arisen in optimal 
consumption Life-Cycle models.  
The importance of these criticisms is debated. Becker (1962) argues that the 
limitations of the Life-Cycle theory are due to the assumptions of rationality (or utility 
maximisation) and/or the utility function choice may be overstated because these choices 
are less important than the budget constraints that are incorporated into the Life-Cycle 
models. He argues that even irrational individuals, or individuals who do not seek to 
maximise utility, are restricted by the budget constraint in making decisions. The choice 
of utility function may also be unimportant because the budget constraint would drive 
results for different utility functions to have similar patterns over the life-cycle.  
Much of the early work of the Life-Cycle theory examined behaviour when agents 
faced no uncertainty and could borrow unrestricted amounts. The Bewley-Aiyagari 
model extends the traditional Life-Cycle model by assuming an incomplete market with 
borrowing constraints and stochastic income states. Bewley (1976) developed the model 
                                                          
104 Such as assuming all consumption goods can be pooled to estimate utility from “consumption”. 
105 For example, the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) by Merton (1971) (used by Vila and 
Zariphopoulou, 1997; Bateman, 2007; Ishakov, 2015), the power utility or constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA), a special case of the HARA model (Nakajima, 2005; Edwards, 2010; Acikgoz, 2018; Gourinchas 
and Parker, 2002) and log utility (Watcher and Yogo, 2010). 
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to include incomplete markets with a range of simulated identical agents (Light, 2017). 
Agents receive a state-dependent income that follows a stochastic process and choose a 
whole optimal consumption path over an infinite horizon. Assets are transferrable 
between periods, and there is a borrowing constraint. Bewley’s model is extended by 
Aiyagari (1994) by introducing a model incorporating a distinction level between 
individual dynamics and uncertainty, and aggregate dynamics and uncertainty (Aiyagari, 
1994). Aiyagari (1994) develops a model of consumption smoothing subject to 
idiosyncratic shocks and borrowing constraints involving a large number of individual 
dynamics, uncertainty and asset trading but with constant aggregate variables (Aiyagari, 
1994). Agents in a stationary equilibrium state of a Bewley-Aiyagari model make 
decisions on consumption and savings to maximise the expected discounted utility 
(Light, 2017). The accrual of greater wealth for consumption smoothing in a Bewley-
Aiyagari model is due to a combination of an incomplete market, borrowing constraints 
and income uncertainty.  
The Bewley-Aiyagari model is similar to models used in other studies that 
estimate optimal consumption from wealth and income that also includes income risk 
and a borrowing constraint. Deaton (1991) numerically solves the intertemporal 
consumption optimality and shows that in an infinite lifetime, impatient consumers only 
hold limited assets to mitigate low income withdrawals. Carroll (1997) shows that when 
impatient agents have finite lives and are subject to income shocks, they choose 
consumption levels close to their income at least until their 40s. 
Despite these expansions, the core of all Life-Cycle models is the consumption 
choice over a consumer’s life-cycle. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) suggest a model for 
optimal consumption and expenditure with labour income shocks. They find that 
individuals only start building up assets for retirement from the age of 40, and their fitted 
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model matches the data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. By applying a log-linear 
Euler equation, in order to avoid issues related with linear models when accounting for 
uncertainty, they follow the Deaton (1985) and Deaton (1991) models of solving the 
optimality numerically. Their work is also closely related to the studies conducted by 
Attanasio et al. (1999) and Attanasio and Browning (1995).  
3.2.1.1. Modern Life-Cycle Models 
3.2.1.1.1. Optimal Consumption in Models Based on Life-Cycle Theory 
Modern Life-Cycle models extend the traditional model by incorporating other 
aspects of an imperfect market, such as transaction costs (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; 
Hu, 2005; Yao and Zhang, 2005; Yang, 2009; Yogo, 2016) and non-financial attributes 
like health (Yogo, 2016; Edwards, 2008; Hurst, 2008; Edwards, 2010; Hugonnier et al., 
2012), by expanding the dimension of the stochastic control (Andreasson et al., 2017). 
A more recent empirical study by Aguiar and Hurst (2013) proposes that 
consumption levels should be disaggregated into different classes of goods and services. 
They argue that durable goods have a different life-cycle profile than that of other 
consumption components. In their application of disaggregated goods, there is a smaller 
amount of uninsurable income risk than implied by a Life-Cycle model that only uses 
aggregate consumption goods. The model they suggest finds that the mean spending on 
clothing, food and nondurable transportation falls after middle-age, unlike other goods. 
Unlike most of the literature on the Life-Cycle model of consumption that assumes a 
single aggregate consumption good, Yogo (2016) and Hugonnier et al. (2012) allow 
consumption disaggregation (Aguiar and Hurst 2013) by separating health expenditure 
from general consumption. Kraft et al. (2017) and Yogo (2016) also distinguish housing 
expenditure. These studies all suggest that the disaggregation of consumption 
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components into different goods may lead to different conclusions about the importance 
of uninsurable income risks (Aguiar and Hurst, 2013). Assuming a single aggregate 
consumption good may not be able to capture consumption heterogeneity. 
3.2.1.1.2. Optimal Consumption and Asset Portfolio in the Life-Cycle Model 
A popular extension of the Life-Cycle model is the consideration of optimal asset 
holding. Various studies extend the Merton (1971) model that includes asset allocation 
between stocks and a risk-free investment.106 Extensions of the Merton model often 
include housing as part of an individual’s asset portfolio. Flavin and Yamashita (2002), 
Yao and Zhang (2005), Hu (2005), Brueckner (1997) and Nakajima (2005) are examples 
of studies that incorporate housing as part of an optimal portfolio choice in a Life-Cycle 
model. Yao and Zhang (2005) and Hu (2005) both find the difference in optimal portfolio 
holding between homeowners and renters. Their results suggest that homeowners tend to 
underinvest in financial shares, while renters overinvest in shares. Similar findings are 
also present in Cocco (2005), who shows that homeownership results in underinvestment 
in stocks. In addition, Hu (2005) and Cocco (2005) propose that regardless of 
homeownership, young and middle-aged individuals invest in fewer shares than expected 
by traditional models. There is also evidence that the balance between housing and 
financial investment may change over the life-cycle. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) show 
that the proportion of housing to total wealth declines over the life-cycle. An increase in 
house prices over the life-cycle also results in underinvestment in stocks (Cocco et al., 
2005; Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018). The majority of studies extending the Life-
Cycle model that incorporate housing as part of a portfolio, regardless of the focus of the 
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study, agree that housing affects the optimality of the portfolio over the Life-Cycle 
model. 
There are several reasons for the importance of housing in the Life-Cycle model 
of consumption and portfolio holding. First, housing contributes to the majority of 
individuals’ wealth (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002), and this is true in most countries in 
the world (OECD, 2015). Second, housing can provide utility from both housing services 
and as an investment (Yao and Zhang, 2005). Third, and as an extension of the previous 
point, because of this ‘duality’, the optimal housing holding may differ, depending on 
the points of view of an individual. For example, a housing service provider may have a 
different perspective to that of an investor who sees housing as an investment tool (Yao 
and Zhang, 2005). Fourth, housing is the only type of investment that allows investors to 
hold very high leverage positions (Hu, 2005). For example, first-time home buyers can 
take up a 90–95% mortgage on a home in countries like the United Kingdom (The 
Guardian, 2019). Finally, housing is not as liquid as other investment instruments (Yao 
and Zhang, 2005).  
Despite the importance of housing in the world to date, most studies that analyse 
housing have focused on its role in optimal portfolio holdings.107 Fewer studies have 
investigated the additional role housing plays in the Life-Cycle model. Findings by Yang 
(2009) show that housing consumption, unlike the general hump-shaped proposition 
contention of non-housing goods consumption, is monotonically upward sloping before 
it levels out. The shape applies to all consumption quartiles, and the applied model is the 
main reason for the reported shape (Yang, 2009). The applied borrowing constraints help 
to clarify the housing asset build-up observed at younger ages. Meanwhile, slow 
                                                          




decumulation of housing in retirement could be explained by transaction costs. Although 
Yang (2009) does not account for possible housing ownership scenarios (renting and 
homeowners), her insight that separates housing consumption from non-housing 
consumption inspires the need for further study. 
Kraft and Munk (2011) investigate optimal housing holding over the life-cycle. 
They suggest that young individuals choose to rent to avoid housing price risks. Only 
when the desire to own a house outweighs that of general consumption, should they 
purchase a home (whether as a first-time buyer or as a rental investment). When agents 
are older, the optimal preference would be to shift back to rental homes. By using a Cobb-
Douglas108 style time additive utility consumption function for housing services and other 
goods, they find closed-form solutions that provide a more elaborate understanding of 
the decision-making process. Their model uses four state variables: wealth, interest rates, 
house prices and income. There are no borrowing constraints and no housing transaction 
costs. The model they propose is interesting because it focuses on factors that may affect 
decision-making over the life-cycle. However, the lack of a borrowing constraint and 
transaction cost are substantial drawbacks. It undermines the uniqueness of housing as 
compared with other investments mentioned above. The absence of a transaction cost 
dampens the illiquid nature of housing in real life (Yao and Zhang 2005). The absence 
of a borrowing constraint would not have been such an issue had the study focused solely 
on the working phase of the Life-Cycle model. It is much harder for retirees or individuals 
over the age of retirement to borrow for consumption or investment. The study also does 
not take health into account in the Life-Cycle model, despite a large amount of literature 
that points out how health plays a role in the model (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Edwards, 
                                                          
108 The Cobb-Douglas utility assumes a constant marginal utility expenditure share for a specified type of 
spending (e.g. a constant marginal utility share of health expenditure out of total consumption) (Kraft and 
Munk, 2011; Nakajima, 2005). 
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2010; Finkelstein et al., 2013; Kuhn et al., 2015; Yogo 2016) and in portfolio choice 
(Edwards, 2008; Hugonnier et al., 2012). 
A more recent study by Kraft et al. (2017) extends Kraft and Munk (2011) by 
introducing habit formation in a model of housing consumption. Habit formation occurs 
when individuals become used to a certain good, which then imposes a greater utility on 
the consumption of that particular good in comparison with other goods (Kraft et al., 
2017). Habit formation applied to perishable good consumption is well studied 
(Browning and Collado, 2007; Ravina, 2007).  Assuming an internal, additive, multi-
period habit utility function life-cycle model, Kraft et al., (2017) find that housing 
consumption in the early stages of life is expensive because individuals commit to a level 
of housing consumption for their remaining lifespan (in other words, they are tied to a 
long-term mortgage). Housing consumption becomes cheaper with shorter time horizons 
(Kraft et al., 2017). Borrowing constraints can explain the hump shape of having 
consumption over a lifetime (Gourinchas and Parker 2002), but if there are no constraints, 
habit formation shifts the hump to an earlier age. Their model produces an age-wealth-
dependent housing expenditure share that is more consistent with data than standard Life-
Cycle models. Housing consumption is less affected by wealth and income shocks than 
perishable consumption, particularly in the early working years of the Life-Cycle model. 
Housing is measured in “units” to capture size, quality and location. The model applies 
an approach by Bick et al. (2013) that exploits closed-form solutions for each simulated 
market. The findings from Kraft et al. (2017) are useful in showing how, unlike most 
studies applying a standard Cobb-Douglas utility (Nakajima, 2005; Kraft and Munk 
2011), housing expenditure may not be at a constant share of total expenditure and is 
affected by wealth and income. However, similar to Kraft and Munk (2011), they lack 
both a borrowing constraint and a health constraint state variable. 
86 
 
3.2.1.1.3. The Role of Health in the Life-Cycle Model of Consumption and Optimal 
Portfolio 
Wealth and asset holding aside, health plays an important role in lifetime 
consumption. Finkelstein et al. (2009) propose two ways consumption can change with 
health. First, the marginal utility of consumption could fall when health declines 
(negative state of dependence). This could happen when individuals experience a health 
decline state that renders them unable to enjoy the same level of consumption as before, 
for example, in terms of travelling, spending time outside and eating out. Secondly, the 
marginal utility of consumption could rise when health declines (positive state of 
dependence). For example, individuals may increase consumption by needing to rely on 
assisted-care, transport and pre-prepared meals. For both negative and positive states of 
dependence, the consumption pattern shifts with health. Ignoring the role of health in 
lifetime consumption may lead to an incomplete picture of the results. Previous studies 
have divided views on the effect of health proposed by Finkelstein et al. (2009). Edwards 
(2008) and Lillard and Weiss (1997) find a positive effect of health on portfolio allocation 
(with no quantifiable estimate), and when accounting for variations in consumption 
profiles, the marginal utility for an individual in a poor health state is 55% higher than 
for those in a healthy state. On the other hand, Sloan et al. (1998) find the marginal utility 
of consumption for an individual in a poor health state is only 8% lower than for 
individuals in a healthy state. Similarly, Viscusi and Evans (1990) find that individuals 
in poor health only consume 77–93% as much general consumption goods and services 
as they would when they are healthy.  
In their assessment of optimal levels of health insurance and savings in a Life-
Cycle model, Finkelstein et al. (2009) find that regardless of the direction of health effect 
on consumption, if consumption is modestly dependent on health status, there is a 
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considerable effect on health insurance benefits and optimal saving levels. Their study is 
among a few that question the state-independence assumption for modelling the demand 
for health care (Hall and Jones, 2007), health-related insurance products (Feldstein, 1998; 
Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006; Brown and Finkelstein, 2011), annuities (Mitchell et al., 
1999) and optimal savings in the Life-Cycle model (Engen et al., 2000, Scholz et al., 
2006). A more recent study reinforces the health-state-dependence of consumption. 
Finkelstein et al. (2012) investigate how consumption depends on health by using the 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) data on elderly and near-elderly, and estimate how 
it affects subjective wellbeing. They find that consumption is negatively affected by 
declining health, rejecting the null hypothesis of no health-state dependency on 
consumption. Their findings suggest that incorporating the relationship between health 
and consumption may result in an important effect on economic problems (Finkelstein  
et al., 2013). They also point out that much of the state-independence in the literature is 
due to the difficulty in approximating sound estimates of the state-dependence 
relationship.  
Health status can also be viewed as a fraction of health investment, rather than 
just an exogenous state in the Life-Cycle model. Scholz and Seshadri (2011) present a 
model of health investment and consumption over the life-cycle. The study assumes that 
health affects the length of years alive, provides utility and that health and consumption 
can be complements or substitutes. Following Grossman (1972), the study proposes that 
health is a cumulative result of investments and choices. Unlike some studies that assume 
health does not affect utility and longevity (Hubbard et al., 1994; Engen et al., 2000; 
Scholz et al., 2006), Scholz and Seshadri (2011) allow an endogenous longevity. Similar 
studies on health and consumption include De Nardi et al. (2010) and Palumbo (1999); 
however, their focus is on the effect of out-of-pocket medical expenditure on 
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consumption. Interestingly, the studies that emphasise health on optimal consumption 
and utility do not consider asset holding, despite the studies adopting or expanding the 
Merton model (Merton, 1971) on asset holding and consumption in the Life-Cycle model. 
Some of these are explored in the previous section. 
On the other hand, health is also found to have an essential role in optimal 
portfolio holdings in a Life-Cycle model. Edwards (2008) proposes two reasons for 
health affecting financial decision-making. First, the risk of out-of-pocket medical 
expenditure from future health shocks encourages precautionary saving (Kimball, 1990) 
and decreases investments in risky assets (Kimball, 1991; Elmendorf and Kimball, 2000). 
Second, health directly affects the marginal utility of consumption (whether a positive or 
negative dependence), which, in turn, affects risky asset holdings. Edwards (2010) 
suggests that health shocks may result in a portfolio shift as a response to a change in the 
marginal utility of consumption.  His suggestion agrees with Finkelstein et al.’s (2009) 
positive state-dependence stance. Edwards (2010) assumes that in the event of a health 
shock individuals’ marginal utility to consume would increase, and would encourage 
individuals to reduce their risky asset holdings.  
Similar findings are present in Edwards (2008), who uses the Asset and Health 
Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data from the US. Edwards (2008) shows 
that risky health encourages safer investment among retirees. Edwards (2010) mentions 
that even though risk taking declines with age (Guiso et al., 2002; Ameriks and Zeldes 
2004), the proposed dynamics of health declination (essentially linked to aging) on 
declining exposure may not be prominent enough to explain the correlation between 
aging and portfolio appetite. Edwards (2008) proposes that risky health may be 
responsible for 20% of the decrease in financial risk appetite among retirees.  He posits 
that even though a shorter time horizon affects risk appetite (Guiso et al., 2002; Ameriks 
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and Zeldes, 2004), the expectation of future health declination encourages safer portfolio 
holding among retirees, and that retirees have a riskier health profile. 
A more complex study by Hugonnier et al. (2012) proposes that health and asset 
holding choices are inseparable. By applying optimal rules in a closed form of a Merton 
model (Merton, 1971) and combining it with Grossman’s insurance choice model 
(Grossman, 1972), Hugonier et al. (2012) solve the model analytically, and present 
patterns of consumption, portfolio, health expenditure and insurance coverage that are 
consistent with empirical observations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
data in the U.S. The model is comprehensive and presents rich findings, but it only allows 
for risky and risk-free assets, as suggested by Merton (1971). The exclusion of housing 
may undermine their findings because of the importance of housing in the asset portfolio. 
The effect of health shocks is more pronounced for retirees than for younger 
individuals because they have a riskier health profile (Edwards, 2008). Following a health 
shock, retirees may experience permanently incapacitated states, forcing them into long-
term care assistance. A health shock can also deny them the capacity to continue working 
past the retirement age (an income shock), and they may be solely reliant on their savings 
or investment withdrawals. A sudden health shock may also force retirees to quickly 
liquidate their assets for health expenditure, regardless of the current price state of the 
asset, leaving them with only suboptimal values (price shock). These possibilities explain 
how retirees are more prone to multiple shocks, and assuming that their consumption is 
shock independent, would result in findings that may be overly optimistic.  
3.2.1.2. The Life-Cycle Model of Consumption of Retirees 
There is a wide range of literature that examines the topic of a retiree’s life-cycle 
consumption profile. Some studies investigate consumption patterns (Blau, 2008; Hurst 
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2008; Chai et al., 2011), optimal wealth withdrawal rates (Milevsky and Huang, 2011; 
Lachance, 2012; Cheng, 2016), and apply the Life-Cycle model in estimating optimal 
consumption of retirees (Blau, 2008; Hurst, 2008). Studies on optimal consumption can 
include one or more of these factors in a Life-Cycle model: 1) health; 2) financial 
investment; 3) housing; and 4) income. Studies that focus on retirees’ Life-Cycle models 
include financial investment (Lim and Shin, 2011; Choi et al., 2008; Lachance, 2010), 
health (Crawford and O’Dea, 2014), health and financial investment (Huang et al., 2012; 
Dybvig and Liu, 2010; Pang and Warshawsky, 2010), financial investment and income 
(Choi et al., 2011), housing (Creedy et al., 2015; Ding, 2013), housing and financial 
investment (Ding, 2013; Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018; Andreasson et al., 2017), 
and only a few include health, housing, and financial investment (Shao et al., 2019; Yogo, 
2016). 
Andreasson and Shevchenko (2018) and Andreasson et al. (2017) both analyse 
housing decisions and public pension provision in retirement in Australia. Andreasson 
and Shevchenko (2018) investigate the optimal consumption, asset allocation, annuities, 
reverse mortgage and downsizing/upsizing choices by applying an expected utility 
stochastic control framework. The model uses a numerical solving approach of the least-
square Monte Carlo method. They find that annuitisation is optimal at the early stage of 
retirement and that means-tested pensions have a negative effect on voluntary 
annuitisation. They also show that reverse mortgages are better options than downsizing 
when there is a means-tested public pension in place.  
Andreasson and Shevchenko (2018) apply the model used in Andreasson et al. 
(2017). Both studies are similar in modelling the retirement behaviour of Australians on 
consumption, housing, investment, bequest and means-tested public pension. 
Andreasson and Shevchenko (2018) extends Andreasson et al. (2017) by including 
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lifetime annuities, reverse mortgages and downsizing as stochastic interest control 
variables. Andreasson et al. (2017) also solve the model numerically but use the 
maximum likelihood method. Their findings are 1) means-tested provision has large 
effects on the optimal policy, but the strength of this effect declines in older age; 2) there 
is a complex relationship between risky asset allocation and means-tested pension; and 
3) single individuals are faced with less risk from longevity than couples, as couples have 
a higher life expectancy for each person. Both Andreasson and Shevchenko (2018) and 
Andreasson et al. (2017) apply dynamic programming with expected utility maximisation 
assumptions in an overlapping generation model. Ding (2014) investigates a similar issue 
with a similar approach, but he applies a semi-analytical HARA utility model instead. 
Andreasson and Shevchenko (2018) and Andreasson et al. (2017) are among a few 
studies that attempt to draw a complete picture of optimal retirement choices, with an in-
depth inclusion of housing liquidation possibilities, but they exclude health. The health 
exclusion does not capture optimal outcomes that are time sensitive in their liquidation 
(such as illiquid housing), resulting from the need for liquid assets to support health 
shocks. 
Yogo (2016) explores asset allocation and health expenditure of retirees facing 
stochastic health deterioration. In his model, retirees choose their consumption, housing 
expenditure, health expenditure and how to allocate their financial investments. This 
study does not account for the house price shocks as included in Andreasson and 
Shevchenko (2018) and Andreasson et al. (2017), but it acknowledges that housing incurs 
separate expenditure from general consumption. Housing expenditure captures a constant 
depreciation rate, negative when downsizing and positive when upsizing. Although Yogo 
(2016) includes housing expenditure, he combines depreciation rate, and the housing 
scale changes into a single value of housing expenditure. However, housing expenditure 
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should only capture the amount of money spent for house maintenance, and not to expand 
or reduce house size or quality. Combining them together would cause a misperception 
when separating the roles of a house as a provider or utility (thus the need for housing 
expenditure or maintenance) and also as an asset (this relates to the size and the quality 
of house for investment purposes). Despite the strong applicability of a multi-state 
dependent model, there are not many studies on the Life-Cycle model in retirement that 
allow the use of state stochastic variables, and these variables can be applied to different 
state scenarios (Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018).109 
This literature review identifies the need for a study that extends the work of 
Andreasson and Shevchenko (2018) and Andreasson et al. (2017) to include housing 
liquidation in an optimal Life-Cycle model for retirees, using a similar approach of 
dynamic programming by including health states and housing expenditure as applied by 
Yogo (2016). In addition, the study should allow for income (Kraft and Munk, 2011) and 
house price shocks (Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018) to express retirees’ vulnerability 
of losing working capacity and reliance on investment returns (including housing). A 
complete study would also include borrowing (Kraft and Munk, 2008; Lim and Shin, 
2011; Vila and Zariphopoulou, 1997; Yao and Zhang, 2005) and liquidity constraints 
(Yogo, 2016; Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Yao and Zhang, 2005; Cocco et al., 2005). 
This chapter extends the literature on the optimal consumption in the Life-Cycle 
model by bridging the literature on optimal consumption and asset portfolio including 
housing, optimal portfolio and health without housing and optimal consumption and 
health expenditure. This study develops a simple multi-period Life-Cycle model with a 
focus on individuals at the decumulation stage of their life that includes stochastic income 
                                                          
109 Also Emms (2012); Blake et al. (2014); Kingston and Thorp (2005). 
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shocks, health shocks and housing price shocks. It investigates the optimal level for 
consumption expenditure, health expenditure, housing expenditure and ownership in a 
stylised setting. With intertemporal budget, borrowing and liquidity constraints on 
housing, this chapter creates a setting that is closer to the incomplete market of the Life-
Cycle model for retirees by including different possible housing tenure options. 
3.2.2. Research Motivation and Contribution 
The literature review elaborated on the development of the Life-Cycle model of 
consumption and the extension of the model by incorporating important issues such as 
income, health and asset holding. It pointed out a gap in the literature between studies 
that extend the model by including in-depth analysis of the role of housing (Andreasson 
and Shevchenko, 2018; Andreasson et al., 2017) and models that show the importance of 
health in a Life-Cycle model with housing (Yogo, 2016; Shao et al., 2019). Previous 
studies have also explained how individuals in the decumulation stage of their life-cycle 
have a different pattern of housing expenditure (Yang, 2009) and that their health plays 
a more important role in housing decision-making (Yogo, 2016).  
OECD (2015) statistics show that most households of retired individuals hold a 
majority of their assets in housing. Many versions of the Life-Cycle model of 
decumulation in old age imply that many versions of retirees may be reliant on asset 
liquidation (including housing) to support their consumption. Contrary findings by 
Telyukova and Nakajima (2010), Benartzi et al. (2011) and Poterba et al. (2011) show 
that individuals are reluctant to liquidate their homes, and only liquidate them in the event 
of an extreme health shock or spousal deaths. There are possible reasons for these results. 
Unlike any other shocks that could potentially be mitigated by precautionary savings, 
health shocks have a higher chance of being persistent. Retirees may experience health 
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shocks from which recovery is harder (e.g. stroke, cancer and other critical illnesses more 
prevalent in older individuals) and may even result in the need for long-term-care (LTC) 
assistance. Either of these possibilities may lead to the loss of working income and the 
need for substantial financial funding to last a longer period of recovery. Given that 
housing constitutes the largest component of a retiree’s wealth (OECD, 2015), retirees 
are inclined to liquidate housing in the event of a health shock. 
Retirees are more vulnerable to house price shocks due to heavy reliance on 
housing. Retirees are generally more prone to health shocks than their younger 
counterparts, as health deteriorates with age (Guiso et al., 2002; Ameriks and Zeldes 
2004). In the event of a health shock, retirees may need quick access to available liquid 
assets to support an increase in health expenditure. Given that most retirees rely on their 
housing for retirement support (Poterba  et al., 2011) and that health shocks may happen 
suddenly and unpredictably, retirees may be forced to accept a suboptimal housing 
liquidation value. Retirees are therefore more prone to losses from housing liquidation. 
Previous studies suggest there are several ways to liquidate housing to support a 
retiree’s consumption. Andreasson et al. (2017) and Andreasson and Shevchenko (2018) 
only include downsizing and reverse mortgages in their assessment of optimal 
consumption of retirees. However, due to retirees’ reluctance to liquidate housing unless 
there are extreme health shocks or a spousal death (Benartzi et al., 2011; Poterba et al., 
2011; Telyukova and Nakajima, 2011), the exclusion of the option to remain in their 
home may create an incomplete picture of retirees’ asset choices. These studies ignore 
the issues that housing maintenance can cause if a person remains in their own home. 
Yogo (2016) includes a constant depreciation rate of housing and allows for maintenance 
of the house through housing expenditure. Another possibility that Andreasson and 
Shevchenko (2018) and Andreasson et al. (2017) did not consider is renting. Retirees can 
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potentially liquidate their home and choose to rent or move to retirement care facilities, 
if they find that their health shock is so severe as to prevent them from living 
independently in their own homes.  
Housing choices depend on house price expectations (Kraft et al., 2017) and 
liquidation costs (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Cocco et al., 2005; Yao and Zhang, 2005; 
Yogo, 2016). When house prices are expected to rise, individuals may prefer to carry out 
maintenance on their existing house, upsize their homes or even purchase a home if they 
had been previously renting. In the event of an expected house price fall, the opposite 
choices prevail. Specifically, individuals can ignore maintenance, and allow their houses 
to depreciate, they can downsize or they can sell their homes and rent. High liquidation 
costs may deter individuals from selling their homes. Liquidation costs include the 
monetary costs of liquidation (e.g. agent’s fees, taxes and relocation cost) and non-
monetary costs (e.g. emotional costs of leaving a good neighbourhood and home with 
various memories, and the potential stress of relocating to a new environment and 
building new networks). House price expectations and liquidation costs are two aspects 
of decisions associated with housing scenarios that may affect one’s decision to change 
living arrangements. 
Retirees’ heavy reliance on housing wealth, their exposure to house price 
fluctuations and their vulnerability to house price shocks all point to the need for a 
stylised study to investigate retirees’ choices and their optimal consumption. Currently, 
no published study provides a detailed investigation of the role of health on optimal 
consumption and multiple living arrangement scenarios of retirees. Such a study can 
bridge a gap in the literature between optimal consumption and housing scenarios 
(Andreasson  et al., 2017; Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018) and the role of health in 
optimal consumption and housing assets for retirees (Yogo, 2016; Shao et al., 2019). 
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3.2.2.1. Research Questions  
This study examines how shocks to health, income and house price may affect the 
demand for housing among older households. It aims to address the following research 
questions:  
What is the optimal housing arrangement for retirees with a given income and asset 
portfolio? How does this optimal housing arrangement change as income and the value 
of the asset portfolio varies? 
What is the benchmark consumption and expenditure allocation for retirees when retirees 
are in good health? This will be used to make comparisons with other scenarios. 
In the absence of other shocks, how do retirees change their consumption and living 
arrangement in the event of a temporary or persistent health shock? 
How do retirees change their consumption and living arrangements in the event of a 
temporary or persistent health shock when house prices are expected to rise? 
How do retirees change their consumption and living arrangements in the event of a 
temporary or persistent health shock when house prices are expected to fall? 
3.3. Methodology 
To investigate the role of health shocks on living arrangements for retirees, a 
model should estimate optimal consumption, health expenditure and housing 
arrangements and expenditure as a function of random health, income and house price 
states. These state variables are subject to shocks that are described by a set of 
intertemporal transition probabilities.  In this study, a program is designed that finds 
optimal decision rules that are a function of health, income and wealth states (Yogo, 
2016; Andreasson et al., 2017; Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018; Shao et al., 2019). 
The computer modelling is done in the GAUSS programming language.  
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The Life-Cycle model is solved numerically, but many stages of the expected 
utility maximization problem have closed-form solutions (Andreasson et al., 2017; 
Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018). Total lifetime utility is calculated using the 
“addilog” (additive logarithmic) utility function that Wachter and Yogo (2010) use, but 
in this case it is applied to general consumption, health expenditure (Hugonnier et al., 
2012; Yogo, 2016) and housing expenditure (Yogo, 2016; Kraft et al., 2017). The 
separation of health and housing expenditure allows for deeper analysis of the shift in 
consumption patterns among retirees, relative to the case that there is only one type of 
consumption expenditure. Although there are other utility functions used in the literature, 
the choice of utility function applied may be less important than the inclusion of a budget 
constraint (Becker, 1962). Becker finds that employing different utility functions results 
in similar patterns over the Life-Cycle model. He further states that even irrational 
individuals not seeking utility maximisation are restricted in their decision-making due 
to budget constraints.  
This study follows Kraft et al. (2017) by allowing housing expenditure shares to 
vary as a function of total expenditure and are affected by an individual’s wealth and 
income. This assumption differs from most other studies that force the housing 
expenditure share of consumption to be constant (Nakajima, 2005; Kraft and Munk, 
2011). The study also extends Kraft et al. (2017) by allowing health and house price 
states to affect housing expenditure. Health expenditure has negative state dependence: 
it is a greater share of total consumption when health deteriorates, and it falls with better 
health states. There is a shift from general consumption to higher health expenditure in 
bad health states. (Viscusi and Evans, 1990; Sloan et al., 1998; Finkelstein et al., 2013). 
Health expenditure is also affected by income, wealth and house price states.  
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The variables are defined in Table 3.1. The utility equation in a particular period 
(or the felicity function) of the model depends on consumption, health expenditure and 
the amount of housing a person lives in (whether rented or owned). It also depends in a 
complex way described below in the bequest a person expects to leave. 𝑉𝑡 is the total 
utility including all types of utility 𝑈 relevant to that period. 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 , 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)   (1) 
Following Wachter and Yogo (2010), the felicity function excluding utility from 
bequests is 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶𝑡) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) + 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡),    (2) 
where 𝑈𝑡 is the utility at time t, 𝛼𝑐 , 𝛼ℎ , 𝛼𝑠 are the propensity for general consumption 
expenditure, health expenditure and housing expenditure, respectively. 
ln(𝐶𝑡) , ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) , ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) are estimations for utility from consumption (𝐶𝑡), health 
expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) and housing expenditure (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) in period t. 
Household maximise utility is subject to several constraints: 
(1) An intertemporal and intratemporal budget constraint as applied by Yao and 
Zhang (2005).  
(2) A borrowing constraint (He and Pages, 1993; Vila and Zariphopoulou, 1997; Yao 
and Zhang, 2005; Farhi and Panageas, 2007; Choi et al., 2008; Dybvig and Liu, 
2010; Kraft and Munk, 2011; Lim and Shin, 2011). 
(3) A liquidity constraint on housing that implies the incurrence of housing 
liquidation cost (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Cocco et al., 2005; Yao and Zhang, 
2005; Yogo, 2016). 
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An intertemporal and intratemporal budget constraint means that individuals 
make decisions based on the amount of money and assets they brought from previous 
periods, and what they acquire in that period (intratemporal). A borrowing constraint is 
applied because retirees find it difficult or impossible to take out a loan without collateral 
due to health vulnerability and mortality risk. Housing liquidation transaction costs are 
applied to capture not just monetary transaction costs of liquidation (e.g. agents’ fees, 
tax, lawyers, and movers’ costs), but also for non-monetary frictions (emotional and 
stress costs).110  
The model is solved numerically using a process of backward induction over a 
sequence of periods that allow multiple states of income (Kraft and Munk, 2011), health 
(Yogo, 2016; Shao et al., 2019) and house prices (Andreasson et al., 2017; Andreasson 
and Shevchenko, 2018) to capture the possibility of multiple shocks at any time. The 
model follows Bick et al. (2013) and Kraft et al. (2017) in exploring closed-form 
solutions in each time period. The program assumes that retirees make decisions on their 
consumption and housing at the beginning of every period (10 years). The program also 
assumes that older New Zealanders are aged 62 at the beginning of the first period and 
will be 82 at the beginning of the final period.111  
3.3.1. Final Period Calculations 
In each period, closed-form solutions are found that describe optimal housing and 
consumption choices for three different housing tenure choices: renting, staying in the 
retiree’s own home or selling and buying to change the amount of housing a person owns. 
The final period optimal housing and consumption decisions are calculated first.  The 
                                                          
110 Benartzi et al. (2011), Telyukova and Nakajima (2010) and Poterba et al. (2011) find that retirees use 
home liquidation as a very last resort, usually in the event of an extreme health shock or spousal death.  




final period (T) utility is used to estimate the previous period (T-1) and that period’s 
utility (T-1) is applied to estimate the period before (T-2). A three-period study is applied 
to capture changes in optimality in different timing considerations.  
Definitions of variables are available in Table 3.1. Each period lasts for n years. 
In the final period, the retiree knows that he or she will not live past the end of this period. 
Utility in the final period is described by equation (3): 
𝑈𝑇 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶𝑇) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇) + 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇) + 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 ln(10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡), 
          (3) 
where 𝑈𝑇 is the utility at final period T, 𝛼𝑐, 𝛼ℎ , 𝛼𝑠, 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 are the propensity for general 
consumption, health, housing expenditure and bequest, respectively. 
ln(𝐶𝑇) , ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇) , ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) , ln(10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡) are estimations for utility 
from consumption (𝐶𝑡), health expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡), housing expenditure (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) and 
bequest (10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡) at final period T. 
In the final period, the bequest is deliberately chosen. The utility in the final period 
depends on the size of the bequest individuals leave as well as their own consumption. 
In previous periods, the decision to leave a bequest is deliberate, but the timing of a 
bequest is accidental. The bequesters often receive utility from the bequest they anticipate 
leaving that depends on the size of the bequest. This is the last term in equation 3. The 
term “10000n” means the bequesters value their own utility, and ensures a bequest is left 
only after the bequesters have satisfied their consumption, health expenditure and house 
expenditure in the final period requirements. “10000” only appears in the utility function 
of the bequester but it does not appear in the budget constraint because the “10000” value 
is only relevant to the bequestee. The marginal utility a bequester receives from leaving 
a bequest is equal to the marginal utility of an additional dollar received by a bequestee, 
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assuming they have at least “10000” of income initially. The purpose of this is to mitigate 
excessive marginal utility values of an additional dollar of bequest, and consequently 
skewing the total utility equation weighting, if the bequestee had no income at all. Since 
people do not know when they will die, in earlier periods they contemplate a schedule of 
possible bequests that might occur in different states of their wealth. Their decisions in 
earlier periods take into account the utility obtained in different states by those receiving 
a bequest. Thus, their savings are made in anticipation of their survival probabilities and 
the amount of bequest they leave in these different states. Note that the general findings 
are robust to using different values for the bequest amount, which is originally assumed 
to be $10,000. Modigliani (1986) suggests that an intended bequest is only available for 
individuals with the highest income and wealth brackets. Meanwhile, outside that group, 
unintended bequest occurs because of precautionary saving for survivorship uncertainty.  
The study assumes two types of transition probability matrices governing the 
probability of different health and income states. The first is an equal transition 
probability matrix that has equal probability across health, income and house price status, 
while the other has a persistent probability of bad health status. The former assumes that 
the probabilities of moving between different of states are equal. The latter assumes that 
an individual has a higher probability of remaining in poor health if they were in a poor 
health state in the previous period. It also assumes the probability of health deterioration 
is higher than health improvement. The second transition matrix is based on the health 
transition matrices used by Ameriks et al. (2011). Their study is based on US data from 
the National Centre for Health Statistics. 
In the final period, individuals choose one of three housing arrangements, their 
consumption and the size of the bequest they wish to leave. If they previously owned a 
house, they choose whether to stay in the same house or to sell and buy a different house. 
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The optimal utility is calculated for each of the three “Rent”, “Stay” and “Sell” options. 
Each of these problems can be solved analytically. The utility from each of these options 
are compared with each other to determine which housing option is chosen. Each housing 
scenario has a Lagrangian equation that sets the utility function relevant to each housing 
scenario that accounts for consumption, health expenditure, housing expenditure, bequest 
(only for final period) and “savings”/wealth brought forward into the next period (for 
period T2 and T1). The derivation of the Lagrangian equations sets the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions relevant in estimating optimal consumption, health expenditure and housing 
for a particular housing scenario. Within each housing scenario, there may be sub-
conditions that are available specifically relevant to a particular housing scenario, for 
example, the option of leaving a bequest and the form of bequest (in the final period), the 
option of bringing an asset forward into the next period and the form of asset brought 
forward into the next period (for period T1 and T2). These sub-conditions have their own 
set of equations in estimating consumption, health expenditure, housing, bequest (only 
for final period) and “savings”/wealth brought forward into the next period (for period 
T2 and T1). 
3.3.1.1. Housing Scenario: Rent Case 
In the final period, individuals could either sell their own houses at the end of the 
previous period and then choose to rent a house of an optimal size in the final period, or 
alternatively, if they were renters in the previous period (with a potentially suboptimal 
house size), they could continue to rent a house in the final period. In addition, individuals 
who rent can potentially 1) leave a bequest in the form of liquid wealth when they die or 
2) leave no bequest. The Lagrangian equation for Rent in the last period is derived from 
(3) by applying an intertemporal budget constraint 𝜆1 and a constraint 𝜇1 that the bequest 
cannot be negative.  
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𝑈𝑇 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶𝑇) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇) + 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇) + 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 ln(10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
−𝜆1[∅𝑇𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 + ∅𝑇𝐶𝑇 + ∅𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇 + 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇
𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 − 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡] − 𝜇1[∅𝑇𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡] 
          (4) 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝐴𝑙𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝛿)






− 1       (4.b) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 = (1 + 𝑁𝑜𝑚_𝑛𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡)
1
𝑛 − 1  (4.c) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑚_𝑛𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 = (1 + ((1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡) ∗ (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) − 1) ∗ (1 −
𝑡𝑎𝑥))
𝑛𝑡
− 1       (4.d) 
𝜋𝑛 = (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑛       (4.e) 
𝑟𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1 + 𝑁𝑜𝑚_𝑛𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡/(1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
𝑛𝑡    (4.f) 









          (4.g) 
where 𝑈𝑇 is the utility at final period T, 𝛼𝑐, 𝛼ℎ , 𝛼𝑠, 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 are the propensity for general 
consumption, health, housing expenditure and bequest, respectively. 
ln(𝐶𝑇) , ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇) , ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) , ln(10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡) are estimations for utility 
from consumption (𝐶𝑡), health expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡), housing expenditure (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) and 
bequest (10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡) at final period T. ∅𝑇 is the discount term in final period 
T, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇
𝑝
 is the rent price per sqm in period T, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 is the house size in period T, 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the total liquid wealth in period T when renting, 𝑌𝑡 is income, 𝐴𝑙𝑡 is liquid 
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asset, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 is house size in period t-1, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 is house price per sqm, (1 − 𝛿)
𝑛 is the 
total depreciation of house in a period, 𝐿𝑖𝑞 is the transaction cost for housing liquidation, 
𝜑𝑛 is the annual return from house price change, 𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑚_𝑛𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the net 
nominal interest in a period, 𝜋𝑛 is the inflation in a period and 𝑟𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 is the real 
interest in a period. Rent is estimated as the opportunity forgone by landlords by 
purchasing a rental home, rather than investing in the financial market. It is dependent 
on current house price and future house price expectations, also accounting for inflation, 
interest rates and tax.  
The study calculates the optimal consumption, housing and health expenditure 
choices from the estimation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions by solving the constrained 
optimisation problem (4). The first order conditions are the following: 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑐   
𝛼𝑐
𝐶𝑡
− 𝜆1∅𝑇 = 0     (4.1a) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕ℎ   
𝛼ℎ
𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡
− 𝜆1∅𝑇 = 0     (4.1b) 





∗ 𝜆1 = 0     




− 𝜆1∅𝑇 − 𝜇1∅𝑇 = 0   (4.1d) 
The first-order conditions are used to estimate the values for optimal 
consumption, health expenditure and house expenditure. See Table 3.1 or after equation 
(4.g) for variable information.  
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3.3.1.1.1. Case 1  
When a retiree leaves a bequest in the form of liquid wealth at the end of the final 
period (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 > 0 and 𝜇1 = 0), then the closed-form solutions for optimal general 
consumption, health expenditure and house size from solving the Kuhn-Tucker 











     
        (4.2a) 










     














𝑝     
        (4.2c) 
𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 = (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − ∅𝑇𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡 − ∅𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡 − (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇
𝑝)) ∗ 𝑟𝑛  
        (4.2d) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (4.g) for variable information. 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the optimal values for general consumption, health and house 
expenditure. 
3.3.1.1.2. Case 2  
When a retiree does not leave a bequest at the end of the final period (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 =
0 and 𝜇1 > 0), the closed-form solutions for optimal general consumption, health 
expenditure and house size from solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions given by Equation 







𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡      (4.3a) 




𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡      





𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡     (4.3c) 
𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 0         (4.3d) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (4.g) for variable information. 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the optimal values for general consumption, health and house 
expenditure. 
3.3.1.2. Housing Scenario: Sell/Buy Case 
In this case, individuals sell the houses they own at the beginning of the final 
period and buy another house. They then stay in the new house until the end of the final 
period. The bequest comprises liquid wealth (𝐵𝑒𝑞1) and the liquidation value of the ‘new’ 
house (𝐵𝑒𝑞2). Individuals can potentially 1) leave the house (𝐵𝑒𝑞2 > 0) and a positive 
liquid wealth (𝐵𝑒𝑞1 > 0) or 2) leave only the house (𝐵𝑒𝑞2>0) and no liquid wealth 
(𝐵𝑒𝑞1 = 0). The Lagrangian equation for the Sell/Buy case is derived from the utility 
function (3) by applying an intertemporal budget constraint on liquid wealth (𝜆1) and on 
housing liquidation value (𝜆2) and a non-negative constraint (𝜇1) that the liquid wealth 
bequest cannot be negative: 
𝑈𝑇 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶𝑇) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇) + 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇) + 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 ln (10000 ∗ 𝑛 +
𝐵𝑒𝑞1+𝐵𝑒𝑞2
∅𝑇∗𝜋𝑛
) − 𝜆1[∅𝑇𝐵𝑒𝑞1 − (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − ∅𝑇𝐶𝑇 − ∅𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇) ∗
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𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟] − 𝜆2[𝐵𝑒𝑞2 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝛿
𝑛) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇] − 𝜇1[−∅𝑇𝐵𝑒𝑞1]  
         (5) 
𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = (1 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖1)
𝑛      (5.a) 
𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝛿
𝑛) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞     (5.b) 
The first-order conditions are the following: 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑐𝑇    
𝛼𝑐
𝐶𝑇
− 𝜆1 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ ∅𝑇 = 0     
         (5.1a) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕ℎ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇   
𝛼ℎ
𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇
− 𝜆1 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ ∅𝑇 = 0     




− 𝜆1 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 𝜆2 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 0   
         (5.1c) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝐵𝑒𝑞1   
𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞
𝜋𝑛∗∅𝑇10000∗𝑛+𝐵𝑒𝑞1+𝐵𝑒𝑞2
− 𝜆1∅𝑇 − 𝜇1∅𝑇 = 0    
         (5.1d) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝐵𝑒𝑞2    
𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞
𝜋𝑛∗∅𝑇10000∗𝑛+𝐵𝑒𝑞1+𝐵𝑒𝑞2
− 𝜆2 = 0   (5.1e) 
where 𝑈𝑇 is the utility at final period T, 𝛼𝑐, 𝛼ℎ , 𝛼𝑠, 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 are the propensities for general 
consumption, health, housing expenditure and bequest, respectively. 
ln(𝐶𝑇) , ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇) , ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) , ln(10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡) are estimations for utility 
from consumption (𝐶𝑡), health expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡), housing expenditure (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) and 
bequest (10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡) at final period T. ∅𝑇 is the discount term in final period 




𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 is the total liquid wealth in period T when selling, (1 − 𝛿)𝑛 is the total 
depreciation of house in a period, and 𝐿𝑖𝑞 is the transaction cost for housing liquidation. 
𝜋𝑛 is the compounded inflation in period t return from house price change that depends 
on the number of periods away from the final period. 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 is the compounded net interest 
in period t or the return on housing investment. 𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 is the expected future house price 
next period net of depreciation 𝛿 and liquidation cost 𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 is the expected future 
house price next period dependent on the house price state next period. 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 is the 
current period’s house price at a given house price state. 𝜋𝑛 is the compounded inflation 
in period t. This depends on the number of periods away from the final period. 
3.3.1.2.1. Case 1  
When a retiree leaves a bequest in the form of liquid wealth and the liquidation 
value of their house (𝑒1 > 0 and 𝜇1 = 0), the closed-form solutions for optimal general 
consumption, health expenditure and house size from solving the Kuhn-Tucker 





𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋
𝑛 ∗ ∅𝑇)  
         (5.2a) 




𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋
𝑛 ∗ ∅𝑇) 
         (5.2b) 




𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗






) ∗ (𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 − (𝛼𝑠 ∗
𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝∗𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟−𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
)) − 10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋𝑛 ∗ ∅𝑇 
         (5.2d) 
𝐵𝑒𝑞2 = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟       (5.2e) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (5.1e) for variable information. 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the optimal values for general consumption, health and house 
expenditure. 𝐵𝑒𝑞1 is the liquid wealth bequest and 𝐵𝑒𝑞2 is the house value bequest. 
3.3.1.2.2. Case 2  
When a retiree leaves a bequest that is only the liquidation value of their house 
(𝑒1 = 0 and 𝜇1 ≥ 0), the closed-form solutions for optimal general consumption, health 
expenditure and house size.  
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 is the solution to the following quadratic equation: 
0 = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡
2 ∗ [−𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ (𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼ℎ + 𝛼𝑠) + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 ∗ [𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ∗
𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ (𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼𝑠) − (10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋
𝑛 ∗ ∅𝑇 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝) ∗ (𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼ℎ + 𝛼𝑠)] +
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ∗ ∅𝑇 ∗ 𝛼𝑠 ∗ (10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋
𝑛)       
         (5.3a) 
The partial derivatives of (5.3a) are the following: 




    
         (5.3b) 




   
         (5.3c) 
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𝐵𝑒𝑞2 = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟      (5.3d) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (5.1e) for variable information. 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the optimal values for general consumption, health and house 
expenditure. 𝐵𝑒𝑞1 is the liquid wealth bequest and 𝐵𝑒𝑞2 is the house value bequest. 
3.3.1.3. Housing Scenario: Stay 
In the case for Stay in the final period, an individual stays in his or her own house 
until the end of the final period. The owners can choose to maintain the value of their 
houses or to let the houses depreciate. The choice for maintaining their houses depends 
on whether the owners expect house prices to rise or fall at the end of the final period. If 
individuals expect house prices to rise, they may choose to forgo current spending and 
maintain their home to leave a larger bequest. The bequesters receive utility from 
knowing that their bequestees would receive a higher-value house. If the owners expect 
a house price to fall, they may choose to not maintain their houses.  
The bequest options for Stay are 1) zero maintenance and zero monetary bequest 
(𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑛) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇); 2) zero maintenance and positive monetary 
bequest (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝐵𝑒𝑞 + (1 − 𝛿
𝑛) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇); 3) positive 
maintenance and zero monetary bequest (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑛 + 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇); and 4) positive maintenance and a positive monetary bequest 
(𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝐵𝑒𝑞 + (1 − 𝛿
𝑛 + 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇). 
The Lagrangian equation for Stay in the last period is derived from equation (3) 
by applying an intertemporal budget constraint on total value of wealth (housing and 










+ (∅𝑇𝐶𝑇 + ∅𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗
𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)] ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 − (1 − 𝛿
𝑛 + 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞] −
𝜇1[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦
− ∅𝑇𝐶𝑇 − ∅𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒] + 𝜇2 ∗
𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑒         (6)  
The first-order conditions are: 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑐𝑇    
𝛼𝑐
𝐶𝑇
− 𝜆1∅𝑇 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 − 𝜇1∅𝑇 = 0    
         (6.1a) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕ℎ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇   
𝛼ℎ
𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇
− 𝜆1∅𝑇 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 − 𝜇1∅𝑇 = 0    
         (6.1b) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒   𝜆1[(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞] − 𝜇1 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗







− 𝜆1 = 0    (6.1d) 
where 𝑈𝑇 is the utility at final period T, 𝛼𝑐, 𝛼ℎ , 𝛼𝑠, 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 are the propensities for general 
consumption, health, housing expenditure and bequest, respectively. 
ln(𝐶𝑇) , ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇) , ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) , ln(10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡) are estimations for utility 
from consumption (𝐶𝑡), health expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡), housing expenditure (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) and 
bequest (10000 ∗ 𝑛 + 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡) at final period T. ∅𝑇 is the discount term in final period 
T, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 is the house price per sqm in period T, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 is the house size in period T, 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦
 is the total liquid wealth in period T when staying in own home, (1 − 𝛿)𝑛 is 
the total depreciation of house in a period, 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the value of maintenance 
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which is equal to the value of depreciation, and 𝐿𝑖𝑞 is the transaction cost for housing 
liquidation. 𝜋𝑛 is the compounded inflation in period t return from house price change 
that depends on the number of periods away from the final period. 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 is the 
compounded net interest in period t or the return on housing investment. 𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 is the 
expected future house price next period net of depreciation 𝛿 and liquidation cost 𝐿𝑖𝑞. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 is the expected future house price next period dependent on the house price state 
next period. 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 is the current period’s house price at a given house price state. 𝜋
𝑛 
is the compounded inflation in period t. This depends on the number of periods away 
from the final period.  
3.3.1.3.1. Case 1  
When retirees do no maintenance and have zero liquid wealth (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 =
(1 − 𝛿) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇). This implies a person will do no maintenance and leave a zero 
monetary bequest if the marginal utility of consumption exceeds the marginal utility of a 





𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦) − 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞 ∗
𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
10000∗𝑛∗𝜋𝑛∅𝑇+(1−𝛿𝑛)∗𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃∗𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇
> 0   (6.2a) 
And 
 𝜇2 = 
𝛼𝑐
𝑐
∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 − (
𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞
10000𝑡∗𝜋𝑛+(1−𝛿𝑛)∗𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃∗𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 > 0 
           (6.2b) 










)     (6.2c) 
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Equations (6.2a) and (6.2c) need to be calculated to determine whether Case 1 holds. The 
closed-form solutions for optimal general consumption, health expenditure and house 






        
          (6.2d) 





       
          (6.2e) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇         (6.2f) 
𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0         (6.2g) 
𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇       (6.2h) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (6.1e) for variable information. 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the optimal values for general consumption, health and house 
expenditure. 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 is the value of the bequest in the form of a house. 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
is the maintenance done on the house. 
3.3.1.3.2. Case 2  
Case 2 retirees leave a monetary bequest but do no maintenance (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 >
(1 − 𝛿) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒). The conditions for this case to hold are the following: 













     
          (6.3b) 
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From (6.3a) and for 𝜇2 > 0 to hold: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 < 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟       (6.3c) 
People do no maintenance when the expected future price (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃) is lower than 
the current house price and the investment return from housing (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟). If 
house prices are expected to fall, individuals are deterred from maintaining their houses, 
but prefer to leave a liquid wealth bequest because the return from liquid wealth is greater 
than an investment in housing maintenance. When this condition holds, the closed-form 
solutions for optimal general consumption, health expenditure and house size from 








+ ((1 − 𝛿𝑛) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃
𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟




         (6.3d) 







+ ((1 − 𝛿𝑛) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃
𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
) + (10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗
𝜋𝑛
𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
)]          (6.3e) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇        (6.3f) 








+ (1 − 𝛿𝑛) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 + 10000 ∗
𝑛 ∗ 𝜋𝑛] − 10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋𝑛       (6.3h) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (6.1e) for variable information. 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the optimal values for general consumption, health and house 
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expenditure. 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 represents the value of the bequest in the form of a liquid wealth 
and 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 refers to the maintenance done on the house. 
 
3.3.1.3.3. Case 3  
In this case, retirees undertake maintenance but do not leave money as a bequest 
(𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑛 − 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇). This occurs when 




> 0     (6.4a) 
So, in order for 𝜇1 > 0 to hold: 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 > 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟       (6.4b) 
Households undertake maintenance when the expected future price (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃) is 
higher than the current house price and the investment return from housing (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗
𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟). In the event of an expected house price rise, individuals are encouraged to 
maintain their houses, as they expect a greater value from them in the future. Expectations 
of rising house prices also deter individuals from leaving liquid wealth, as the return from 
housing is greater than the return from liquid wealth. When this condition holds, the 
closed-form solutions for optimal general consumption, health expenditure and house 








+ 10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋𝑛 ∗
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑛) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝]         (6.4c) 
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+ 10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋𝑛 ∗
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑛) ∗
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝]        (6.4d) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇          






      
         (6.4f) 








 − 10000 ∗
𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝜋          (6.4g) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (6.1e) for variable information. 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the optimal values for general consumption, health and house 
expenditure. 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 is the liquid wealth amount of the bequest and 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is 
the cost of house maintenance. 
3.3.1.3.4. Case 4  
In this case, retirees leave both liquid wealth and undertake maintenance 
(𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 > (1 − 𝛿𝑛 − 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇). The case occurs when the 
return from maintenance and liquid wealth are the same. Case 4 holds when 
𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 > 0, 𝜇1 = 0, 𝜇2 = 0: 
The condition for case 4 to hold is  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝 = 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟.        
         (6.5a) 
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This assumes that Case 4 of leaving a bequest of liquid wealth and investing in 
maintenance occurs when the expected future price equates the current house price and 
its returns. Equal price suggests that individuals are indifferent in choosing the balance 
of bequest left as liquid wealth or as a maintained house. The study assumes that 
individuals only make a monetary bequest (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 > (1 − 𝛿 − 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒). When an equal price condition holds, the closed-form solutions for optimal 
general consumption, health expenditure and house size from solving the Kuhn-Tucker 










      
         (6.5b) 








∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋
𝑛 + (1 − 𝛿𝑛) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃]          (6.5c) 







∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 10000 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝜋
𝑛 + (1 − 𝛿𝑛) ∗
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃]        (6.5d) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒        (6.5e) 








∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 + (1 − 𝛿
𝑛) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 + 10000 ∗
𝑛 ∗ 𝜋𝑛] − 10000 ∗ 𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝜋         
         (6.5g) 
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See Table 3.1 or after equation (6.1e) for variable information. 𝑊𝑡 is the liquid 
wealth available, and 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the optimal values for general 
consumption, health and house expenditure. 
3.3.1.4. Choice Between Housing Scenarios 
Individuals choose the maximum of the three options (Stay, Sell/Buy or Rent). 
While there are analytical solutions to each scenario, the solution has to be calculated 
numerically. The optimal solution is calculated for all states at period T and this solution 
is used to calculate the solutions for T-1. 
3.3.2. Previous Period (T-I) Calculations 
The decision rules and utility calculations for earlier periods are derived from a 
constrained optimisation (Lagrangian) equation. The constraints depend on whether 
individuals Rent, Sell/Buy or Stay. The following equations are used to calculate the 
decisions made at some period t before the final period T, and assume the functions 
describing optimal behaviour and optimal utilities at time t+1 are already calculated. The 
estimation from the relevant Lagrangian equation based on the general utility equation 
(2): 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶𝑡) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) + 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽 𝐸(𝑈𝑡+1)   (7) 
where 𝑈𝑡 is the utility at period t, 𝛼𝑐, 𝛼ℎ , 𝛼𝑠, 𝛽  are the propensity for general 
consumption, health, housing expenditure and “savings” or bringing wealth into the next 
period, respectively. ln(𝐶𝑡) , ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) , ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) , 𝐸(𝑈𝑡+1) are estimations for utility 
from consumption (𝐶𝑡), health expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡), housing expenditure (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) and 
“savings” or expected utility from wealth brought into next period 𝐸(𝑈𝑡+1) at period t. 
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3.3.2.1. Housing Scenario: Rent Case 
In the Rent case period t, individuals could either sell the house they owned at the 
end of the previous period, and then choose to rent a house of an optimal size in the 
current period. Alternatively, if they were renters in the previous period, they could rent 
an optimally sized house in the current period. Individuals can potentially 1) take liquid 
wealth into the following period as savings (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 > 0) or 2) take no wealth into 
the following period (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 = 0). The Lagrangian equation for Rent maximises 
equation (7) subject to an intertemporal budget constraint (𝜆1) and a borrowing constraint 
(𝜇1) that 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 cannot be negative: 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶𝑡) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) + 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽 𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) 
−𝜆1[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 + ∅𝑡𝐶𝑡 + ∅𝑡𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑝
∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 − 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡] − 𝜇1[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1]  
(8) 
𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑡𝑉 = 𝛽 𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1)     (8.a) 
where 𝑈𝑡 is the utility at period t, 𝛼𝑐, 𝛼ℎ , 𝛼𝑠, 𝛽  are the propensity for general 
consumption, health, housing expenditure and “savings” or bringing wealth into the next 
period, respectively. ln(𝐶𝑡) , ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) , ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) , 𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) are 
estimations for utility from consumption (𝐶𝑡), health expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡), housing 
expenditure (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) and “savings” or expected utility from wealth brought into next 
period 𝐸(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) in the form of money and house at period t. ∅𝑡 is the 
discount term in period t, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑝
 is the rent price per sqm in period t, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 is the house 
size in period t, 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the total liquid wealth in period t when renting, 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 
and 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 is the liquid wealth and housing wealth brought into next period (t+1). 
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𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) is the expected utility at time 𝑡 + 1 for someone with wealth 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 and a house size of 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1. 
The first-order conditions are the following: 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑐𝑡    
𝛼𝑐
𝐶𝑡
− 𝜆1∅𝑡 = 0      
         (8.1a) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕ℎ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡   
𝛼ℎ
𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡
− 𝜆1∅𝑡 = 0      
         (8.1b) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡   
𝛼𝑠
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡
− 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑝 ∗ 𝜆1 = 0     




− 𝜆1 − 𝜇1 = 0     
         (8.1d) 
See after (8.a) for variable information. 
3.3.2.1.1. Case 1  
When a retiree takes liquid wealth into the next period then the closed-form 
solutions for optimal general consumption, health expenditure and house size from 





𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡      (8.2a) 




𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡         







𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡         
         (8.2c) 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − ∅𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡 − ∅𝑡𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑝
   
         (8.2d) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (8.a) for variable information. 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the optimal values for general consumption, health and house 
expenditure. 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 is the value of liquid wealth brought into next period t+1. 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is adjusted for compounded inflation as all the terms are estimated at real 
value. 
3.3.2.1.2. Case 2 
When individuals take no liquid wealth into the next period, the closed-form 
solutions for optimal general consumption, health expenditure and house size from 





𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡      (8.3a) 




𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡      





𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡    (8.3c) 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 = 0        (8.3d) 
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3.3.2.2. Housing Scenario: Sell/Buy 
In the case for Sell/Buy in period t, individuals sell their original house at the 
beginning of a period and purchase a different sized house bringing forward the ‘new’ 
house into the next period. In Sell/Buy, individuals choose whether to spend on 
maintaining their house or to let the house depreciate until the end of the period. The 
options for Sell/Buy are 1) hold no liquid wealth and do no maintenance on the ‘new’ 
house; 2) hold positive liquid wealth and do no maintenance in their home; 3) hold liquid 
wealth into the next period and choose to invest in house maintenance; and 4) take both 
liquid wealth into the future and undertake house maintenance. The Lagrangian equation 
for Sell/Buy in period t is derived from (7) by applying an intertemporal budget constraint 
on total value of wealth (𝜆1), and on housing taken into the next period (𝜆2), and a non-
negative constraint on maintenance (𝜇1) and on liquid wealth held as savings (𝜇2): 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶𝑡) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) + 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽 𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) −
𝜆1[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 − (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑡 − ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗
((𝛿𝑛 − 1) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟] − 𝜆2[𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿
𝑛 + 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡) ∗
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡] + 𝜇1[𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡] + 𝜇2[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1]      
           (9) 
Note that maintenance is defined implicitly: 
𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 = [(𝛿 − 1) +
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡
]     (9.a) 
The first order conditions are the following: 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑐𝑡    
𝛼𝑐
𝐶𝑡
− 𝜆1 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 0     
         (9.1a) 
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𝜕𝑢/𝜕ℎ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡   
𝛼ℎ
𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡
− 𝜆1 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 0     




− 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝛿 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝜆1 − 𝜆2 − 𝜇1(1 − 𝛿) = 0  




[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] − 𝜆1 + 𝜇2 = 0    




[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝜆1 − 𝜆2 + 𝜇1 = 0 
          (9.1e) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  𝜇1 + 𝜆2 = 0       
          (9.1f)     
For notation simplification: 
 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑚 = 𝛽 𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑚
[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1]      (9.1g) 
𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑠 = 𝛽 𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑆
[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1]      (9.1h) 
where 𝑈𝑡 is the utility at period t, 𝛼𝑐, 𝛼ℎ , 𝛼𝑠, 𝛽  are the propensity for general 
consumption, health, housing expenditure and “savings” or bringing wealth into the next 
period, respectively. ln(𝐶𝑡) , ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) , ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) , 𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) are 
estimations for utility from consumption (𝐶𝑡), health expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡), housing 
expenditure (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) and “savings” or expected utility from wealth brought into next 
period 𝐸(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) in the form of money and house at period t. ∅𝑡 is the 
discount term in period t, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 is the house price per sqm in period t, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 is the 
house size in period t, 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 is the total liquid wealth in period t when 
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selling/buying, (1 − 𝛿)𝑛 is the total depreciation of house in a period, 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is 
the value of maintenance done on the house and 𝐿𝑖𝑞 is the transaction cost for housing 
liquidation. 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 is the compounded net interest in period t or the return on housing 
investment. 𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 is the expected future house price next period net of depreciation 𝛿 and 
liquidation cost 𝐿𝑖𝑞.  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 and 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 is the liquid wealth and housing wealth 
brought into next period (t+1). 𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) is the expected utility at time 




[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] and 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑠 = 𝛽 𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑆
[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] are the partial 
derivatives from the expected utility from money and house brought forward, based on 
money and house size, respectively. 
3.3.2.2.1. Case 1  
This is the case when an individual holds no liquid wealth and does no house 
maintenance: that is 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 0, 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 = 0, 𝜇1 > 0, 𝜇2 > 0. From the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions in (9.1), the conditions for this case to hold arise from the 
inequalities 𝜇1 > 0 and 𝜇2 > 0: 
(9.2a) means an individual chooses a larger house than necessary to equate marginal 
utility from housing with marginal utility of consumption this period, as the house also 
provides utility in the next period. This suggests that the marginal utility from housing in 






)      (9.2a) 
 (9.2b) implies that no liquid wealth is held because the marginal utility of liquid wealth 
next period is less than the marginal utility of consumption this period. Individuals 
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receive higher marginal utility from current consumption than marginal utility from 




)      (9.2b) 
(9.2c) requires the marginal utility of housing next period to be less than the marginal 
utility of consumption this period because the person also receives marginal utility from 
this period’s housing. This means that the marginal utility from housing next period is 




)       (9.2c) 
To summarise the conditions for case 1: 
𝑀𝑈(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) < 𝑀𝑈(𝐶𝑡) 
𝑀𝑈(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1) < 𝑀𝑈(𝐶𝑡) 




The solutions 𝑋 = [𝐶𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡]′ is derived from the first order conditions in (9.1): 
The solution is derived numerically. Let 𝑋 = [𝐶𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡]′ that solves 𝐹(𝑋) = 0 where 
𝐹(𝑋) = [
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − (∅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑡 (1 +
ℎ
𝑐
) + 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡)
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑐 − 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝛽 𝐸𝑉𝑠[0, (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)𝑆𝑡] ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)−𝑠∗𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡
] = 0      
                 
 (9.2d) 









−𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝛽 𝐸𝑉𝑠[0, (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡] ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)−𝑠 ∗ ∅𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑐 − 𝛽 𝐸𝑉𝑠[0, (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡] ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 − ) − 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝐸
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒2
[0, (1 − 𝛿𝑛)𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡] ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)2
]  
                 (9.2e) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (9.1h) for variable information. Starting with an initial guess 𝑋0, the optimal solution 𝑋𝑡 is found numerically 




3.3.2.2.2. Case 2  
This case is when an individual holds liquid wealth but does no house maintenance; that is 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 0, 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 > 0, 𝜇1 >
0, 𝜇2 = 0. The conditions for this case to hold arise from the inequality 𝜇1 > 0: 
(9.3a) states that the marginal utility of current consumption is less than the marginal utility of taking liquid wealth into the next period. 
𝛼𝑐
𝐶𝑡∗∅𝑡∗𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
< 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑚              (9.3a) 
(9.3b) implies that the marginal utility of taking liquid wealth into the next period is greater than investing in maintenance.  
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑚 > 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑠            (9.3b) 
𝑀𝑈(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1) > 𝑀𝑈(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) Individuals are better off accumulating wealth as money rather than by maintaining a house. 
Lastly, the case requires the marginal utility from current consumption must be higher than current marginal utility from housing (9.3c). 
𝛼𝑠
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡




             (9.3c) 







> 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑠              (9.3d) 
To summarise the conditions for case 2: 
𝑀𝑈(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) < 𝑀𝑈(𝐶𝑡) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑈(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) < 𝑀𝑈(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1) 
𝑀𝑈(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) < 𝑀𝑈(𝐶𝑡) 
𝑀𝑈(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1) = 𝑀𝑈(𝐶𝑡) 
To derive three equations from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions in (9.1) with three unknowns: 










− 𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑚
[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)𝑆𝑡]
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝛼𝑐 − 𝛽𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑚
[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)𝑆𝑡] ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)) − 𝑠∗𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − (𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
ℎ
𝑐






    (9.3e) 













[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, (1 − 𝛿
𝑛) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡] −𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝐸
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝜕𝑠
[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, (1 − )𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡] ∗ (1 − 𝛿
𝑛) −𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝐸
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑚2





[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡]∅𝑡(1 − 𝛿
𝑛) − 𝑠∅𝑡 (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝𝛼𝑐 − 𝛽𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑠








[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, (1 − 𝛿
𝑛)𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡]𝐶𝑡∅𝑡(1 − 𝛿
𝑛)
∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
ℎ
𝑐







See Table 3.1 or after equation (9.1h) for variable information. The derivation of the equation (9.3f) starts with an initial guess 𝑋0, the optimal 
solution 𝑋𝑡 is found numerically using the Newton Rhapson algorithm by setting 𝐹(𝑋) = 0 using equations 9.3e and 9.3f. 
3.3.2.2.3. Case 3  
This is the case when an individual undertakes house maintenance but liquid savings are zero; that is 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 > 0 , 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 =






 [0, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1]                   
(9.4a) 
(9.4a) implies that when 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝
∅𝑡






 [0, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1]. In the event of higher future house price, the marginal utility from 








 [0, (1 − 𝛿𝑛)𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡]           (9.4aa) 




 [0, 𝑠𝑡+1] <
𝛼𝑐
𝐶𝑡∗∅𝑡∗𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
             (9.4b)   
  
Together these conditions imply 
𝑀𝑈(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) > 𝑀𝑈(𝐶𝑡) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
𝑀𝑈(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1) < 𝑀𝑈(𝐶𝑡) 






 𝛼𝑐 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 − 𝛽𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑠
[0, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡
𝛼𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝛿
𝑛 ∗ 𝛼𝑐 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − (𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
ℎ
𝑐
) + 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝛿





    (9.4c) 














[0, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] ∗ ∅𝑡 0 −𝛽𝐸
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑆2
[0, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡
𝛼𝑠 ∗ ∅𝑡 −𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝛿
𝑛 ∗ 𝛼𝑐 0
−∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
ℎ
𝑐






       (9.4d) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (9.1h) for variable information. Starting with an initial guess 𝑋0, the optimal solution 𝑋𝑡 is found numerically 
using the Newton Rhapson algorithm by setting 𝐹(𝑋) = 0 using equations 9.4d and 9.4e. 
3.3.2.2.4. Case 4  
This is the case when both house maintenance and liquid wealth are positive; that is 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 > 0 , 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 > 0, 𝜇1 = 0, 







𝛼𝑐 − 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑀 ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
𝛼𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝛿
𝑛 ∗ 𝛼𝑐 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 − (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − (∅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ (1 +
ℎ
𝑐
) + 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝛿
𝑛 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟





   (9.5a) 














 −𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑀 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 0 −𝛽𝐸
𝜕2𝑉
𝑚2
[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 −𝛽𝐸
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝜕𝑠
[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
𝛼𝑠 ∗ ∅𝑡 −𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝛿
𝑛 ∗ 𝛼𝑐 0 0
∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
ℎ
𝑐
) ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝛿
𝑛 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 1 −𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
−𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑆 ∗ ∅𝑡 0 −𝛽𝐸
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝜕𝑠
[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1] ∗ 𝐶𝑡 ∗ ∅𝑡 −𝛽𝐸
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝑠2










Starting with an initial guess 𝑋0, the optimal solution 𝑋𝑡 is found numerically using the Newton Rhapson algorithm by setting 𝐹(𝑋) = 0 




3.3.2.3. Housing Scenario: Stay 
In Stay, the individuals stay in the house they had last period. They choose how 
much to spend on maintaining the value of their house. Zero maintenance means that the 
house depreciates until the end of the period. The amount of maintenance depends on 
individuals’ expectations for the house prices next period. If individuals expect house 
prices to rise, they may choose to forgo current spending and invest in maintaining their 
home, as it is an investment.  
The options for Stay are 1) hold positive amounts of liquid wealth and undertake 
house maintenance; 2) hold positive amounts of liquid wealth but choose not to do 
maintenance; 3) hold zero liquid wealth into the next period but choose to invest in house 
maintenance; and 4) neither hold some liquid wealth nor undertake house maintenance. 
The Lagrangian equation for Stay t periods is derived from (7) by applying an 
intertemporal budget constraint on total value of wealth (𝜆1), on housing brought into the 
next period (𝜆2), and a non-negative constraint on maintenance (𝜇1) and on liquid wealth 
brought to the next period (𝜇2): 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶𝑡) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) + 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽 𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) −
𝜆1[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 − (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦
− ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑡 − ∅𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗
𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟] − 𝜆2[𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿
𝑛 + 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡] +
𝜇1[𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒] + 𝜇2[𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1]  (10) 
The first-order conditions are 
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𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑐𝑡    
𝛼𝑐
𝑐𝑡
− 𝜆1 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ ∅𝑡 = 0     
         (10.1a) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕ℎ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡   
𝛼ℎ
ℎ𝑡
− 𝜆1 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ ∅𝑡 = 0     
         (10.1b) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 −𝜆1(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟) + 𝜆2 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝜇1 = 0  




(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) − 𝜆1 + 𝜇2 = 0   
         (10.1d) 
𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1  𝛽 𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) − 𝜆2 = 0    
         (10.1e) 
For notation simplification: 
 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑚 = 𝛽 𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡     
         (10.1f) 
𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑠 = 𝛽 𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝛿𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡     
         (10.1g) 
where 𝑈𝑡 is the utility at period t, 𝛼𝑐 , 𝛼ℎ , 𝛼𝑠, 𝛽  are the propensity for general 
consumption, health, housing expenditure and “savings” or bringing wealth into the next 
period, respectively. ln(𝐶𝑡) , ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) , ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) , 𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) are 
estimations for utility from consumption (𝐶𝑡), health expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡), housing 
expenditure (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) and “savings” or expected utility from wealth brought into next 
period 𝐸(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) in the form of money and house at period t. ∅𝑡 is the 
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discount term in period t, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 is the house price per sqm in period t, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 is the 
house size in period t, 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦
 is the total liquid wealth in period t when staying, 
(1 − 𝛿)𝑛 is the total depreciation of house in a period, 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the value of 
maintenance done on the house and 𝐿𝑖𝑞 is the transaction cost for housing liquidation. 
𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 is the compounded net interest in period t or the return on housing investment. 
𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 is the expected future house price next period net of depreciation 𝛿 and liquidation 
cost 𝐿𝑖𝑞.  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 and 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 is the liquid wealth and housing wealth brought into 
next period (t+1). 𝐸𝑉(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) is the expected utility at time 𝑡 + 1 for 
someone with wealth 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 and a house size of 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1. 
𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑚 = 𝛽 𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 and 
𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑠 = 𝛽 𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝛿𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡   
are the partial derivatives from the expected utility from money and maintenance brought 
forward, based on money and maintenance respectively. 
3.3.2.3.1. Case 1  
Case 1 is when an individual holds liquid wealth and maintains their house. This 




= 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑚          
         (10.2a) 
𝛼𝑐
𝐶𝑡∗∅𝑡∗𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝛽 𝐸𝑉𝑠(𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡   
         (10.2b) 
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𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝛿
𝑛 + 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1      
          (10.2c) 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦
− ∅𝑡 ∗ (𝐶𝑡 + 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡) − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒] ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 =  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 
           (10.2d) 
The solution is derived numerically. The solution is a vector that satisfies 𝐹(𝑋) = 0, 


















− ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
𝛼ℎ
𝛼𝑐







          (10.2e) 
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See Table 3.1 or after equation (10.1g). Starting with an initial guess 𝑋0, the optimal solution 𝑋𝑡 is found numerically using the Newton 













2 0 −𝛽 𝐸
𝜕2𝑉
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2 0  −𝛽 𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝛿𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒




0 −𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 0 1
∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
𝛼ℎ
𝛼𝑐

















            (10.2h) 
In both cases, the marginal utility of holding money and undertaking maintenance are equal to the marginal utility of consumption. 
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3.3.2.3.2. Case 2  
Case 2 occurs when individuals hold wealth but do not undertake house maintenance when 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0, 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 > 0, 𝜇1 >
0, 𝜇2 = 0. The conditions for this case to hold is from the inequality 𝜇1 > 0. 





           (10.3a) 
Condition (10.3b) shows that the marginal utility of taking money into the next period is greater than the marginal utility from maintenance. 
𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑠 < 𝛽𝐸𝑉𝑚 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟          (10.3b) 
As 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0 and 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡, the optimal values of 𝑋 = [𝐶𝑡 , 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1]′ must be found. 







− ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
𝛼ℎ
𝛼𝑐
) ∗ 𝐶𝑡] ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
]     (10.3c) 
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See Table 3.1 or after equation (10.1g). Starting with an initial guess 𝑋0, the optimal solution 𝑋𝑡 is found numerically using the Newton 











∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
𝛼ℎ
𝛼𝑐
) ∗ 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 1
]    (10.3d) 
3.3.2.3.3. Case 3  
This is the case individuals undertake house maintenance but hold no liquid wealth when 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 > 0, 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 = 0, 𝜇1 =
0, 𝜇2 > 0. The conditions for this case to hold occur when 
Maintenance > 0, the marginal utility from maintenance equals the marginal utility from spending on the current period’s consumption. 
𝛽𝑉𝑠 = 𝛼𝑐 ∗
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝
𝐶𝑡∗∅𝑡
            (10.4a) 




            (10.4b) 













𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦 − ∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
𝛼ℎ
𝛼𝑐
) ∗ 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿





    (10.4c) 
See Table 3.1 or after equation (10.1g). Starting with an initial guess 𝑋0, the optimal solution 𝑋𝑡 is found numerically using the Newton 















−∅𝑡 ∗ (1 +
𝛼ℎ
𝛼𝑐
) −𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 0





    (10.4d) 
3.3.2.3.4. Case 4  
This is the case when individuals undertake no house maintenance and take no liquid wealth into the next period. This is the case 











          (10.5b) 







          (10.5c) 
The solution for 𝐶𝑡 is applied to calculate 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡, since there is no maintenance:  
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿
𝑛) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡         (10.5d) 
The estimation of consumption, health expenditure and house expenditure are calculated from the equations above.
142 
 
3.3.3. Program Design and Parameterisation 
3.3.3.1. Program Design 
Following Wachter and Yogo (2010), the solution for the final period is calculated first. The utility at each state at the T is used to 
calculate the optimal solutions at time T-1, which are then used to calculate the optimal solutions at T-2. The following diagrams explain the 
program logic: 
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3.3.3.2.1. Wealth Statespace Creation 
The study uses a grid of values to model the wealth statespace. The grid used assumes 
that at 𝐴𝑙, a retiree’s liquid wealth ranges from $0 to $1.96 million since the difference between 
each value in a grid is $40,000, there are 𝑛𝐴𝑙 = 50 points on the liquid wealth (𝐴𝑙) grid and 
10 points on the housing wealth grid (𝐴ℎ). A homeowner’s house size ranges from 0 (for 
renters) to 360 square-metre (sqm). The difference between each grid point is 40sqm and the 
number of points on the 𝐴ℎ grid is 10. 
3.3.3.2.2. Random State Variables 
There are three types of random state variables: income, health and house price. There 
are five income states. The lowest is from $20,000 per year reflecting values close to the 
current NZ Superannuation. The highest income state is $40,000 per year that captures some 
paid work past retirement. There are three health states (poor, average and good health). Health 
affects the parameters of the utility function. It is assumed the utility from consumption 
expenditure declines as health deteriorates. To model this, the study uses the following 
parameter choices: Bad health (𝛼𝑐 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼ℎ = 0.5); average health (𝛼𝑐 = 1.2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼ℎ =
0.3); and good health (𝛼𝑐 = 1.4 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼ℎ = 0.1). There are five house price states; house prices 
range from $1,000–$3,000 per square metre to capture a range of possible house price shocks. 
In each time period, an optimal choice is calculated at all 30,000 points in the statespace.112 
3.3.3.2.3. Parameter Assumptions 
The study assumes certain parameters in the program. Annual depreciation is set at 3%. 
The depreciation rate assumed is higher than that used by Yogo (2016), who uses data from 
                                                          
112 30,000 is calculated from 10 (𝐴ℎ) * 50 (𝑛𝐴𝑙) * 4 (Income states) * 5 (house price states) * 3 health states) + 1 
(death state).   
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housing in the US because the allowed depreciation rate for taxation in NZ is set at 2%.113 
Although, with rising house prices in NZ114 currently offsetting the depreciation rates, this does 
not suggest that depreciation does not happen, especially if retirees do stay in their homes. The 
inflation rate is set at 1%115 and the interest rate is set at 2%.116 The Liquidity Discount or 
transaction cost on housing liquidation is set at 10% as the benchmark. The 10% cost incurs 
both the financial cost of 5%,117 and an additional 5% to include moving costs and a 
measurement of emotional and time cost.  
3.3.3.3. Optimisation Estimation 
The study applies the dynamic programming method of Kraft et al. (2017) for the 
closed-form markets explained above and combines them with the endogenous grid method of 
Shao et al. (2019).  
3.3.3.3.1. Interpolation 
To find the solution in period t before the final period, it is necessary to calculate utility 
in the subsequent period. This normally requires interpolation of the period t+1 statespace, as 
the optimal choice of money holdings and future house size will not normally be a round 
number. The interpolation program allows for the estimation for all possible values between 
grid points. In the interpolation estimation, the study assumes a linear interpolation of the 
values on the grid. For example, suppose the calculation requires utility to be evaluated at value 




115 Reserve Bank NZ has maintained an inflation rate between 1-3% since 2002 
(https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-policy/inflation). 
116 Reserve Bank NZ Official Cash Rate (OCR) is around 1.75% in 2018 (https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-
policy/official-cash-rate-decisions). 




𝑥 that lies between grid points 49 and 50 along the dimension. The utility is calculated as 
follows: 
𝑢(𝑥) = 𝐴 ln(𝑥) + 𝐵       (11.a) 
A and B are the solutions to the following equations: 
𝑢(50) = 𝐴 ln(50) + 𝐵      (11.b) 
𝑢(49) = 𝐴 ln(49) + 𝐵      (11.c) 
This implies 
𝑢(50) − 𝑢(49) = 𝐴 ln (
50
49




       (11.f) 
𝐵 = 𝑢(50) − 𝐴 ln(50)      (11.g) 



















ln(50))   (11.i) 
3.3.3.3.2. Extrapolation 
It is sometimes the case that the calculation of utility at time t requires the calculation 
of utility at time t+1 for values of 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1  or 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 that are larger than the maximum grid 
values. In these cases, utility is calculated by using an extrapolation of the grid. The 
extrapolation program estimates all possible values that are beyond the grid point’s highest 
values. Extrapolations are assumed to be linear if they are only extrapolated on one dimension 
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of wealth. If extrapolations are two-dimensions, a log-linear extrapolation algorithm is used. 
This shows briefly how 𝑢(𝑥) is calculated.  
Ln Extrapolation for utility functions 
For each dimension, the study assumes 
𝑢(𝑥) = 𝐴 ln(𝑥) + 𝐵  
Case 1 – extrapolation along 1 dimension 
Consider the following example. Suppose it is desired to calculate the value of utility 
corresponding to 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 = $1.93 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 and 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡+1 = 410 𝑠𝑞𝑚. The maximum size of 
the two values of house sizes are 320 sqm and 360 sqm but there are grid points for money 
$1.92 million and $1.96 million.  
Stage 1A 
The study first extrapolates along one dimension for the lowest grid point of M (M = $1.92 
million, S = 410m). 
𝑢(1.92, 320) = 𝐴 ln(320) + 𝐵      (12.a)  




       (12.c) 
𝐵 = 𝑢(1.92, 360) − 𝐴 ln(360)      (12.d) 
The study then estimates 𝑢(1.92, 410) = 𝐴 ln(410) + 𝐵 using a similar approach to (11.i). 
Stage 1B 
The method is repeated but this time for the highest grid point (M = 1.96m, S = 410m). 
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The following coefficients A2 and B2 refer to the case that M = 1.96m 
𝑢(1.96, 320) = 𝐴 ln(320) + 𝐵      (13.a)  




       (13.c) 
𝐵 = 𝑢(1.96, 360) − 𝐴 ln(360)      (13.d) 
The estimation of 𝑢(1.96, 410) = 𝐴 ln(410) + 𝐵 uses a similar approach to (11.i). 
Stage 1C 
The study now uses a linear interpolation of 𝑢(1.96, 410) and 𝑢(1.92, 410) to calculate 
𝑢(1.93, 410). 
Case 2 – extrapolation along 2 dimensions 
Using the same framework as above with x and y but now x and y are both above the 
maximum grid points. Suppose M = $2.01 million, S = 410sqm. The study extrapolates for S 
and M. 
Stage 2A 
First calculate 𝑢(1.92,𝑚) = 𝐴1 ln(𝑚) + 𝐵1 where 𝐴1 and 𝐵1 solve as  
𝑢(1.92, 320) = 𝐴1 ln(320) + 𝐵1     (14.a)  




      (14.c) 
𝐵1 = 𝑢(1.92, 360) − 𝐴 ln(360)     (14.d) 
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The estimation of 𝑢(1.92, 410) = 𝐴1 ln(410) + 𝐵1 uses a similar approach to (11.i). 
Stage 2B 
In calculating 𝑢(1.96,𝑚) = 𝐴2 ln(𝑚) + 𝐵2 the method is repeated. 
The following coefficients A2 and B2 refer to the case that M = $1.96 million. 
𝑢(1.96, 320) = 𝐴2 ln(320) + 𝐵2     (15.a)  




      (15.c) 
𝐵2 = 𝑢(1.96, 360) − 𝐴2 ln(360)     (15.d) 
The estimation of 𝑢(1.96, 410) = 𝐴2 ln(410) + 𝐵2 uses a similar approach to (11.i). 
Stage 2C 
Having calculated 𝑢(1.92,𝑚) and 𝑢(1.96,𝑚),  𝑢(𝑠,𝑚) 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 =  𝐴3 ln(𝑠) + 𝐵3. 
The following coefficients A3 and B3 refer to the case that S = 410sqm: 
𝑢(1.92, 410) = 𝐴3 ln(1.92) +𝐵3     (16.a) 




      (16.c) 
𝐵3 = 𝑢(1.96, 410) − 𝐴3 ln(1.96)     (16.d) 
The study estimates 𝑢(2.01, 410) = 𝐴3 ln(2.01) + 𝐵3. 
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The solution technique relies on a mixture of analytical and numerical techniques. The 
analytical equations for the periods before the final period all require the calculation of future 
expected utility which is calculated numerically. 
3.3.3.3.3. Estimation for Unknown Values in the Mathematical Equations 
In the closed-form solutions estimated for T-I periods, there are several unknowns and 
several equations. The solutions for those unknowns are solved using the Newton–Raphson 
method of the root-finding algorithm for solving an on-linear algebraic equation 𝑓(𝑥) = 0. The 
Newton-Rhapson iteration from Tjalling (2012) is 
𝑥𝑖+1 = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑓(𝑥𝑖)/𝑓(𝑥𝑖)
′ 
By making a first guess 𝑥0, and iterating the function until meeting a convergence 
criterion, the method finds a solution close to the true value of the solution to the unknowns of 
the equation, 𝑓(𝑥). The optimal solutions at each point in the statespace are calculated by 
finding a solution to a nonlinear multidimensional equation 𝑓(𝑥) = 0. 
3.4. Simulation of Results and Discussions 
3.4.1. The Data Matrix 
The vertical axis represents the non-housing wealth and housing wealth position. The 
horizontal matrix represents each of the possible state combinations. The program is set to have 
a layout of the data matrix as follows: 
[Insert Table 3.2] 
3.4.2. Equal Probability Matrix 
Equal probability matrix is when there is no difference in the probability between 
different state combinations. This study uses an equal probability matrix as a benchmark to 
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compare results when a different probability matrix is applied. The probability for each is 1/61 
(due to 61 possible state combinations) for any time period.  
3.4.2.1. Final Period 
3.4.2.1.1. Overview of Optimal Choice in Final Period  
[Insert Graph 3.1] 
Graph 3.1 shows the overall utility of the optimal choice chosen for each of the 61 state 
combinations in the final period given their respective wealth positions. The graph shows that 
optimal utility increases with increasing non-housing wealth (1 to 50) for each housing wealth 
position. The graph displays the dips every time there is a move from one housing wealth to 
another (e.g. from 50 to 51, 100 to 101, 150 to 151) as this shows the drop in non-housing 
wealth back to zero, whilst moving up one position in the housing wealth position. This finding 
supports the notion of increasing utility with increasing the value of non-housing and housing 
wealth. Similar patterns are observed across all 61 state combinations from column 184 to 244 
for the final period. In the column for death (244) the graph shifts to a much lower optimal 
utility value, as retirees no longer receive utility from consumption and housing and only 
receive utility from leaving a bequest. 
3.4.2.1.2. A Closer View on Each Housing Scenarios 
3.4.2.1.2.1. RENTING IN FINAL PERIOD 
[Insert Graph 3.2] 
Graph 3.2 shows the optimal utility in retirees’ option of renting. The graph displays 
similar patterns to Graph 3.1. For example, rising utility with higher wealth positions and dips 
at the points where non-housing wealth starts at zeros (the 51, 101, 151, points). Graph 3.2 
shows a closer look of the overlaps between each wealth position graph. The increase in optimal 
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utility from a lower to higher wealth position declines with higher wealth positions. This 
supports the notion of decreasing marginal utility of wealth. The difference of optimal utility 
between each state combination is wider for lower wealth than for higher wealth positions. A 
possible explanation is that retirees with higher wealth positions are more resistant to any 
shocks proposed by the different states.   
3.4.2.1.2.2. SELLING AND BUYING IN FINAL PERIOD 
[Insert Graph 3.3] 
The optimal utility of each wealth position in each state combination is shown in Graph 
3.3. Although showing similar trends to that of renting, the optimal utility value in 
selling/buying is higher than that observed in renting from wealth position 250 and higher. This 
may suggest that renting is a poorer choice than selling/buying for retirees with a wealth 
position of at least 250.  
3.4.2.1.2.3. STAYING IN CURRENT HOME IN FINAL PERIOD 
[Insert Graph 3.4] 
Graph 3.4 shows the optimal utility when retirees choose to stay in their current home. 
The wealth position in the graph starts from 51 because retirees need to own a home before 
they are eligible for this scenario, unlike in renting and selling that start from 1. There is very 
little difference between selling/buying (Graph 3.3.) to staying (Graph 3.4.), but the Stay 
scenario shows slightly higher optimal utility for those in the wealth position range 201 to 251. 
Sections 3.4.2.1.3 and 3.4.2.2.1 further analyse the comparison of each choice for retirees with 
different wealth positions.  
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3.4.2.1.3. Case Examples of Housing Options for Final Period 
3.4.2.1.3.1. RETIREE WITH LOW WEALTH POSITION 
This section takes an example of a retiree with a low wealth position, i.e. no non-housing 
wealth nor housing wealth (Wealth Position 1). 
[Insert Graph 3.5] 
Graph 3.5 shows how retirees with no non-housing or housing wealth face their optimal 
choice. The fluctuation in each graph is affected by the different state combinations. The first 
hump from 184 to 186 is due to better health states, and this is repeated on to the next sequence 
of house price states. The general trend of fluctuation for every 15 numbers (184–198, 199–
213, 214–228, 229–243) shows that optimal utility falls with increasing house prices. The 
pattern moves up with higher income states. The graph shows how Sell/Buy results in higher 
optimal utility than renting when retirees are healthy and is lower when they are in bad health. 
The fluctuation of utility is also greater in Sell/Buy because of the transaction cost. 
The second example is of a retiree with no non-housing wealth but some minimal 
housing wealth (Wealth Position 51). 
[Insert Graph 3.6] 
Graph 3.6 shows the utility of each housing option when a retiree has no non-housing 
wealth but owns a very small house of 40sqm (wealth position 51).  The optimal utility of all 
the scenarios across state combinations range from just under 23 to slightly above 24. The 
Sell/Buy choice fluctuates slightly but does more so than renting. Renting seems to be the least 
optimal choice, as it has the highest utility of the three only at very few state combinations 
which is mostly a state of poor health. Staying is the most frequent optimal choice among the 
state combinations, but Sell/Buy sometimes is the best option when retirees have higher 
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income, better health and during low house prices (Wealth Positions 201, 216, 231). These 
findings are reasonable, as at these points, the utility loss from incurring a transaction cost for 
selling may be less than the utility gained from the purchase of a different sized house. 
3.4.2.1.3.2. RETIREE WITH MEDIUM WEALTH POSITION 
The study chooses two cases for retirees with medium wealth as having an average size 
house of 200sqm following the 2011 report from QV.co.nz.118 First is the case when retirees 
have an average size house and no non-housing wealth (Wealth Position 251). 
[Insert Graph 3.7] 
Graph 3.7 shows how the utility of the choices are more dispersed in relation to each 
other than that of retirees of lower wealth shown in Graph 3.6. The dispersion may be due to 
the position of owning a home, giving retirees a wider range of housing options. Another reason 
for the dispersion is the lack of non-housing wealth, putting greater importance on housing as 
a source of potentially liquid assets in the event of shocks. Rent’s utility fluctuates less than 
Sell/Buy or Stay across the state combinations. The availability of liquid wealth from selling 
then choosing to rent helps retirees overcome shocks, even though they may be suboptimal. 
Stay is lower than both renting and Sell/Buy in the case of low-income state (Wealth Position 
184 to 214) and diverges further when house prices are high (Wealth Position 194 to 199). In 
the state of high income (229 onwards), the three housing options converge because the high 
cost from Sell/Buy becomes less attractive and mitigates the rise in income. Similar to the 
graphs previously shown (Graph 3.6., 3.5., 3.4.), the peaks of the hump shape are when retirees 
are healthy, and gains the highest level of utility, and the dips are when retirees experience bad 
health.  




[Insert Graph 3.8] 
The second case is when retirees have an average size house of 200sqm and average 
non-housing wealth value of $120,000 (Wealth Position 254).119  Graph 3.8 demonstrates how 
having some non-housing wealth improves the stability of housing options of Buy/Sell and 
Stay compared with non-housing wealth owners shown in Graph 3.7. The stability is more 
prominent in that it boosts the utility from Stay, making it a more favourable option compared 
with Graph 3.7. The ownership of non-housing wealth potentially gives retirees a financial 
buffer to deal with shocks presented by different state combinations, less reliance on housing 
and affordability to stay in their own home even in the event of shocks. 
3.4.2.1.3.3. RETIREE WITH HIGH WEALTH POSITION 
Two cases are chosen to investigate retirees with a high wealth position. One is when 
retirees have a larger house of 320sqm and no non-housing wealth (Wealth Position 401), and 
the other is when they have both a larger house and a larger sum of non-housing wealth (Wealth 
Position 424).120 
[Insert Graph 3.9] 
[Insert Graph 3.10] 
By comparing Graph 3.9 and Graph 3.10, the study finds that the absence of non-
housing wealth, even for retirees with larger homes, makes the choice to stay in their home 
least desirable. When retirees have non-housing wealth on top of their larger home, then staying 
                                                          
119 The average non-housing wealth is estimated as the Median Total Household Wealth from Statistics NZ 2018 
of $520,000 (https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/wealth-of-top-20-percent-rises-by-394000) minus the average 
house value held (average size house of 200sqm times the average sqm price for house building of $2,000 from 
http://www.buildingguide.co.nz/planning/building-costs/).  
120 Calculated using the top quantile median wealth of $1,750,000 (https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/wealth-of-top-
20-percent-rises-by-394000) minus the house value from building a 320sqm house times the premium sqm price 




is potentially the most favourable option in the final period. The fluctuation present in Graph 
3.9 for Rent and Sell/Buy is less prominent when retirees have non-housing wealth to rely on 
when facing shocks. 
3.4.2.2. T-1 And T-2 Periods 
3.4.2.2.1. Case Examples when Comparing Time Periods 
3.4.2.2.1.1. RETIREE WITH LOW WEALTH POSITION 
[Insert Graph 3.11] 
[Insert Graph 3.12] 
From Graph 3.11 and Graph 3.12, the study finds that moving away from the final 
period (T-2 graphs vs T-1 graphs) results in a higher level of utility across all housing 
liquidation options. Both graphs show that the transition between state combinations results in 
a similar pattern for Renting and Sell/Buy. The Stay option is not available in Graph 3.11 
because of the lack of home ownership. The Stay option in Graph 3.12 presents intriguing 
findings of zero utility values from the first state combination of T-1 (equivalent to column 
123) and T-2 (equivalent to column 62) to state combination 30 for T-1 (equivalent to column 
150) and 45 for T-2 (equivalent to column 105). The zero values on the green and grey lines 
for Stay in state combinations 1 to 30, and 1 to 45, respectively, indicate that the option Stay is 
a viable option in T1 and T2 until there is an increase in the income state to income state 4 (or 
$35,000) in T1 and an increase to income state 3 ($30,000) in T2. This finding suggests that 
Stay is a viable option for an individual with limited housing and no non-housing wealth in T1 
and T2 only when there is sufficient income to support the option to stay in their current home. 
Upon the availability of the Stay option in Graph 3.12 (from state combination 31 for T-1 and 
state combination 46), this study observes that the Stay option results in similar utility values 
to Sell/Buy.  
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When comparing between Graph 3.11 and Graph 3.12 with their respective final period 
utility graphs (Graphs 3.5 and Graph 3.6.), the utility from T-1 and T-2 is always higher than 
that in the final period (except for Stay in Graph 3.12.). The utility difference between choices 
Rent and Sell/Buy in T-I graphs is also more observable than the utility of those in the final 
period. A possible reason for the dispersion in T-I is that retirees have a greater number of 
years until they die than in the final period, so the utility from future housing consumption due 
to Sell/Buy is greater than the transaction cost, even in high price states. This is the opposite 
for retirees in the final period. Knowing that they will die within that period, the utility they 
receive from future housing is very small. It consists of the utility they receive from the house 
bequest to the bequestee. Renting is thus more desirable in the final period than in T-I compared 
with other housing options in those periods. 
3.4.2.2.1.2. RETIREE WITH MEDIUM WEALTH POSITION 
[Insert Graph 3.13] 
[Insert Graph 3.14] 
Graphs 3.13 and 3.14 show similar trends to that of retirees with low wealth position. 
In Graph 3.13, the zero values on the green and grey lines for Stay in all state combinations 
indicate that the option Stay is not viable in T1 and T2. This suggests that staying in a 200sqm 
home for an individual with no non-housing wealth may be too expensive in maintaining 
consumption levels irrespective of income, health and house price levels. Individuals with such 
circumstances would, optimally, need to liquidate some of their housing wealth to maintain 
consumption levels.  
In Graph 3.14, the zero values on the grey line for Stay in state combinations 1–45 
indicate that the option Stay is a viable option in T1 with an increase in income to income state 
4 ($35,000). Stay is not a viable option across all state combinations in T2. This finding 
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suggests that Stay is a viable option for individuals with limited average housing (200sqm) and 
non-housing wealth in T1 only when there is sufficient income to support the option to stay in 
their current home. 
The utility graphs in T-I fluctuate less than that in the final period for medium retirees. 
Similar to the pattern shown by retirees in the low wealth position, this is due to the higher total 
utility received from future period expectation than the utility received from a bequest. The 
greater number of years of life in T-I also allows retirees to spread the risks associated to their 
housing choice across a number of years, in comparison with retirees in the final period. 
3.4.2.2.1.3. RETIREE WITH HIGH WEALTH POSITION 
[Insert Graph 3.15] 
[Insert Graph 3.16]  
The findings from Graph 3.15 and Graph 3.16 show that there is very little additional 
utility when moving up from a medium wealth to a higher wealth retiree, due to the diminishing 
marginal utility of the life-cycle effect. A retiree with non-housing wealth (Graph 3.15.) has a 
more stable utility across all the housing options than a retiree without. This trend is observed 
across all the different wealth positions of retirees, across all state combinations. In Graph 3.15, 
the zero values on the green and grey lines for Stay in all state combinations indicate that the 
option Stay is not viable in T1 and T2. This suggests that staying in a 320sqm home for an 
individual with no non-housing wealth may be too expensive in maintaining consumption 
levels irrespective of income, health and house price levels. Individuals with such 
circumstances would, optimally, need to liquidate some of their housing wealth to maintain 
consumption levels. 
Graph 3.16 shows that Stay as a viable option in all state combinations only occurs in 
the presence of high non-housing wealth to support the possibility of staying in the current 
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home. This suggests that individuals require adequate non-housing wealth to support the 
possibility of choosing to stay in their own home and that staying in their own home is an 
expensive option that is not viable for everyone. 
The results so far have applied an equal probability matrix. However, the Life-Cycle 
model states that the probability of bad health is higher with age (Edwards 2008). This study 
offers an analysis of optimal utility across housing scenarios when the probability matrix is 
health and age dependent. The matrix also accounts for income fall probabilities due to health 
shocks. All house price states and income states for individuals in good or medium health are 
assumed to be equal. This assumption allows the change in optimal utility to be solely due to 
changes in health- and age-dependent probabilities.  
3.4.3. Persistent Health Probability Matrix 
This study applies a persistent negative health probability matrix to account for the 
falling health recovery capacity of individuals of older age. The purpose of the inclusion is to 
show how poor health recovery, more commonly found among older individuals, may associate 
with different optimal consumption and housing paths to that of individuals with better 
recovery capacity, more commonly found among younger individuals. This study follows the 
health transition calibration of Ameriks et al. (2011). Their study finds the best fit based on US 
data from the National Centre for Health Statistics. The “1-period ahead transition matrix at 
age 62 + 𝑎 is given by 𝑃(𝑎) =” in equation 11.121 The age adjustment is shown in the second 
matrix.  
                                                          




𝑝11 𝑝12 𝑝13 1 − 𝑝11 − 𝑝12 − 𝑝13
𝑝21 𝑝22 𝑝23 1 − 𝑝21 − 𝑝22 − 𝑝23
𝑝31 𝑝32 𝑝33 1 − 𝑝31 − 𝑝32 − 𝑝33
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   Eq. 11 
The study uses the average health transition matrix calibration of males and females 
from Ameriks et al. (2011) and recalibrates it to capture 10 years in each period. The purpose 
of the study is the development of a working program that can provide reasonable results, so 
an average of males’ and females’ health transition is applied. The calibration results in an age-
adjusted probability for a retiree from the age of 62 to 72 years old in T-2, 72–82 years in T-1 
and 82–92 years old in the final period compared with the one-year period of Ameriks et al. 
(2011). The recalibration allows the probability matrix to be period specific, with the emphasis 
of declining health and higher mortality probability towards the final period. The study extends 
the health transition calibration by including an income probability of change when a retiree 
has bad health. The income probability in persistent health is held equal except for the case of 
bad health. In the event of a bad health state, the probability for medium and high income drops 
to 0 and is 1 for low income. When retirees are in bad health, they may lose the capacity to 
work past retirement and only rely on non-employment income (such as the NZS) which is 
equivalent to a low-income state in the matrix. 
3.4.3.1. General Overview with Persistent Health Probability 
[Insert Graph 3.17] 
[Insert Graph 3.18] 
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Graph 3.17 shows how persistent bad health probability affects the choice for renting. 
Persistent bad health in Graph 3.17 portrays a more dispersed compilation of utility graphs 
branching according to their respective health status. For an individual in a bad state of health, 
optimal utility when renting is lower compared with medium or good health states. Graph 3.18 
shows that when retirees Sell/Buy, those with bad health still have the least utility, but, in 
general, Sell/Buy provides greater utility than renting. This finding suggests that at T-1, 
Sell/Buy is better than renting when there is persistent bad health. 
3.4.3.2. Case Example of Housing Options and Time Period Change 
3.4.3.2.1. Retiree with Low Wealth Position at All Periods 
This section takes an example of a retiree with a low wealth position. First, consider a 
retiree that has neither non-housing wealth nor housing wealth (Wealth Position 1). 
[Insert Graph 3.19] 
There is very little difference between Renting and Sell/Buy for non-homeowners with 
little wealth in the final period. However, for periods T-1 and T-2, Sell/Buy is a better choice 
as shown in Graph 3.19. Utility increases with better health and fluctuates with house price. 
When compared with Graph 3.11 and Graph 3.12 for low Wealth Position retirees with an 
equal health probability matrix, Graph 3.18 and Graph 3.19 both fluctuate more and are 
responsive to health states. The application of a persistent health state probability matrix 
emphasizes variation in utility, depending on the different housing options when there are 
changes in health. The difference between outcomes based upon equal probability graphs and 




Second, when a retiree has no non-housing wealth but owns some minimal housing 
wealth (Wealth Position 51). 
[Insert Graph 3.20] 
Graph 3.20 shows similar trends to that of Graph 3.19, but in Wealth Position 1, retirees 
own a small 40sqm home. The trends in the final period between the three options are similar 
to that of retirees with Wealth Position 1. Sell/Buy is preferable to renting in T-1 and T-2. Stay 
shows inconsistent numbers, the zero values for Stay on state combinations 0–30 of the green 
line, and in all state combinations of the dark grey lines indicate that the option Stay is not 
viable in T1 until a minimum income of $30,000 and is not a viable option in all state 
combinations in T2. This suggests that staying in their current home for an individual with no 
non-housing wealth may be expensive in maintaining consumption levels unless they have at 
least a $30,000 income in T1. It is too expensive to stay in their current homes in T2 irrespective 
of income, health and house price levels. Individuals with such circumstances would, 
optimally, need to liquidate some of their housing wealth to maintain consumption levels. 
When the Stay option is available in T-1 (state combination 31 onwards), the optimal utility 
from Stay is comparable with that for Sell/Buy. 
3.4.3.2.2. Retiree with Medium Wealth Position 
The study chooses two cases for retirees with medium wealth, characterised by owning 
an average size house of 200sqm, following the report from QV.co.nz.122 First, the case when 
retirees have an average-sized house and no non-housing wealth (Wealth Position 251). 




Second, the case when retirees have an average-sized house and average non-housing wealth 
value of $120,000 (Wealth Position 254).123 
[Insert Graph 3.21] 
[Insert Graph 3.22] 
Graph 3.21 and Graph 3.22 show similar patterns of optimal utility from different 
housing scenarios for retirees given a medium Wealth Position with and without 
homeownership, compared with that of low earners. Medium Wealth Position retirees have 
higher utility than low Wealth Position retirees, but the pattern across state combinations is 
very similar. In Graph 3.21, the zero values on the green and dark grey lines for Stay in all state 
combinations indicate that the option Stay is not viable in T1 and T2. This suggests that staying 
in a 200sqm home for an individual with no non-housing wealth may be too expensive in 
maintaining consumption levels irrespective of income, health and house price levels. 
Individuals with such circumstances would, optimally, need to liquidate some of their housing 
wealth to maintain consumption levels.  
The zero values in Graph 3.22 for Stay on state combinations 0–46 of the green line and 
in all state combinations of the dark grey lines indicate that the option Stay is not viable in T1 
until a minimum income of $35,000 and is not a viable option in all state combinations in T2. 
This suggests that staying in their current home of 200sqm for an individual with average non-
housing wealth may be too expensive in maintaining consumption levels unless they have at 
least a $30,000 income in T1. It is too expensive to stay in their current homes in T2 irrespective 
of income, health and house price levels. Individuals with such circumstances would, 
optimally, need to liquidate some of their housing wealth to maintain consumption levels. The 
                                                          
123 The average non-housing wealth is estimated as the Median Total Household Wealth from Statistics NZ 2018 
of $520,000 (https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/wealth-of-top-20-percent-rises-by-394000) minus the average 




findings suggest that the Stay option is more readily available at a higher liquid wealth position 
for those with medium wealth. 
3.4.3.2.3. Retiree with High Wealth Position 
The study uses two case examples to investigate retirees with a high wealth position. 
The first is when retirees have a larger, 320sqm house and no non-housing wealth (Wealth 
Position 401). The second is when retirees have both a larger house and a larger sum of non-
housing wealth (Wealth Position 424).124 
[Insert Graph 3.23] 
[Insert Graph 3.24] 
Graph 3.23 and Graph 3.24 still show a similar trend to the low and medium Wealth 
Positions in terms of fluctuations due to changing health state. The zero values in Graph 3.23 
on the green and dark grey lines for Stay in all state combinations indicate that the option Stay 
is not viable in T1 and T2. This suggests that staying in a 320sqm home for an individual with 
no non-housing wealth may be too expensive in maintaining consumption levels irrespective 
of income, health and house price levels. Individuals with such circumstances would, 
optimally, need to liquidate some of their housing wealth to maintain consumption levels.  
Graph 3.24 shows that staying as a viable option in all state combinations only occurs 
in the presence of high non-housing wealth to support the possibility of staying in current home 
in T1 from the green lines. The dark grey lines in T2 for Stay suggests that Stay is only a viable 
option when individuals are in good health (state combinations multiples of 3). The inclusion 
of a persistent bad health probability makes Stay a less viable option in T2 for individuals with 
                                                          
124 The top quantile median wealth of $1,750,000 (https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/wealth-of-top-20-percent-
rises-by-394000) minus house value from building a 320sqm house times the premium sqm price for house 




bad or average health because of the need of liquid wealth to support health expenditure for 
longer bad health periods. 
3.4.4. The Effects of Health Shocks 
The study chooses two cases to illustrate the health shock effect. First, retirees with low 
Wealth Position and no housing (Wealth Position 1). This case applies to retirees who rely 
mostly on NZS (low income) and are renters in retirement. Second, retirees with low income 
and a small house (for example, 120sqm) and some non-housing wealth ($320,000). 
[Insert Graph 3.25] 
[Insert Graph 3.26] 
From Graph 3.25, the effects of health shocks are more prominent at T-1 than in T-2 or 
in the final period. One explanation may be that T-2 is 20 years away from the final period and 
the retirees are still relatively young (62–71). Therefore, the health shock effect can spread 
across a longer timeframe. At the final period, retirees know that they will die at some point 
during that 10-year period; therefore, there is little or no value from future period expectations 
that would allow for short-term planning versus long-term planning. Conversely, in T-1, 
retirees have expectations to survive into the next and final period of their life. Given this 
situation, retirees must make a consumption housing decision that would last them a whole two 
periods (T-1 and T) while realizing that there is only one more period to benefit from the 
expected future utility. This may be the most crucial period for a retiree in terms of decision-
making. The situation results in the largest utility spread across the health states.  
Graph 3.26 confirms that T-1 provides a wider divergence of utility across the housing 
scenarios than at T. Both graphs also show that Renting always provides the least difference in 
utility across health states. One explanation is that renting allows liquidity for retirees to deal 
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with shocks such as health. Sell or Stay have different utility levels with different health states 
because of housing illiquidity that involves transaction costs (for Sell/Buy) or maintenance 
(Stay) considerations. Housing illiquidity restricts retirees from managing shocks, thus 
providing a large utility drop when retirees are in bad health. 
3.5. Conclusion 
The chapter investigates the role of health shocks and housing liquidation among 
optimal choices for retirees. The study develops a program that estimates optimal utility from 
a mixture of consumption, health expenditure and housing expenditure. The program considers 
different states of health, income and house price shocks. The study uses two sets of probability 
matrices, one with equal probability for good and bad health and the other when bad health has 
a persistently higher probability. 
The key findings from the chapter show that housing liquidation options produce 
varying levels of optimal utility when there is equal probability for good and bad health. 
Renting is least preferable compared with Sell/Buy and Stay, in general, but more preferable 
than Stay in cases with low liquid wealth and income. Housing liquidation options’ utility 
changes when there is a persistent bad health probability in place. A persistent health 
probability causes a divergence of utility between Renting, Sell/Buy and Stay scenarios. 
Renting is found to be the most flexible option when it comes to dealing with shocks, although 
it may not be the optimal choice. Sell/Buy is an optimal choice for the different scenarios but 
is also most prone to utility drops in the event of a bad health shock. Stay straddles Renting 
and Sell/Buy. Stay is not available for non-homeowners and when there is insufficient income 
or non-housing wealth to support consumption maintenance without liquidating housing. 
Andreasson (2018) reports that downsizing is not an optimal choice in any possible case 
in their investigation of the effect of Australia’s means-tested Age Pension on investment 
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choices. This study finds similar findings, namely that Sell/Buy or downsizing can be a 
beneficial choice only under certain circumstances. The chapter addresses some limitations of 
prior studies. For example Andreasson (2018) does not account for health shocks and does not 
consider optimal housing in the event of bad health. Even though Shao et al. (2019) find that 
borrowing against home equity provides higher consumption in earlier years and longevity 
insurance, the focus of their study is not on housing liquidation options so they only introduce 
borrowing against housing as a means to provide additional income from housing.  The concept 
of releasing equity in the form of borrowing from housing (Shao et al. 2019) or Selling/Buying 
as documented in this chapter both acknowledge the potential for an increase in utility, although 
the chapter does not explicitly include reverse mortgage. The current lack of existing literature 
on different housing tenure and health shocks when modelling optimal utility means that there 
is no research directly comparable with this study.  
This chapter only focuses on the role of health shocks to housing liquidation options for 
utility optimization. Future research might include studies on income or house price shocks, 
changing liquidation costs and the role of bequest and precautionary savings over time. Results 
generated from this research are beneficial for retirees to better understand the level of income 
and non-housing wealth they need to have in order to stay in their own home without sacrificing 
consumption levels. The findings suggest that the New Zealand government needs to encourage 
diversification of investments, especially non-housing investment, to support retirement 
income and the possibility of retirees staying in their homes. It also points to the need for 
affordable and better-quality homes for retirees seeking to downsize following housing 





4. Financial Literacy and Spending Decisions Among Older 
New Zealanders: Evidence from a 1000Minds Survey 
4.1. Introduction 
This study investigates the financial literacy levels of older New Zealanders and 
explores the relationship between financial literacy and (i) debt ownership and (ii) risk attitude, 
and subsequent spending decisions. It is the first financial literacy study to use conjoint analysis 
that considers potentially all pairwise rankings of all possible alternatives to investigate the 
spending preferences of older New Zealanders.125 Crossan et al. (2011) suggest that New 
Zealanders have high financial literacy, but that it has no impact on retirement planning. 
However, Crossan et al.’s (2011) study does not account for debt or risk attitude. This is the 
first study to investigate these two factors together when examining the role of financial 
literacy. This chapter is also the first to investigate the relationship between financial literacy 
and retiree’s spending decisions; in particular, how retirees rank different spending alternatives, 
such as consumption (i.e. general or luxury consumption), investment alternatives such as 
KiwiSaver or property investments, bequest motives such as giving money to family members 
and philanthropic motives such as donations.  
Prior studies have found that financial literacy, based on the “Big Three” financial 
literacy questions (Agnew, Bateman, and Thorp, 2013, p. 1),126 is low around the world 
(Agnew et al., 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011c; Van Rooij et al., 2012) but that financial 
literacy is comparatively high in New Zealand. Crossan et al. (2011) also find that financial 
illiteracy is highest among the lower educated, young or old, female, Māori and those living in 
rural areas. The results also show that unlike the other countries,127 financial literacy does not 
                                                          
125 Uses 1000Minds software. 
126 See section 4.2.1 for a definition. 
127 Ameriks et al. (2011); Lusardi and Mitchell (2007); Behrman et al. (2012); Lusardi and Mitchell (2017). 
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have any effect on New Zealanders’ retirement planning. It has been suggested that the lack of 
effect is due to New Zealand’s universal public pension that “cushions” (Crossan et al., 2011, 
p. 3) retirees if they make financial mistakes. In particular, Crossan et al. (2011) suggest that 
New Zealand’s Superannuation (NZS) provision is large enough to deter individuals from 
making additional preparations to support their retirement savings.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2015) reports 
that NZS only covers up to around 40% of New Zealand’s average income, making it one of 
the lowest among OECD countries. Additionally, New Zealand does not have a mandatory 
contributory retirement savings scheme like most OECD countries (OECD, 2015), limiting 
New Zealanders’ capacity to provide additional savings to their retirement savings. New 
Zealand does have a voluntary contributory retirement saving scheme (KiwiSaver); however, 
it does not have an annuitisation option for withdrawal. Retirees need to arrange their own 
annuitisation within the private sector or withdraw their KiwiSaver as a lump sum and manage 
it on their own. The New Zealand retirement system puts greater pressure on retirees to 
personally manage their wealth and make spending or investment decisions that prevent 
poverty in retirement or outliving their wealth. Therefore, given this additional information, 
the findings from Crossan et al. (2011) that New Zealanders’ financial literacy level has no 
effect on retirement planning is worthy of further investigation.  
This study finds that the financial literacy level in New Zealand is high in the sample, 
with 57% of older New Zealanders in the sample scoring “high” and getting all the financial 
literacy questions correct. Sample subjects who are younger, of Māori or Pacific Islands 
ethnicity, female, having lower educational attainment, lower incomes and high family 
responsibility are associated with significantly lower levels of financial literacy, and this 
potentially leaves them more vulnerable to financial mistakes (Calvet et al., 2009; Stolper and 
Walter, 2017). The study also finds that higher financial literacy has a significant correlation 
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with better debt position and higher risk tolerance. New Zealanders prefer to invest in 
KiwiSaver, put money in the bank and do home improvements, when asked to choose among 
and rank 13 spending alternatives if they hypothetically received a windfall of $50,000. The 
least preferred alternatives are donations, general consumption and health investment.  
In addition, the study finds that New Zealanders’ spending preference is significantly 
correlated with higher financial literacy, debt position and risk attitude. However, the strength 
of the effects depends on the type of decision considered. Using structural equation modelling, 
the study explores the complex relationships between financial literacy, debt position and risk 
attitude on different spending alternatives. The results show that higher financial literacy has a 
strong positive association with choosing KiwiSaver and that having more worrying levels of 
debt is strongly associated with choosing to pay off debt, regardless of financial literacy levels. 
Wide heterogeneity appears across subsample groups of gender, ethnicity, marital status and 
living arrangements. 
This study is organised as follows: 4.2 Literature Review, 4.3 Data and Methodology, 
4.4. Results and Discussion and 4.5 Conclusion.  
4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1. Financial Literacy 
Financial literacy research has grown rapidly since Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) first 
developed a method of measuring financial literacy that can be applied across countries, 
allowing comparison of results. OECD (2005) defines financial education as a means for 
improving financial literacy, as individuals’ effort to increase their understanding of financial 
concepts and of products to develop their capabilities, confidence and welfare. This is achieved 
by using information and advice to better comprehend the opportunities and risks in making an 
informed alternative. Widdowson and Hailwood (2007) break down financial literacy into four 
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components: 1) basic numeracy skills to estimate interests and returns; 2) the grasp of risk and 
returns from financial decisions, such as spending, investments and leverage; 3) the capability 
to comprehend basic financial concepts, such as risk and return, availability of different 
financial products, diversification and time value of money; and 4) the ability to seek 
professional help, knowing the questions to ask and understanding the advice given. The 
definition by Widdowson and Hailwood (2007) identifies two important components of 
financial literacy: the first is the knowledge and cognitive function to understand financial 
information, and the second is the ability to take actions from the understanding of that 
information. 
Lusardi (2008) cites the US Presidency Advisory Council on Financial Literacy’s 
(PACFL, 2008) conceptual model of the financial literacy process. Similar to OECD (2005) 
and Widdowson and Hailwood (2007), the PACFL (2008) suggests that financial literacy starts 
with financial knowledge of and capacity to understand financial concepts and products, which 
then leads to the development of financial skills and perceived knowledge that may affect an 
individual’s financial behaviour. Hogarth and Hilgert (2002) show that there is a positive 
correlation between financial knowledge and financial behaviour. The experience from 
financial behaviour further improves financial knowledge, and thus the cycle continues. Some 
also consider financial literacy as a human-capital production function (Banks, 2010) that can 
develop or deteriorate over time (Finke, Howe, and Huston, 2017). 
[Insert Figure 4.1.] 
Financial literacy is not only important for an individual’s financial welfare, but it also 
has the potential to affect the population, the government and the financial system. First, if 
individuals are financially illiterate and make poor financial decisions, then they are more 
likely to rely on the government for support, and potentially become a burden for the rest of 
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the population in terms of a higher tax requirement (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011b). Second, 
individuals’ financial literacy and decision-making (including spending and investment 
decisions) also affects the resource allocation within an economy, and this may have 
subsequent effects on economic growth and stability (Widdowson and Hailwood, 2007). 
Finally, the potential impact of financial literacy has encouraged some governments (in 
countries such as Japan and Sweden) to further invest in financial education programs (Lusardi 
and Mitchell, 2007).  
Previous studies have found that financial literacy around the world is still low. Lusardi 
and Mitchell (2011c) find that financial literacy is low in Italy, Sweden, Russia, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Netherlands and the US. Their paper amalgamates the findings of many studies,128 
which all apply the same measure of financial literacy called the “Big Three” (Agnew et al., 
2013, p. 1). The Big Three consists of a set of three questions used to measure financial literacy, 
developed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b), and has been applied by many studies since. 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011c) find that financial illiteracy is more prominent in women, older 
and younger persons (compared with middle-aged) and those with the poorest educational 
background. In the US, Lusardi (2008) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) find that African 
Americans and Hispanics typically have lower financial literacy than whites. Agnew et al. 
(2013) show that financial literacy in Australia is similar to that in other countries. Those who 
are young, least educated, unemployed or not in the labour force are most vulnerable.  
In New Zealand, Crossan et al. (2011) find that Māori have lower levels of financial 
literacy than non-Māori after controlling for demographic factors. However, there is little 
difference in financial literacy levels between the Ngāi Tahu129 and the rest of the New 
                                                          
128 Alessie et al. (2011); Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh (2011); Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011); Crossan 
et al. (2011); Fornero and Monticone (2011); Klapper and Panos (2011); Lusardi and Mitchell (2011c); Sekita 
(2011).  
129 South Island Māori tribe (iwi). 
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Zealanders studied. Klapper et al. (2015) suggest that financial literacy is considerably lower 
in transition economies and in those economies showing a lower income. There is a difference 
in the way that financial literacy affects financial decision-making in countries of different 
income levels (Xu and Zia, 2012). Financial literacy correlates with retirement planning, 
sophisticated investment alternatives, debt and mortgage consequences and microeconomic 
implications in high-income countries (Xu and Zia, 2012). On the other hand, in low-income 
countries, financial literacy correlates with owning bank accounts, insurance ownership, 
business literacy and financial education interests (Xu and Zia, 2012). 
Despite these findings, it is not clear from the literature if financial literacy affects 
decision-making. Most studies support the notion that financial literacy has a positive 
correlation to decision-making, such as retirement planning,130 accumulation of wealth131 or 
investment/portfolio alternatives,132 and that financial illiteracy has a negative effect on debt.133  
However, there are some studies that suggest otherwise. Crossan et al. (2011) find that financial 
literacy does not influence retirement planning in New Zealand. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that New Zealand’s universal public pension (NZS) discourages individuals from 
planning for their retirement (Crossan et al., 2011).  Dvorak and Hanley (2010) determine that 
although participants show moderate to high levels of financial literacy, they are unable to 
understand the differences among several investment options. This finding may be due to the 
difference between basic financial literacy and financial sophistication.134 Basic financial 
literacy covers the Big Three (Agnew et al., 2013, p. 1) concepts of compounding interest, 
inflation and risk diversification (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011). On the other hand, 
                                                          
130 Agnew et al. (2013); Ameriks et al. (2003); Behrman et al. (2012); Klapper et al. (2015), Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007, 2011a, 2011c, 2017); Lusardi (2008); Van Rooij et al. (2012). 
131 Behrman et al. (2012); Jappelli and Padula (2013). 
132 Calvet et al. (2009); Christelis et al. (2010); Hastings and Mitchell (2020); Jappelli and Padula (2015); Lusardi 
and Mitchell (2014); OECD (2005); Van Rooij et al. (2011).  
133 Agarwal et al. (2009); Lusardi et al. (2016); Lusardi and Tufano (2015).  
134 Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011); Kimball and Shumway (2006); Lusardi (2008); Van Rooij et al. (2011).  
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differentiation among investment options requires a higher level of financial sophistication 
(Dvorak and Hanley, 2010). The possible explanations of why certain studies report 
contradictory findings strengthens the belief of a strong correlation between financial literacy 
and differing complexity levels of decision-making.  
4.2.1.1. Financial Literacy and Decision-Making 
In their definition of financial literacy, Widdowson and Hailwood (2007) note financial 
decisions include spending, borrowing and investing. This section explores the literature on 
how financial literacy affects borrowing (or debt management) and investment alternatives. 
4.2.1.1.1. Financial Literacy and Debt 
Lusardi and Tufano (2015) analyse US individuals’ debt literacy, financial experiences 
and judgements of debt levels. They measure debt literacy as a combination of the 
understanding of financial concepts and/or a self-assessment of financial knowledge. Financial 
experiences are participants’ reported encounters with borrowing or investment alternatives, 
and indebtedness levels are self-assessed. They show that only a third of the population 
understand compounding interest and many do not realise how credit cards work. Lower-level 
debt literacy is associated with high transaction costs from higher fees and expensive 
borrowing. Individuals with less financial knowledge also pay higher credit card charges and 
fees and report excessive debt loads or are unable to self-assess how much debt they have. 
Using a single question to assess whether individuals can estimate interest rates, Stango and 
Zinman (2009) find that those who could not estimate the correct interest rate from a payment 
stream had higher borrowing and less wealth accumulation. While their study employs a single 
question to measure interest rate understanding, interest rate is one of the three financial 
concepts to assess basic financial literacy. Their finding indirectly supports the possibility that 
financial illiteracy may cause individuals to incur more debt. 
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4.2.1.1.2. Financial Literacy and Investment Decisions 
Using data from the Netherlands, Van Rooij et al. (2011) report that although the 
majority of respondents understand basic inflation, compounding interest and time value of 
money financial literacy concepts, very few have financial investment product knowledge. The 
results are similar to Dvorak and Hanley (2010). Van Rooij et al. (2011) report that individuals 
with lower financial literacy (or financial sophistication) are less likely to invest in stocks. 
However, the resistance to invest in stocks may be due to a specific lack of understanding about 
stocks, asset pricing and the way the stock market works, rather than a lack of general financial 
literacy (Campbell, 2006; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995).  
Financial literacy is found to affect returns from stock market participation and the 
incurred cost. Jappelli and Padula (2015) posit that financial literacy is a form of human-capital 
production that has costs and benefits in the Life-Cycle model (supported by Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2014)). Using an intertemporal portfolio alternative model, in which individuals can 
invest in financial literacy, choose to save, allocate their wealth in either safe or risky assets 
and collect a pension in retirement, Jappelli and Padula (2015) show that financial literacy 
accumulated early in life has a positive correlation with the accumulation of wealth and 
portfolio alternative in the future. They suggest that the positive correlation to financial literacy 
is due to the reduction of participation cost in the stock market. They also point out that 
increasing the generosity of a social security system reduces incentives to participate in the 
stock market.  
Using a similar intertemporal consumption model approach, Jappelli and Padula (2013) 
find that financial literacy early in life has a positive correlation on wealth levels. Jappelli and 
Padula (2013) propose that the higher wealth is partly due to better investment returns as a 
result of higher financial literacy. They point out in their model, however, that financial literacy 
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decreases over time. The depreciation of financial literacy over time causes concern that the 
older population would have lower financial literacy and are at greater risk of making financial 
mistakes. This concern is supported by findings that show that the older population (i) has 
lower financial literacy than the rest of the population (except the young),135 (ii) is more prone 
to making financial mistakes (Calvet et al., 2009), (iii) is more vulnerable to financial fraud 
(DeLiema et al., 2018), (iv) has debt in retirement136 and (v) is not ready for retirement.137 
4.2.1.2. Financial Literacy Among the Older Population 
Financial literacy is lowest among the older population (Calvet et al., 2009; Lusardi, 
2012a; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2014). Lusardi (2012a) notes several 
reasons why money management and financial literacy are both important for the older 
population:  
1) Older individuals have reached the decumulation stage of their life-cycle. They have a 
limited capability to continue working past retirement. Therefore, retirees need to 
manage the wealth that they have so that they do not run out of funding during their 
retirement years. 
2) Due to their limited capability to continue working past retirement, older individuals 
may face dire financial consequences if they make any financial mistakes. 
3) Older individuals have passed the peak of their wealth accumulation stage in the life-
cycle. They have accumulated wealth but are found to have lower financial literacy 
levels than the middle-aged generation (Calvet et al., 2009; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, 
                                                          
135 Christelis et al. (2010); Lusardi (2012b); Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011a, 2014). 
136 Agarwal et al. (2009); Lusardi et al. (2016). 
137 Agnew et al. (2013); Ameriks et al. (2003); Behrman et al. (2012); Klapper et al. (2015); Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007, 2011a, 2011c, 2017); Lusardi (2008); Van Rooij et al. (2012) 
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2011c), and thus are prone to financial mistakes (Calvet et al., 2009; Stolper and Walter, 
2017) and being the victim of fraud (DeLiema et al., 2018; Lusardi, 2012a). 
Those reasons may have motivated the growing literature on financial literacy and 
financial decision-making among the older population. The next section focuses on two of the 
most popular areas of financial literacy research among the older population: investment 
decisions (including debt ownership) and retirement planning. 
4.2.1.2.1. Financial Literacy, Debt and Investment Decisions Among Older Individuals. 
One of the important motivations behind investigating financial literacy within the older 
population is the work limitation that older persons face. This makes them more vulnerable to 
the financial consequences of financial decisions made in error (Lusardi, 2012a). 
Consequently, older individuals or retirees may have difficulty repaying loan obligations if 
they choose to rely on debt throughout their retirement years. Using data from the Health and 
Retirement Study and the National Financial Capability Study in the US, Lusardi et al. (2016) 
analyse debt and the financial vulnerability of older individuals. They examine three cohorts 
(1994, 2004 and 2010) with an age range of 56 to 61 and estimate cross-cohort debt changes 
over time (Lusardi et al., 2016). The results reveal that for the more recent cohort, debt levels 
are higher because of their higher mortgage debt. The higher mortgages were mostly due to 
higher-priced homes purchased with smaller down payments. Lusardi et al. (2016) suggest that 
more recent cohorts are more financially insecure than earlier ones. Higher financial literacy, 
higher income and education are associated with better debt management (Lusardi et al., 2016).  
The Lusardi et al.’s (2016) study also highlights the importance of debt management. In 
particular, the study notes that 1) debt interest rates are higher than most rates of return on 
investment, so managing debt is crucial to ensure that retirees do not outlive their retirement 
funds; 2) the ease of borrowing in more recent years and the smaller down payments on homes 
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may lead to higher borrowing rates and higher chances of mortgage defaults for low-income 
households; and 3) alternative lending services such as payday loans and pawnshops are 
dangerous, as they target mostly low-income individuals and set very high interest rates. These 
conditions deter wealth accumulation for retirement.  
The debt concern of the older population is supported by Vornovytsky et al. (2011), 
who find that older individuals (aged 55–64 and older than 65 years of age) have the highest 
relative growth in household debt ownership. Masnick et al. (2006) find that inadequate lending 
practices and higher tolerance for debt are responsible for the increase in mortgage debt among 
the older population. The older population also pay the highest debt fees. Agarwal et al. (2009) 
investigate financial mistakes made using a Life-Cycle model. They find a U-shaped pattern in 
the life-cycle, with the young and the older generations making greater mistakes. An age of 53 
is identified as having the lowest costs and the optimal performance. There is also evidence 
that the older population has the fastest-growing numbers of bankruptcy filings, with most 
cases due to credit card interest payment and fees. 
The older population are also more prone to investment mistakes (Calvet et al., 2009) 
and may not benefit from optimal investment returns. Using data from the Health and 
Retirement Study, Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) show that older individuals are not financially 
sophisticated. They do not understand diversification and portfolio alternative, asset valuation 
and investment fees. Failure by older individuals to understand investment option differences 
is also reported by Dvorak and Hanley (2010). The limited investment knowledge of the older 
population limits their capacity to gain from investment returns, and thus restricts wealth 
accumulation. The low level of financial literacy among the older population and their lack of 
capacity to manage debt and benefit from investment opportunities may make them more 
vulnerable to poverty in retirement. 
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4.2.1.2.2. Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning. 
The introduction of a metric to measure financial literacy by Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007) provided an opportunity to contribute to the literature on financial literacy, retirement 
planning and preparedness around the world,138 and the relationship between retirement 
planning and wealth accumulation.139 The majority of studies report a positive association 
between retirement preparedness and financial literacy140 and greater wealth accumulation and 
financial literacy.141 Very few studies find conflicting results.  
Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2012) use the 2004 Health and Retirement Study 
in the US to examine the role of financial knowledge, especially knowledge on the Social 
Security system and on pensions. The findings include 1) that numeracy or cognitive measures 
do not significantly affect pension understanding; 2) pension wealth is significantly linked to 
pension and the Social Security system understanding; and 3) pension and Social Security 
system knowledge does not affect non-pension and Social Security related wealth. Gustman et 
al. (2012) use three measures of cognitive ability: a series of questions on individuals’ ability 
to serially subtract a number and count backwards, recalling of a list of words and a series of 
questions on compounding interest, fractions and probability. A possible reason as to why their 
measure of cognitive ability does not affect pension understanding is that only the compound 
interest question is directly linked to retirement preparation. Pension and Social Security 
system knowledge has a positive effect on pension and Social Security wealth because of their 
direct relevance. One drawback to the Gustman et al. (2012) study is that it adopts a different 
measure of financial literacy compared with the majority of studies. Direct comparison of the 
                                                          
138 Agnew et al. (2013); Ameriks et al. (2003); Behrman et al. (2012); Klapper et al. (2015); Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007, 2011a, 2011c, 2017); Lusardi (2008); Van Rooij et al. (2012) 
139 Ameriks et al. (2003); Behrman et al. (2012); Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011a, 2017). 
140 Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2017). 
141 Ameriks et al. (2003); Behrman et al. (2012); Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011a, 2017). 
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findings to research that has applied “the Big Three” Agnew et al. (2013, p. 1) set of questions 
to quantify financial literacy is arguably more difficult. 
Applying “the Big Three” Agnew et al. (2013, p. 1) questions on interest compounding, 
inflation and diversification to a New Zealand sample, Crossan et al. (2011) report no 
significant association between financial literacy and retirement planning. The authors argue 
that the public pension provision level may “cushion” (Crossan et al., 2011, p. 3) retirees’ 
financial mistakes and discourage financial education motivations. Klapper and Panos (2011) 
also support this view when finding that there is a negative correlation between a social security 
system’s generous provision and financial literacy. A generous social security system reduces 
the incentive for improving financial literacy. Mandell and Klein (2007) show that motivational 
variables significantly improve financial literacy. If the government of a country that provides 
such “cushioning” wishes to reduce its public provision or encourage self-sufficiency, it is 
likely that retirees may not be prepared to support themselves in retirement. The unique result 
for the case of New Zealand has motivated the author to further investigate the Crossan et al. 
(2011) finding using a more recent time series of data and to explore the impact of potential 
financial illiteracy on retirees living in poverty. 
To date, the literature has explored relationships between financial literacy and 
particular types of decision-making activities, such as retirement planning and debt ownership 
among the older population. There is limited literature on the effect of financial literacy on 
wealth spending decisions among retirees. Furthermore, there is limited, if any, literature that 
considers the relationship between financial literacy and debt and risk attitude, and also how 
these all affect spending decisions. This gap in the literature has motivated the author to 
investigate the relationships between retiree spending decisions, financial literacy, debt 
ownership and risk attitude.  
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4.2.1.3. The Case of New Zealand and the Research Questions 
NZ is one of only a few countries that have a universal public pension. NZ’s public 
pension provision, the New Zealand Superannuation (NZS), is not means tested and provides 
one of the highest population coverage rates around the world (OECD, 2015). However, it only 
covers up to around 40% of the NZ’s average income,142 making it one of the lowest pensions 
within the OECD countries (OECD, 2015). NZ is also one of the few countries that do not have 
a mandatory contributory pension system.143 NZ has a voluntary contributory retirement 
savings scheme called KiwiSaver. KiwiSaver does not have an annuitisation option when 
withdrawing upon retirement at the age of 65. The low provision level of NZS, the lack of a 
mandatory savings scheme and having KiwiSaver not linked to an annuitisation option are all 
important concerns that can affect NZ’s aging population. Failing to save additional funds for 
retirement or an inability to manage wealth close to retirement, due to the unavailability of a 
default annuitisation option in KiwiSaver, mean that retirees are more vulnerable to poverty in 
retirement. The NZ system puts a lot of pressure on retirees to be financially literate and to be 
responsible in making sound financial decisions, in order to ensure they do not outlive their 
wealth. These critical factors serve to motivate the investigation into financial literacy, debt 
ownership and risk attitude, and how they contribute to NZ retirees’ spending decisions. 
There is limited literature on financial literacy and retirement in NZ. As far as the author 
is aware, only Crossan et al. (2011) have investigated financial literacy and retirement planning 
in NZ. The Crossan et al. (2011) study uses data from the 2009 ANZ/Retirement Commission 
Financial Knowledge Survey of 850 New Zealanders. The survey follows a previous survey 
conducted in 2005–2006, with both surveys asking the same questions. Results from a survey 
                                                          
142 Gross current NZS level (as of April 1, 2019) is at 33.6-46.8% of median weekly earnings (Author’s estimation 
based on NZS rates from workandincome.co.nz and median weekly earnings from Statistics NZ).  
143 OECD (2015) 
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of 400 members of the Ngāi Tahu iwi (tribe) on financial knowledge using the same questions 
as those in the 2009 Financial Knowledge Survey are also reported. Crossan et al. (2011) also 
apply Agnew et al.’s (2013) “Big Three” questions on interest rate, inflation and 
diversification, adjusting the diversification questions for the word stock.144 Survey participants 
answer questions about financial goals, if they have a written financial plan and the extent to 
which they have thought about retirement planning, as a measure of retirement planning. Their 
findings show that low financial literacy is more prominent among those who are lower 
educated, young or old, female, Māori and living in rural areas. Although Māori score lower 
financial literacy scores than the rest of the population, Ngāi Tahu members do not. The authors 
suggest that the difference may be due to wellbeing and learning opportunities associated with 
tribal affiliation, compared with those of Māori ethnicity but without such affiliations. Another 
possible reason is that Ngāi Tahu’s tertiary education rate is higher than that of the total Māori 
population.  Crossan et al. (2011) report little relation between financial literacy and retirement 
planning. The study does emphasise that the lack of effect may be due to the universal nature 
of NZS that discourages individuals to plan for retirement. 
This proposition assumes that the provision of NZS is adequate to deter retirement 
planning. However, the NZS payments only provide up to around 40% of NZ’s average 
income,145 which implies that retirees are living on minimal income. There is no research to 
support the adequacy assumption made by Crossan et al. (2011). This study aims to 
reinvestigate financial literacy levels in NZ and explore the relationship between financial 
literacy and (i) debt ownership and (ii) risk attitude. No previous studies have considered these 
two factors. This chapter also investigates the relationship between interest rates, inflation and 
diversification and retiree’s spending decisions; in particular, how retirees rank different 
                                                          
144 The term “stock” may be misinterpreted by some New Zealanders. 
145 Gross current NZS level (as of April 1st, 2019) is at 33.6%–46.8% of median weekly earnings (Author’s 
estimation based on NZS rates from workandincome.co.nz and median weekly earnings from Statistics NZ). 
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spending alternatives, such as consumption (i.e. general or luxury consumption), investment 
alternatives such as KiwiSaver or property investments, bequest motives such as giving money 
to family members and philanthropic motives such as donations. This is the first study to 
investigate the relationship between financial literacy, debt ownership and risk attitude on 
spending preferences among retirees, in general, and among NZ retirees specifically. 
This study aims to answer the following research questions: 
1. Are NZ retirees financially literate? Who are the most vulnerable NZ retirees? 
2. How does financial literacy affect debt ownership and risk attitude among NZ retirees? 
3. Does financial literacy affect spending preferences among NZ retirees? 
4. How does the relationship dynamics between financial literacy, debt ownership, risk 
attitude and spending preferences change with different types of spending alternatives? 
4.3. Data and Methodology 
4.3.1. Data 
This study collected data from a total sample of 1,191 New Zealanders aged 55 and 
older in December 2018–May 2019, working together with Research Now (renamed Dynata), 
a well-established global survey company.146 The study was first piloted among older staff 
members of Otago University and members of the NZ community in September 2018. After 
feedback was received, the survey was revised and then rolled out in December 2018. The first 
survey roll-out between December 2018 and 2019 provided a sample size of 966, in proportion 
to the NZ population by gender, but disproportionately dominated by European New Zealander 
(Pākehā) respondents. Therefore, a second survey roll-out in April–May 2019 was conducted 
to collect additional responses from the Māori and Pacific Island community. The final sample 
consisting of all the respondents is now very close to a national representation of the NZ 
                                                          
146 See https://www.dynata.com/ for more information. 
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population based on gender and ethnicity. The sample included six respondents who answered 
“other” for gender, so these responses were omitted and a total sample of 1,185 was used 
instead of 1,191 when analysis by gender was conducted. 
[Insert Table 4.1.] 
Table 4.1 shows that the sample slightly under-sampled the “70 and over” intentionally 
and over-sampled those aged “60–64” and “65–70”. These age classes capture those older 
individuals close to retirement or have just entered retirement and represent individuals who 
must make decisions about changes to their spending decisions. Table 4.1 shows the respondent 
distribution is close to the national population distribution of income. The sampling is slightly 
lower at the lowest and highest income population and higher in the lower and middle.  
4.3.2. Methodology 
4.3.2.1. Financial Literacy, Debt, and Risk Attitude 
4.3.2.1.1. Measuring Financial Literacy (Research Question 1) 
For comparability, this study uses the set of questions by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b) 
to measure financial literacy.147 The survey measures three basic financial concepts: interest 
compounding, inflation and risk diversification (Agnew et al., 2013). The study modifies the 
diversification question in Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) by changing the word “stock” to the 
word “shares”, as potentially New Zealanders may misinterpret “stock” as livestock (Crossan 
et al., 2011). In addition, the study includes a question on the concept of investment risks and 
returns from the G20/OECD INFE Report on Adult Financial Literacy in G20 Countries. The 
exact wording for each question in the survey is as follows: 
                                                          
147 Countries such as Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, Italy, USA, Russia, NZ and Australia. See Agnew 
et al. (2013); Alessie et al. (2011); Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh (2011); Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011); 
Crossan et al. (2011); Fornero and Monticone (2011); Klapper and Panos (2011); Lusardi and Mitchell (2011c); 




Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per annum. After 5 
years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow?  
a. More than $102 
b. Exactly $102 
c. Less than $102 
d. Do not know 
Inflation 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per annum and inflation was 
2%. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account? 
a. More than today 
b. Exactly the same 
c. Less than today 
d. Do not know 
Diversification 
Please tell me whether this statement is true or false. 'Buying a single company's shares usually 




c. Do not know 
Investment Risks and Returns 
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Please tell me whether this statement is true or false. 'An investment with high return is likely 
to be high risk' (if someone offers you the chance to make a lot of money, it is likely there is 
also a chance that you can lose a lot of money). 
a. True 
b. False 
c. Do not know 
The total financial literacy score is the number of questions respondents answered 
correctly. This value ranges from 0 to 4. The study has categorized these scores as “Low” if 
respondents have answered at most one correctly, “Medium” if they answered two correctly 
and “High” if they answered at least three correctly. The study does not go into the detail of 
the breakdown on the distribution of which questions are answered correctly (like previous 
financial literacy studies).148 Instead, the focus is on how financial literacy affects different 
spending preferences.  
4.3.2.1.2. Measuring Debt 
Debt is a self-assessed measurement. It is measured using two questions. One question 
is about indebtedness and the other question refers to how the respondent views debt. Self-
judgement on debt follows Lusardi and Tufano (2015), and this study uses a self-assessed debt 
ownership question to cross-check debt ownership and position. The study uses the exact 
wording of Lusardi and Tufano (2015) in asking debt position views but has removed the 
options of “I have too little debt right now. I wish I could get more” (Lusardi and Tufano, 2015, 
p. 20) and “I just don’t know” (Lusardi and Tufano, 2015, p. 20) because this study focuses on 
the older population where debt is less easily accessible, as retirees are more prone to health 
shocks and have less ability to pay back loans (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Guiso et al.,2002). 
                                                          
148 Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011); Van Rooij et al. (2012). 
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The removal of “I just don’t know” was done to minimise the number of alternatives, as the 
focus of the study is beyond the debt estimation of retirees. The survey instrument questions 
are the following: 
Self-Assessed Debt Ownership 
Do you have any outstanding debt more than a month's worth of salary/your income? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
Self-Assessed Debt Position 
Which of the following best describes your current debt position? 
a. I may have difficulty paying it off 
b. I face no problems paying my debt 
c. I have no debt 
4.3.2.1.3. Measuring Risk Attitude 
We introduce a self-assessed measurement of risk-taking attitude149 because some of 
the spending alternatives we consider may be affected by risk appetite (Hayhoe, Leach, Turner, 
Bruin, and Lawrence, 2000). The literature shows that financial literacy (i) affects stock market 
participation, (ii) leads to better returns and (iii) lowers incurred cost (Jappelli and Padula, 
2015).  Previous studies have yet to propose a relationship between financial literacy and higher 
risk tolerance, but high stock market participation can imply a higher risk tolerance of retirees. 
The exact wording of the self-assessment of risk attitude150 is the following: 
                                                          
149 Self-assessment of risk attitude is also used in Ding et al. (2010). 




How would you 'honestly' describe yourself as a risk-taker? 
a. Reckless/hasty 
b. Willing to take evaluated risk 
c. Careful 
d. Low risk taking capability 
e. Extremely unwilling to take risk 
4.3.2.1.4. Method for Describing Financial Literacy (Research Question 1) 
Financial literacy levels are described by the percentages of specific groups that have 
scored “high”, “medium” or “low”. These groups are based on age, gender, ethnicity, 
education attainment and income level. The findings elaborate on the groups who are the 
most financially literate and those who are most vulnerable to old-age poverty due to 
financial illiteracy. 
4.3.2.1.5. Method for Analysing Financial Literacy, Debt and Risk Attitude (Research 
Questions 1 and 2) 
The study initially applies an ordinal logistic regression to investigate the demographic 
factors affecting financial literacy.  Previous studies have found a negative correlation between 
financial literacy and debt ownership.151 Therefore, this study also uses ordinal logistic 
regression to test for a negative relationship between financial literacy and debt as suggested 
in the literature. The relationship is given by hypothesis 1: 
H1: Debt ownership decreases with financial literacy. 
This study explores the possible relationship between financial literacy and risk attitude 
by applying an ordinal logistic regression. Previous studies have yet to propose a relationship 
                                                          
151 Agarwal et al. (2009); Bucks et al. (2009); Lusardi et al. (2016), Lusardi and Tufano (2015). 
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between financial literacy and higher risk tolerance, but high stock market participation can 
imply higher risk tolerance of retirees. Therefore, it is reasonable to test for a positive 
relationship between financial literacy and risk attitude. The relationship is given by hypothesis 
2: 
H2: Risk tolerance increases with financial literacy. 
The estimated logistic models for both debt ownership and risk attitude include controls 
for demographic factors (gender, ethnicity, age group, education, marital status, income, health, 
family responsibility and work hours), respectively.  The models are given by 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑍𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒55 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ + 𝛽8𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝 + 𝛽9𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 +  
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑍𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒55 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ + 𝛽9𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝 + 𝛽10𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 +  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑍𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒55 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ + 𝛽9𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝 + 𝛽10𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 +  
where 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 is financial literacy, 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a self-reported debt assessment, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 
is a self-reported risk tolerance assessment, and the control variables include 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 for male, 
𝑁𝑍𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑛 for European New Zealander, 𝐴𝑔𝑒55 for retirees age 55–59, 𝑁𝑜𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 for low 
educational attainment, 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 for single individuals, 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 for income up to NZ$20,845 
(the NZS provision level in 2018), 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ is a self-reported number of medical visits in a year, 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝 is the measure for family responsibility including the number of children and family 




4.3.2.2.1. Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (1000Minds) 
There are several unique aspects to this study. First, it uses a multi-criteria decision-
making method.  The approach is similar to applications used to analyse policymaking (Au et 
al., 2015), sustainable energy planning (Pohekar and Ramachandran, 2004), supplier 
evaluation (Ho et al., 2010) and supply chain selection (Wang et al., 2004), among others. 
Second, the analysis uses a multi-criteria decision-making method to incorporate financial 
literacy into spending decisions. The study uses a multi-criteria decision-making software 
package, 1000Minds (Ombler and Hansen, 2012).152 Unlike traditional multi-criteria decision-
making methods that require respondents to rank the importance from a list of alternatives, the 
Potentially All Pairwise RanKings of all possible Alternatives (PAPRIKA) method applied in 
1000Minds shows two alternatives each time and respondents are asked to indicate their 
preference between them.  
The 1000Minds software applies the Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Analysis for two 
types of analysis: one that analyses prioritisation of a set of alternatives or one that analyses 
prioritisation of a combination of criteria for a set of alternate alternatives (conjoint analysis). 
This thesis uses the simpler prioritisation of a set of alternatives. The 1000Minds software 
allows the ranking of a set of alternatives based on alternatives made by participants with a 
repetition of two alternatives presented at each time and is repeated until all combinations of 
alternatives are presented (Pairwise ranking). The 1000Minds software processes the 
respective responses and produces a preference weight for each alternative for each participant, 
totalling to 1 (weighted sum model). The software ranks the alternatives and then tests the 
weighting of an alternative compared with other alternatives. The algorithm produces different 
                                                          
152 1000Minds was first launched in 2002 after discovering the PAPRIKA (Potentially All Pairwise RanKings of 
all possible Alternatives) algorithm (Hansen and Ombler, 2009).  
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combinations for each pair of alternatives until it is able to estimate the relative rank of all 
alternatives (Hansen and Ombler, 2009).  The study designs the 1000Minds survey so as to 
estimate the relative spending preference of older New Zealanders. Respondents were asked 
how they would choose to spend a $50,000 windfall. The question states: 
What would you do if you received a $50,000 windfall? 
Respondents are given 13 alternatives that cover different spending motivations, such 
as day-to-day consumption, investments (financial products and property), health investment, 
family and philanthropic motives. This is the list of possible alternatives: 
[Insert Table 4.2.] 
The layout of the 1000Minds survey is presented in Figure 4.2. 
[Insert Figure 4.2.] 
4.3.2.2.2. Methods for Analyzing Decision-Making in 1000Minds (FM Logit) 
The responses from 1000Minds are analysed using a Fractional Multinomial Logit 
Model (FMNL), an extension of the fractional logit model. Koch (2010) uses FMNL on 
expenditure share data. He points out that the Multinomial Logit Model had to be extended to 
allow not just discrete data but also continuous observations. The 1000Minds software, using 
the PAPRIKA method, allows for results of each alternative preference to be in the form of 
fractions that all add up to 1 (Koch, 2010). This study applies FMNL to assess how financial 
literacy, debt ownership and risk attitude affect each spending alternative. Examples of the 
model for the alternative “Money in Bank” and “KiwiSaver” are 
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𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑍𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒55 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑜𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
+ 𝛽10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ + 𝛽11𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝 + 𝛽12𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 +  
𝐾𝑖𝑤𝑖𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑍𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒55 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑜𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
+ 𝛽10𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ + 𝛽11𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝 + 𝛽12𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 +  
where 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 is the propensity to choose to put money in the bank and 𝐾𝑖𝑤𝑖𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟 is the 
propensity to invest in KiwiSaver.  
4.3.2.3. Understanding Relationships Between Variables 
4.3.2.3.1. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or Factor Analysis 
Due to the complexity of the study, principal component analysis is applied to reduce 
the number of potentially correlated variables.153 Literature consistently documents a strong 
positive correlation between income and education.154 The study uses PCA on education 
attainment and income to create the variable “Advantage” as a combination of the effect of 
income and education. The eigenvalues for high education are 1.2 and 0.75 for income; the 
former explains 63% of the variation and 37% is explained by the latter. 
The study also uses PCA on “children” and “family health” to determine the measure 
“Family Responsibility”. Family health and number of children have both eigenvalues either 
greater than 1 (1.07 for family health) or very close to 1 (0.93 for children); therefore, the two 
values are combined to create the variable family responsibility that weights family health 
(0.5364) and the number of children (0.4636), respectively. 
                                                          
153 Wold, Esbensen, and Geladi (1987). 
154 Example in as early as 1959 (Houthakker, 1959) to most recent study by Bernhofen (2019). 
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There are also different combinations of variables, such as “income” and “work hours”, 
“medical visits” and “health ratings”, and “debt ownership” and “debt position”, that are tested 
using PCA but find either a weak result (income and work hours) or one variable dominates 
the other (debt position and medical visit) based on their respective eigenvalues.  
4.3.2.3.2. Structural Equation Modelling (Research Questions 3 and 4) 
This study is the first to deeply investigate the relationship dynamics between financial 
literacy, debt position, risk attitude and spending preference. Previous studies have established 
a positive correlation between financial literacy and debt position (Lusardi and Tufano, 2015), 
possible correlation between financial literacy and risk attitude (Jappelli and Padula, 2015) and 
that financial literacy affects general decision-making.155 This study applies structural equation 
modelling to explore and test the possible complex relationship paths between individual 
financial literacy, debt, position and spending preferences.  
Following Koch and Hadaya (2018), an effect size of 0.30 is determined to be important 
for any paths applied to a sample size of at least 100. Using a required sample size of 51, Koch 
and Hadaya (2018) suggest effect sizes of 0.15 and 0.35 are medium and large, respectively. 
When applying structural equation modelling for path analysis, samples are split according to 
their categorical variable subsamples, which reduces sample size. 
4.4. Results and Discussion 
4.4.1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
4.4.1.1. Financial Literacy in NZ 
[Insert Table 4.3.] 
                                                          
155 Such decision-making includes retirement planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011b; Van Rooij et al., 2012), 
and incurring debt (Lusardi and Tufano, 2015). 
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Table 4.3 shows the financial literacy distribution for New Zealanders based on the 
study’s sample. The majority of New Zealanders aged 55 and over are financially literate, with 
more than half scoring a “high” financial literacy score. Only 8.14% of the sample scored low, 
and 2.52% of the sample got none of the questions correct. A “medium” score, defined as 
achieving between two and three correct responses, was observed for 34.84% of the sample. 
The majority of these respondents got three questions correct rather than two. The results are 
different to those reported in prior financial literacy studies for other countries. That is, older 
New Zealanders report a general financial literacy level that is medium to high. Most studies 
of financial literacy in the older population indicate that financial literacy is low;156 however, 
high financial literacy of older citizens is also found in Germany (Stolper and Walter, 2017). 
[Insert Table 4.4.] 
Table 4.4 shows that financial literacy in the sample is highest among males, with 
65.86% males scoring “high” compared with 48.76% of females. There are more females that 
score “low” than there are males. Financial literacy is similar across age groups, except for 
those in the 55–59 age group. These respondents report the smallest percentage of “high” scores 
and the greatest share of “low” scores. European New Zealanders have the highest financial 
literacy level compared with other ethnicities. Māori and Pacific Islanders report lower 
financial literacy than Asians and also report the largest fraction of “low” scores compared 
with other ethnicities. Higher income levels and better education are both associated with 
higher financial literacy levels. Married individuals make up the majority of the sample. 
Married individuals have the highest proportion of “high” scores and the lowest fraction 
scoring “low” compared with single/never married or divorced/widowed. More than half of the 
                                                          
156 Alessie et al. (2011); Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh (2011); Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011); Crossan 




sample have two or three children, and their financial literacy scores are similar across the 
number of children. The sample contains more than 60% of individuals not having debt more 
than a month’s salary. Individuals with debt more than a month’s salary are associated with a 
lower proportion of scoring “high” and a higher fraction of “low” scores. Similar findings are 
present among those with more worrying levels of debt. Most of the sample individuals have 
either one to three or four to seven medical visits a year and have similar financial literacy 
scores across the number of medical visits a year. Similar trends are found across self-reported 
health ratings and self-reported family health, with the majority of the sample having at least 
good health in both. More than 70% of the sample live in their own home, and they are 
associated with a much higher fraction of scoring “high financial literacy” of 63% compared 
with 25–38% from those with other living arrangements. The majority of the sample are not in 
paid work, and financial literacy scores are similar regardless of the number of work hours. 
The sample consists of more than 40% of careful risk-taking attitude individuals, and the 
highest fraction of “high” financial literacy scores are those who take some risk. 
The highest scoring financially literate respondents in the sample are older, married, 
European New Zealander, males, living in their own home, willing to take evaluated risks, with 
higher levels of education and income and less worrying levels of debt. The lowest financially 
literate group are younger Māori or Pacific Island female renters who have lower incomes and 
lower levels of educational achievement and higher levels of debt. Their low level of financial 
literacy makes this group of respondents the most vulnerable. This is consistent with earlier 
work by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011), who report that non-white US (African Americans and 
Hispanic) females with low educational attainment and low income levels have the lowest 
financial literacy level. 
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4.4.1.2. Risk Attitude in NZ 
[Insert Table 4.5.] 
 Table 4.5. shows that the younger working males in the sample across ethnicity 
groups, marital statuses, number of children, medical visit per year, living arrangements, with 
higher income and education, better personal and family health, less than month’s salary and 
lower debt levels have a higher degree for risk tolerance. 
4.4.1.3. Debt Levels in New NZ 
[Insert Table 4.6.] 
 Table 4.6. presents levels of debt ownership by sample individuals. Debt ownership is 
lower among married, older, not in paid work, European New Zealanders, living in their own 
home and with better personal and family health. Debt ownership is similar across gender, 
income, education, number of children, medical visits last year and risk tolerance. Younger 
European New Zealanders not living in their own home, working at least 30 hours a week, with 
more frequent medical visits, poorer personal and family health have higher levels of debt. 
Worrying debt levels (based on answers of having difficulty of paying off debt) are spread 
similarly across gender, income, education, marital status, number of children and risk 
tolerance. 
4.4.2. Empirical Findings 
4.4.2.1. Financial Literacy in NZ 
[Insert Table 4.7.] 
The results reported in Table 4.7 show by sample older European New Zealander males 
with higher income and better education and less family responsibilities are associated with a 
significantly higher chance of scoring higher in the financial literacy measure than younger 
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Māori or Pacific Island females who have lower incomes and poorer educational attainment 
and have greater family responsibilities. Table 4.7 also provides insight into the association of 
debt and risk attitude with financial literacy. Individuals with higher levels of debt or greater 
appetite for risk are associated with half the chance and twice the likelihood, respectively, of 
having significantly greater financial literacy than those without debt or with less risk appetite. 
Marital status, self-reported health levels, medical visits and work hours have no significant 
associations with the odds of having higher financial literacy. 
4.4.2.2. Financial Literacy and Debt Position 
[Insert Table 4.8.] 
Table 4.8 reports that younger, male, Māori, with longer working hours and greater 
family responsibility in the sample are significantly associated with a more worrisome debt 
position. Older Asians with higher financial literacy, income over $100,000 and with excellent 
personal health are significantly associated with a lower chance of having worrying levels of 
debt. Table 4.8 shows a negative association between financial literacy and debt ownership 
(H1). Similar to Lusardi et al. (2016), a positive association between higher financial literacy, 
higher income and education is associated with better debt management. However, this chapter 
goes beyond investigating the role of financial literacy and debt management by incorporating 
the two and exploring their effect on spending preferences. There are no significant 
associations between risk attitude, education, marital status and the likelihood of debt position 
levels. 
4.4.2.3. Financial Literacy and Risk Attitude 
[Insert Table 4.9.] 
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Table 4.9 of the sample reports evidence that significantly greater chances of greater 
risk appetite are associated with healthy Māori or Pacific males, with higher financial literacy, 
education attainment and income. Table 4.9 shows a positive association between financial 
literacy and risk tolerance (H2). Debt position levels, age, marital status, number of medical 
visits, family responsibility and work hours have no association with the odds for greater risk 
appetite. 
4.4.3. Spending Decisions of Older New Zealanders 
4.4.3.1. General Spending Preference 
[Insert Table 4.10.] 
From Table 4.10, it can be seen that older New Zealanders in the sample have their most 
preferred spending alternatives, when faced with a $50,000 windfall, are ranked as follows: put 
the money in the bank (1), spend on home improvements (2) and invest in Kiwi Saver (3). The 
least preferred alternatives are donations (13), health investments (12) and general 
consumption (11). The results in Table 4.10 suggest that older New Zealanders, on average, 
tend to prefer conservative alternatives of windfall spending, given that placing money in the 
bank is the most preferred alternative. Home improvement as the second alternative suggests 
that older New Zealanders are potentially homeowners and value maintaining their home. The 
third alternative of investing in KiwiSaver implies that older New Zealanders, on average, 
value saving additional money for retirement and trust KiwiSaver as an investment alternative 
compared with share purchases (rank 8). The least preferred alternative, donations, suggests 
that philanthropic motives are least important, while putting aside money for family members 
is more important (ranks 6 and 7, respectively). Health investment is the second least preferred 
alternative. The NZ public health care system provides health coverage, especially for older 
New Zealanders, although the application of treatment is based on a point system that is queue 
centred on urgency and several other extenuating factors. The findings indicate that older New 
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Zealanders, on average, tend to say they do not put private health care as a priority, suggesting 
that they are perhaps content with the public health care system and would prefer to wait for 
treatment than spend on health investment. Interestingly, increase in general consumption is 
the third least preferred alternative, and this may imply that most older New Zealanders are 
careful in their spending habits. 
Table 4.10 presents the minimum, maximum and standard deviation of each 
alternative’s weight preference. It can be seen that the minimum is the same across all 
alternatives, and the maximum is higher among the more preferred alternatives than the less 
preferred. There is comparable variation across alternatives, but it is highest for debt payment 
and luxury items. This suggests that there may be other factors associated with those 
alternatives. For debt payment and luxury items, individuals without debt may not prefer the 
former alternative and individuals who may not be able to afford luxury items may not prefer 
the latter. 
4.4.4. The Role of Financial Literacy on Older New Zealanders’ Spending Decisions 
4.4.4.1.Empirical Findings 
[Insert Table 4.11.] 
The results of the fractional multinomial logit are presented in Table 4.11. They show 
that higher financial literacy in the sample is, on average, significantly associated with less 
tendency to spend on home deposits, investment property deposits, donations, general 
consumption, giving money to family now or later, putting money in the bank, investments in 
health and paying off debt rather than choosing to invest the $50,000 windfall into KiwiSaver. 
Those with more worrisome debt positions are significantly associated with using the $50,000 
windfall for home deposits, property investment deposits, general consumption, home 
improvements, health investments and paying off debt rather than choosing to invest in 
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KiwiSaver. Respondents with higher risk appetites are significantly associated with leaving 
money for family now or later, purchasing luxury goods and purchasing shares over choosing 
to invest in KiwiSaver. They also show a significant association with investing in KiwiSaver 
compared with putting the money in the bank. The findings from Table 4.11 suggest that those 
with a higher degree of financial literacy are significantly associated with KiwiSaver as the 
most preferred alternative, whilst those in more worrying debt positions are significantly 
associated with KiwiSaver as the least preferred alternative and those with higher risk appetite 
are significantly associated with putting money in the bank as the least preferred alternative. 
On average, males in the sample demonstrate a significant preference for making 
KiwiSaver investments rather than donations; however, they prefer share investments to 
KiwiSaver more so than females. There are also ethnic differences. Māori report a significantly 
lower preference for general consumption and purchasing luxury goods than investing in 
KiwiSaver, in comparison with European New Zealanders. Pacific Islanders, on average, 
exhibit a significant preference to leave money to family members later rather than investing 
in KiwiSaver compared with European New Zealanders. Asians, on average, report a 
significant preference to home deposit, property and health investments but show less 
preference to giving money to family members now than investing in KiwiSaver, compared 
with their European New Zealanders counterparts. The study finds that, on average, older 
individuals show a significant preference for donations and giving money to family members 
now and later, but have a lower preference for general consumption to KiwiSaver investment. 
On average, more advantaged157 individuals significantly prefer home deposits and general 
consumption less but prefer share purchase investments more, in contrast to KiwiSaver.  
                                                          
157 Individuals with higher education qualification levels and income. 
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Average responses for married individuals in the sample show that they have a 
significant preference for home deposit, property investment deposit, home improvements and 
paying off debt to investing in KiwiSaver, when compared with single individuals. Responses 
from divorced/widowed individuals show that, on average, these individuals significantly 
prefer investing in home improvements rather than KiwiSaver when compared with singles. 
Individuals with a higher level of family responsibility have no significant association effect. 
People with poorer health (8–11 medical visits a year), on average, report a lower preference 
for paying off debt versus investing in KiwiSaver when compared with healthy individuals. 
Individuals who rent or live in supported care, on average, indicate a significant preference to 
using the windfall payment as a home deposit versus home improvements or KiwiSaver, in 
comparison with individuals living in their own home. Those living with family or classified 
as having ‘other’ living arrangements demonstrate a preference for home improvements and 
share purchases significantly less than investing in KiwiSaver when compared with individuals 
living in their own home. The results of the study show that working more hours is significantly 
associated with less preference for donations, general consumption, giving money to family 
now or later, purchasing luxury goods, putting money in the bank, home improvement, health 
investment and purchasing shares, respectively, when compared with investing in KiwiSaver. 
The findings show heterogeneity in spending preferences across demographic factors. The 
study divides the sample based on four categorical variables of gender, ethnicity, marital status 
and living arrangement to further investigate spending preference differences between each 
subsample. 
4.4.4.2.Gender 
[Insert Table 4.12.] 
[Insert Table 4.13.]  
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Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show the spending preference of subsamples based on gender. 
Comparing Tables 4.12 and 4.13, the study finds that both male and female subsamples rank 
putting money in the bank and in KiwiSaver among their three most preferred alternatives. 
Males rank debt payment in their top three, whereas females choose home improvement. On 
average, males and females both report donations and general consumption as their least 
preferred alternative. Females also report least preference for share purchase, whilst males 
ranked it as their sixth most preferred alternative. The minimum weighted preference value is 
the same across all alternatives, and the maximum is higher among the more preferred 
alternatives than the less preferred. While evidence of similar variation for alternatives between 
the two genders exists, there is more variation for female preference to make share purchases 
than for male.   
4.4.4.3. Ethnicity 
[Insert Table 4.14.] 
[Insert Table 4.15.] 
Comparing Tables 4.14 and 4.15 shows that older European New Zealanders and 
Māori/Pacific Island ethnicities, on average, place KiwiSaver and putting money in the bank 
among their top three alternatives. European New Zealanders also report home improvement 
as one of their top three alternatives. This is in contrast to Māori/Pacific Islanders, who opt for 
debt payment as the other top three alternative. European New Zealanders and Māori/Pacific 
Islanders, on average, tend to say they all have donations and health investment among their 
least preferred alternatives. European New Zealanders report home deposit among their least 
preferred alternatives, whilst Māori/Pacific Islanders include general consumption as their least 
preferred. There is similar variation across alternatives between ethnicities. There is greater 
variation for home deposit in the Māori/Pacific Islanders subsample than in the European New 
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Zealander subsample (standard deviation for Māori/Pacific Islanders is 0.041 compared with 
0.036 for European New Zealander), and for debt payment among European New Zealanders 
(0.049 compared with 0.043 for Māori/Pacific Islanders). 
4.4.4.4. Marital Status 
[Insert Table 4.16.] 
[Insert Table 4.17.] 
[Insert Table 4.18.] 
By comparing Tables 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18, the study shows that putting money in banks 
and investing in KiwiSaver are among the top three preferred alternatives across all marital 
status groups in the sample. On average, married and single individuals report the inclusion of 
home improvements in their top three alternatives, whereas divorced/widowed individuals 
include paying off debt. Among the least preferred alternatives across marital status groups are 
donations and health investments. Married and divorced/widowed individuals include general 
consumption as the least preferred alternative, on average. In contrast, singles include property 
investment deposits in their least preferred alternatives. Variations in each of the alternatives 
are comparable across marital status but greater for KiwiSaver and leaving money to family 
later among singles than married or divorced/widowed. 
4.4.4.5. Living Arrangement 
[Insert Table 4.19.] 
[Insert Table 4.20.] 
[Insert Table 4.21.] 
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Putting money in the bank ranks in the top three alternatives across all the different 
living arrangement groups (Tables 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21) in the sample. Those living at home 
and individuals living with family/other report including KiwiSaver as one of their top three 
alternatives, on average. Paying off debt is among the top three alternatives for individuals 
renting and those living with family/other. Individuals living in their own home report home 
improvement among their most preferred alternatives. The least preferred alternatives across 
living arrangement groups include donations and health investment. Homeowners also include 
home deposit, renters include consumption and individuals living with family/other include 
purchasing shares as one of the least preferred. Variation among alternatives across living 
arrangements are similar; however, home deposit and debt repayment are lower for individuals 
living in their own home and renters/in supported care, respectively. 
4.4.4.6.Comparison Between Subgroups 
KiwiSaver and placing money in the bank rank in the top three alternatives across all 
subgroups in the sample. This suggests that most New Zealanders are prudent in allocating 
their wealth close to or in retirement. Donations and investing in health are among the least 
preferred alternatives across the subgroups, and suggests that most New Zealanders do not 
prioritise philanthropic motives and that they may rely on public health provision. Home 
improvement is a preferred alternative for females, European New Zealanders, married or 
singles living in their own home. An assessment of the subgroups that prefer home 
improvement indicates that those who prefer home improvement are financially better able to 
support their alternative. Males, Māori/Pacific Islanders, divorced/widowed, living with family 
or renting do not report a preference for home improvement.  
The differences in preferences across different subsamples are unique in their own way, 
as these preferences may be affected by other variables. For example, male subjects include 
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paying off debt as one of their top alternatives, whilst female subjects do not. Similar findings 
on debt payment preference differences arise between Māori/Pacific Islanders and European 
New Zealanders. A possible explanation for male and Māori/Pacific debt payment preferences 
could be due to debt ownership, rather than pure preference. On average, female subjects and 
those living with family/other include share purchases in their least preferred alternatives. One 
possible explanation for this difference may be the influence of a comparatively higher risk 
appetite in males than in females, as shown in Table 4.9. Renters are the only ones preferring 
to put a deposit on a home. The lack of homeownership within this subsample could be a high 
motivation for home purchase rather than financial literacy effects. Indeed, females, those of 
European ethnicity, married, single and those living in their own home, on average, report a 
preference for home improvement due to their homeownership status, as opposed to pure 
preference motives. The complexity of the relationships between factors that may have an 
influence on decision-making is further investigated in the next section. The study introduces 
structural equation modelling to establish different possible paths among different factors that 
may affect spending preferences. 
4.4.5. The Complex Relationship between Financial Literacy, Debt, Risk Attitude, and 
Spending Decisions 
The structural equation modelling analysis considers all the possible paths between 
variables. The results report those paths with a strong effect size of at least 0.30. 
4.4.5.1. Gender 
4.4.5.1.1. Female 
[Insert Figure 4.2.] 
[Insert Figure 4.3.] 
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Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show that for females in the sample, advantage (income and 
education) has a strong positive association with financial literacy, and higher financial literacy 
has a strong positive association with risk tolerance. Higher financial literacy also has a strong 
positive association on females choosing KiwiSaver. Debt position is negatively associated 
with rising age and is positively associated with a poorer degree of health (more medical visits). 
Higher debt position often deters females from choosing money in the bank or choosing to 
invest in KiwiSaver. 
4.4.5.1.2. Male 
[Insert Figure 4.4.] 
[Insert Figure 4.5.] 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 display that for males in the sample, financial literacy is again 
positively associated with advantage, and financial literacy is positively associated with the 
KiwiSaver alternative and is negatively associated with debt position. Older age is associated 
with lower debt position, and a higher debt position is associated with a higher preference for 
paying off debt. Advantage also has a strong positive association with risk attitude. When 
comparing male and female subjects, the finding suggests that financial literacy has a positive 
correlation with choosing to invest in KiwiSaver, but the preference for choosing to pay debt 
is strongly associated with debt position rather than financial literacy. 
4.4.5.2. Ethnicity 
4.4.5.2.1. European New Zealander 
[Insert Figure 4.6.] 
[Insert Figure 4.7.] 
[Insert Figure 4.8.] 
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Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show that the financial literacy of European New Zealanders in 
the sample is positively associated with advantage, and financial literacy has a positive 
association with choosing investments in home improvement and KiwiSaver. Higher debt 
position is negatively associated with higher age and higher financial literacy, and debt position 
has a negative association with choosing money in the bank. Risk attitude is positively 
associated with advantage and also financial literacy, but has no association with the decision 
to choose money in the bank, home improvement and KiwiSaver. 
4.4.5.2.2. Māori/Pacific Islanders 
[Insert Figure 4.9.] 
The financial literacy level of Māori/Pacific Islanders in the sample is positively 
associated with advantage, but financial literacy does not have a strong association with the top 
three alternatives of Māori/Pacific Islanders. Older individuals report a negative association 
with debt position, and debt position has a strong association with choosing to pay debt. When 
comparing results from European New Zealanders against Māori/Pacific Islanders, the 




[Insert Figure 4.10.] 
Married individuals’ level of financial literacy is positively associated with advantage 
(Figure 4.10). The study also finds that financial literacy has a positive association with higher 
risk tolerance, a negative association with higher debt position and a positive association with 




[Insert Figure 4.11.] 
[Insert Figure 4.12.] 
[Insert Figure 4.13.] 
Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 show that higher age and greater advantage have a positive 
association with financial literacy. Greater financial literacy has a positive association with 
choosing to put money in the bank and investing in KiwiSaver. A poorer debt position is 
associated with greater family responsibility. Putting money in the bank is negatively 
associated with a poorer debt position, whereas choosing to pay debt is positively associated 
with a poorer debt position.  
4.4.5.3.3. Divorced/Widowed 
[Insert Figure 4.14.] 
Divorced/widowed individuals report a positive association between financial literacy, 
higher advantage and less family responsibility. Financial literacy level positively associates 
with risk tolerance and less debt position worries, but is not directly associated with their top 
three spending preferences. Poorer debt position is negatively associated with older age and is 
negatively associated with choosing to invest in KiwiSaver. The study compares the findings 
from different marital status subsamples and shows that financial literacy is positively 
associated with greater advantage across marital statuses. Financial literacy associates 
positively with choosing KiwiSaver for married and single individuals, but has no association 
with the spending preference decision of divorced/widowed subjects. Debt position plays a 
strong role in the association of spending preference among single and divorced/widowed 




4.4.5.4.1. Living in Own Home 
[Insert Figure 4.15.] 
[Insert Figure 4.16.] 
[Insert Figure 4.17.] 
From Figures 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17, the study shows that individuals who live in their 
own home in the sample have their financial literacy positively associated with higher 
advantage, and higher financial literacy has a positive association with higher risk tolerance 
and less worrying debt positions. Figure 4.17 shows financial literacy has a positive association 
with choosing KiwiSaver. Figures 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 show that a poorer debt position is 
negatively associated with higher age. Poorer debt position has a positive association with 
choosing home improvements and a negative association with putting money in the bank. 
Advantage has a negative association with risk tolerance, and risk tolerance has no association 
with spending preferences.  
4.4.5.4.2. Renting/Supported Care 
[Insert Figure 4.18.] 
Figure 4.18 shows that higher financial literacy of renters in the sample is positively 
associated with greater advantage. Financial literacy has a positive association with higher risk 
tolerance but has no association with a renter’s spending preference. Higher debt position has 
a positive association with choosing to pay debt. 
4.4.5.4.3. Family/Other 
[Insert Figure 4.19.] 
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[Insert Figure 4.20.] 
[Insert Figure 4.21.] 
The financial literacy levels for individuals living with family/other are positively 
associated with advantage and negatively associated with greater family responsibilities and 
more hours worked. Financial literacy has a positive association with better debt positions and 
higher risk tolerance among individuals living with family/other. Financial literacy only has a 
positive association with KiwiSaver and no associations with the other top three preferences. 
Poorer debt position has a positive association with preferring to pay off debt. Higher risk 
tolerance has a negative association with choosing to put money in the bank. 
4.4.5.5.Comparison Between Subgroups 
Advantage has a strong positive association with financial literacy across sample 
subgroups. There is evidence of the advantage from higher income and education being 
positively associated with financial literacy. This supports similar findings by previous studies 
(Crossan et al., 2011; Alessie et al., 2011). Higher family responsibility is associated with lower 
financial literacy for divorced/widowed and those living with family. Financial literacy is 
associated with greater preference for KiwiSaver across gender, for European New Zealanders, 
married or single, living in their own home or living with family. Meanwhile, there is no 
association between financial literacy and subsequent spending alternatives for Māori/Pacific 
Islanders, divorced/widowed and renting/in supported care. Although not a direct comparison 
with our findings, Crossan et al. (2011) also report that financial literacy does not affect 
retirement planning among older Māoris. 
Age has a strong negative association with debt position across sample subgroups. 
Males, Māori/Pacific Islanders, singles, renting/living in supported care or living with family 
and poorer debt positions are strongly associated with choosing to pay debt. Debt is found to 
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have a negative association with placing money in the bank (female, European New Zealander, 
single) and putting money in KiwiSaver (female, divorced/widowed). Advantage is associated 
with higher risk tolerance (male, European New Zealander, living in own home), but risk 
attitude has no association with spending preference (European New Zealander, living in own 
home). Higher financial literacy is associated with greater risk tolerance for European New 
Zealanders, married, divorced/widowed, living in own home or renting/in supported care. 
4.4.6. Robustness Checks 
4.4.6.1.Interaction Effects 
[Insert Table 4.22.] 
Table 4.22. shows that the interaction terms have no significant association with 
financial literacy, debt position or risk attitude. 
4.5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the financial literacy of older New Zealanders and the 
relationship between financial literacy and decision-making. The study reports that NZ 
financial literacy is relatively high, with 57% of New Zealanders scoring “high” and getting at 
least three out of four financial literacy questions correct in the sample. Younger females of 
Māori or Pacific Islands ethnicity with lower education attainment, lower incomes and high 
family responsibility have significantly lower levels of financial literacy. These findings 
provide answers to Research Question 1. Lower financial literacy is concerning because these 
individuals are the most vulnerable to financial mistakes (Calvet et al., 2009; Stolper and 
Walter, 2017). Evidence that higher financial literacy is significantly correlated to better debt 
position and higher risk tolerance provides answers to Research Question 2. Overall, the 
findings from the study suggest that, on average, New Zealanders prefer to invest in KiwiSaver, 
put money in the bank and do home improvements when asked to choose among 13 spending 
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alternatives given a windfall of $50,000. The least preferred alternatives are donations, general 
consumption and health investment.  
 Based on the sample of New Zealanders surveyed, the findings indicate that spending 
preferences are significantly correlated to higher financial literacy, debt position and risk 
attitude. This finding answers Research Question 4. However, the strength of the effects 
depends on the types of decision considered. Using structural equation modelling, the study 
explores the relationship complexity between financial literacy, debt position and risk attitude 
on different spending alternatives. Results reporting that higher financial literacy has a strong 
positive association with choosing KiwiSaver and holding more worrying levels of debt as the 
main factor affecting the choice to pay off debt regardless of financial literacy levels provide 
an answer to Research Question 3. There is substantial heterogeneity across the subsample 
groups for gender, ethnicity, marital status and living arrangements.  
This study is the first to investigate the relationship between financial literacy and 
spending decisions for older New Zealanders. It is also the first to apply a conjoint analysis 
methodology that considers potentially all pairwise rankings of all possible alternatives to 
investigate spending preferences of older New Zealanders.158 It is hoped that the reported 
findings of complex relationships between financial literacy, debt position, risk attitude and 
different spending decisions will inspire further research on these interconnected factors. By 
having a better understanding of the factors affecting New Zealanders’ decision-making, the 
government and the private sector may benefit from providing more efficient retirement-
savings-related policies and products. 
  
                                                          










5. Conclusion and Summary 
This chapter provides the overall conclusion of the thesis. Section 5.1 provides the thesis 
overview, highlights the concerning issue of retirement wellbeing and explains the relevance 
of the focus on NZ. Section 5.2 summarises the main findings from Chapters 2–4. 
Contributions of the thesis are shown in section 5.3, followed by policy implications from the 
findings (section 5.4), emphasising ways to improve financial retirement wellbeing. Finally, 
section 5.5 explains the limitations of the thesis and suggestions for future research. 
5.1. Overview of the Study 
The thesis is motivated by the unique retirement provision system in NZ. As a country, 
NZ  has a low replacement rate from its public pension provision, NZS (OECD, 2015), a lack 
of a public mandatory contributory retirement savings scheme,159 a voluntary retirement 
savings system with limited power to accumulate wealth and lacking annuitisation options 
(KiwiSaver)160 and a taxation system that favours investment in housing. NZ’s retirement 
provision system puts a lot of pressure on individuals to save up for retirement and to manage 
their wealth in retirement so as to prevent poverty in old age. Despite its unique system, limited 
research has been undertaken to assess financial retirement wellbeing in NZ. The studies that 
have been carried out find that NZ retirees are financially adequate for retirement;161 however, 
the studies are overly optimistic in assuming that retirees would readily liquidate all their 
wealth, particularly their homes, to finance their retirement.162 There is a gap in the literature 
                                                          
159 See section 1.4.1.1 for details. 
160 See section 1.4.1.2 for details. 
161 Scobie et al. (2004); Le et al. (2009), St. John (2007). 




that investigates the role of housing for retirement wellbeing, especially one that includes 
multiple housing liquidation scenarios for retirement funding. 
Retirement wellbeing can also be measured as a comparison between spending in 
retirement and optimal spending. Previous studies have included housing in estimating optimal 
consumption in retirement, but either include only health shocks (Yogo, 2016) or house price 
shocks (Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018; Andreasson et al., 2017) but not both.  Retirees 
are found to be more prone to health shocks (Guiso et al., 2002; Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004) 
that may result in a fall in their wellbeing. Most retirees also have their wealth in housing, 
although housing is illiquid in nature and has emotional value (Moore and Mitchell, 2007). The 
overinvestment in housing leaves retirees prone to house price shocks. Retirees may have to 
sell their homes at low prices when faced with poor health or when they need liquid wealth. 
Excluding either health or house price in optimal consumption estimations may lead to 
incomplete results. There is no research on optimal consumption that includes both health and 
house price shocks, nor incorporates multiple housing liquidation options. 
Previous studies have found there is a positive association between financial literacy 
and retirement planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011) and accumulated wealth (Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2011). Crossan et al. (2011) is the only study, as far as the author is aware, that 
investigates financial literacy and retirement planning in NZ. They find that although New 
Zealanders are financially literate, there is no association between financial literacy and 
retirement planning. The NZ government has introduced financial education efforts (Feslier, 
2006) to better prepare New Zealanders in managing their wealth. The findings from Crosssan 
et al. (2011) are cause for concern because government efforts may not be as effective as hoped. 
There are no studies that investigate the relationship between financial literacy and decision-
making among NZ retirees.  
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There is a gap in the literature on financial wellbeing in retirement specifically 
identifying the role of housing in retirement and financial literacy in the decision-making of 
retirees. This thesis consists of three studies that complement each other. Chapter 2 investigates 
the financial adequacy of NZ retirees and the role of housing. The findings from Chapter 2 
benchmark the current wellbeing of NZ retirees. Chapter 3 is inspired by the results of Chapter 
2. Given the current wellbeing of retirees, Chapter 3 investigates how retirees can make optimal 
choices in terms of spending and housing decisions. Chapter 3 also allows the exploration of 
how different housing scenarios may affect retirees’ optimal choices. Chapter 4 takes a 
different approach to retirement wellbeing by investigating retirees’ financial literacy levels 
and exploring the complex relationship between financial literacy, debt ownership, risk attitude 
and spending decisions. The results from the three studies improve knowledge about NZ retiree 
wellbeing in terms of financial adequacy, consumption and housing optimality and financial 
literacy. 
5.2. Summary of the Findings 
Chapter 2 investigates the financial adequacy of NZ retirees and the role of housing in 
retirement using SoFIE. Applying a replacement rate and the PL methods, the study compares 
retiree’s post- and pre-retirement income. The study introduces five different housing 
liquidation scenarios: 1) full liquidation and move in with family; 2) full liquidation and move 
to a rental home; 3) downsize and stay in the same area; 4) downsize and move to a cheaper 
area; and 5) reverse mortgage. The study finds that financial adequacy is highest when retirees 
liquidate their homes and move in with family. Financial adequacy is lowest when retirees 
liquidate their homes and rent. Downsizing and moving is only beneficial for financial 
adequacy of retirees in Auckland but not for the rest of NZ. The study reports evidence of 
variation in financial adequacy for baseline wealth, rent imputation and five housing liquidation 
options by gender, partnership status, ethnicity, living arrangement, home ownership and 
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locality. The results show that people who do not own their own home are less financially 
adequate. The disparities are driven by gaps caused by wealth and income differences. The 
chapter finds that Māori, renters and individuals living in multi-dwelling occupancies have 
much lower levels of financial adequacy. Individuals of Pākehā or Asian ethnicity, 
homeowners and those living alone benefit more from imputed rent derived through home 
ownership. 
Chapter 3 investigates develops a program that estimates optimal utility from a mixture 
of consumption, health expenditure and housing expenditure.  A persistent health probability 
causes divergence of utility between Renting, Sell/Buy and Stay scenarios. Renting is shown 
to be the most flexible of options when it comes to dealing with shocks, although it may not be 
the optimal choice. Sell/Buy is an optimal choice among the housing scenarios but is also most 
prone to utility drops in the event of a bad health shock. Stay straddles Renting and Sell/Buy. 
Stay is not always available for non-homeowners or when the Lagrangian equation conditions 
are not met. 
Chapter 4 investigates the financial literacy of older New Zealanders and the 
relationship between financial literacy and decision-making. The study has found that the 
financial literacy level in NZ is high, with 57% of New Zealanders scoring “high” and getting 
all the financial literacy questions correct. Younger females of Māori or Pacific Islands 
ethnicity with lower education attainment, lower incomes and high family responsibility have 
significantly lower levels of financial literacy. The results show that New Zealanders prefer to 
invest in KiwiSaver, put money in the bank and do home improvements when they are asked 
to choose among 13 spending options if they received a windfall of $50,000. The least preferred 
options are donations, general consumption and health investment. The study finds that that 
higher financial literacy has a strong positive effect on choosing KiwiSaver and having more 
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worrying levels of debt as the main factor affecting choosing to pay off debt regardless of 
financial literacy levels. 
5.3. Contributions of the Study 
This thesis provides new evidence on retirement wellbeing in NZ, the role of housing 
in retirement, suggestions on optimal consumption and housing options in retirement and the 
implications of financial literacy on decision-making. The research contributions of the thesis 
are summarised as follows. 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on financial adequacy levels of retirees 
and is the first to incorporate different housing liquidation options. Chapter 2 provides 
empirical evidence on the financial adequacy levels of NZ retirees by using the SoFIE dataset 
in NZ. It is the first study to introduce the housing liquidation options of full liquidation and 
living with family, downsizing and living in the same area, downsizing and moving to a 
different region, reverse mortgage and full liquidation and renting. Most of the literature 
available either has only full liquidation163 or a simple partial housing liquidation option.164 
This thesis offers the first evidence of how housing liquidation options may result in 
differing levels of financial adequacy among retirees. Chapter 2 shows that although the full 
liquidation option results in the greatest share of financially adequate retirees, when accounting 
for rent payments, it is the worst option. These findings contest previous studies that assume 
full liquidation without rent payments165 and conclude that retirees are financially adequate. 
Assuming that all retirees who sell their home would move to live with their family members 
and not considering rental payments may provide misleading conclusions. 
                                                          
163 Engelhardt and Kumar (2011); Gibson et al. (2010); Le et al. (2012); Le et al. (2009); Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007); Moore and Mitchell (1997); Munnell and Soto (2005); Scobie and Henderson (2009); Scobie et al. (2006). 
164 Engen et al. (2000) includes partial housing equity liquidation of 0%, 50% and 100%. 
165 Engelhardt and Kumar (2011); Gibson et al. (2010); Le et al. (2012); Le et al. (2009); Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007); Moore and Mitchell (1997); Munnell and Soto (2005); Scobie and Henderson (2009); Scobie et al. (2006). 
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Chapter 2 is the first study to include imputed rent in estimating financial adequacy.166 
Previous studies have ignored imputed rent because rent values are property and region 
specific, and are further affected by perceptions and expectations of the homeowners (Munnell 
and Soto, 2005). This thesis offers a basic estimation of imputed rent based on regional rent 
prices in NZ.  
Chapter 3 shows a program development that can estimate optimal consumption, health 
and housing spending, as well as finding the optimal housing situations for older New 
Zealanders. This thesis is the first to develop a dynamic program that incorporates different 
housing scenarios: sell house and rent, sell house and buy a different house (downsize/upsize) 
or stay in current home. 
This thesis is the first to investigate how housing situations may lead to different 
wellbeing levels of retirees when they are faced with a health shock. The program in Chapter 
3 includes health shocks and shows how renting is the more flexible option for facing health 
shocks, even though it may not be the optimal choice. It also finds that staying or sell/buy may 
be an optimal choice; however, the retirees’ optimal utility level fluctuates more compared with 
renting. 
The GAUSS program used in Chapter 3 incorporates multiple shocks to health, income 
and house prices. Previous studies have either incorporated health shocks (Yogo, 2016), house 
price shocks (Andreasson and Shevchenko, 2018; Andreasson et al., 2017) or shocks to income 
(Kraft and Munk, 2011), but no study has considered all three shocks together. Although 
Chapter 3 primarily focuses of the effects of health shocks, the program allows the author to 
investigate income and house price shocks simultaneously as well. 
                                                          




Chapter 4 of the thesis contributes to the limited literature on financial literacy in NZ. 
Crossan et al. (2011) show that most New Zealanders are financially literate compared with 
other countries, but their levels of financial literacy do not affect retirement planning. Chapter 
4 finds that older New Zealanders are financially literate, with 57% answering all the questions 
on financial literacy correctly. Young, less educated and lower income Māori/Pacific female 
retirees have the lowest financial literacy level. It also reports that financial literacy only affects 
certain spending preferences in retirement, such as putting money in KiwiSaver but not on debt 
payments. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on financial literacy and debt position.167 It also 
contributes to the limited literature on financial literacy and risk attitude.168 Results show that 
individuals with higher financial literacy have a lower debt position and a higher tolerance for 
risk. 
This thesis is the first to investigate retirement spending preferences in NZ. It is also the 
first to use conjoint analysis that implements a pairwise comparison method to consider 
potentially all pairwise rankings of all possible alternatives.169 The multi-criteria decision-
making method presents two choices at a time for all possible combinations of choices, and 
then ranks the subject’s preference. Chapter 4 shows that New Zealanders’ top three spending 
choices when receiving a windfall is to (1) put money in the bank, (2) spend on home 
improvements and (3) invest in KiwiSaver.  
This thesis is the first to investigate how financial literacy affects spending preferences, 
in general, and among New Zealanders, in particular. Furthermore, it is also the first to include 
a variety of spending options, such as those with consumption motives (general consumption 
                                                          
167 Lusardi and Tufano (2015) find that better financial literacy is associated with lower debt position.  
168 Previous studies have yet to propose a relationship between financial literacy and higher risk tolerance , but 
high stock market participation from financial literacy (Jappelli and Padula, 2015) can imply higher risk tolerance 
of retirees. 
169 The process was implemented using 1000Minds software, www.1000minds.com  
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and luxury consumption), financial investment motives (putting money in the bank and 
purchasing shares), housing investments (putting a deposit for a home, putting a deposit for an 
investment property and home improvements) and philanthropic motives (leave money for 
family now or later and donations). The results in Chapter 4 show that financial literacy has a 
positive effect on choosing KiwiSaver but not on debt payment. 
Chapter 4 is the first study to investigate the complex relationships between financial 
literacy, debt, risk attitude and spending preferences. By applying structural equation 
modelling (SEM), it finds that the relationships among financial literacy, debt, risk attitude and 
spending preferences is complex and depends on different subsampling. Chapter 4 splits the 
sample into groups by gender, ethnicity, marital status and living arrangements. The findings 
show that compared with females, males choose share purchases as one of their top three 
preferences, and the decision is affected by risk attitude rather than financial literacy. Financial 
literacy has a positive effect on choosing KiwiSaver across subsample groups. Māori/Pacific 
choose debt payment as one of their top three preferences, whereas NZ Europeans do not. This 
motivation for choosing debt is strongly affected by greater indebtedness rather than financial 
literacy. 
5.4. Implications of the Findings 
The findings of this thesis have several policy implications for the government, the 
private sector and academics, as well as retirees, in general. Chapter 2 finds that different 
housing liquidation options influence the level of financial adequacy of retirees. These findings 
can encourage the government to reconsider the NZS provision level, offer alternative housing 
for retirees, to reconsider a compulsory contributory retirement savings scheme, offer an 
annuitisation option for KiwiSaver and re-evaluate the investment taxation system that 
currently favours investment in housing. Findings from Chapter 2 also suggest that there is a 
gap in the market for annuities, bridging loans that could help retirees downsize by giving a 
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loan to purchase a house prior to the selling of the previous house and more options for reverse 
mortgage. The findings point to the importance of home ownership to financial adequacy in 
terms of quality of life, wellness, generational financial inadequacy and the marginalisation of 
society. The importance of home ownership presented in this study highlights the need for the 
NZ government to address the lack of suitable public housing and rising housing and rental 
prices and to mandate personal retirement savings plans that require compulsory contributions 
to retirement savings. 
Chapter 3 proposes simulations of optimal consumption and housing scenarios. It finds 
that the option to sell and then buy another house provides the highest optimal utility but is less 
versatile than the suboptimal sell then rent option. Findings in Chapter 3 may encourage the 
government to address the rising house price and shortages issues by building more small 
homes for retirees, which are affordable, so that they can sell their homes and downsize, thus 
leaving more money to support them in retirement. The findings are beneficial for retirees and 
practitioners, in general, because it can show how retirees can manage their consumption given 
different housing options, and inspire practitioners to develop spending plan products or advice 
based on the housing options. 
Findings from Chapter 4 can assist the government to better understand the financial 
literacy levels of New Zealanders and identify those who are more vulnerable to poverty due 
to financial illiteracy. Findings from Chapter 4 also show how individuals with different 
demographic characteristics and financial literacy levels respond differently in their decision-
making. Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 suggest a commonality that the more vulnerable individuals 
are among the Māori/Pacific Islanders and non-homeowners who are less financially literate. 
By focusing on the most illiterate, and understanding the motives behind decision-making, the 
government can better allocate resources for more effective financial education efforts. By 
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having a better understanding of what affects New Zealanders’ decision-making, the 
government and the private sector may benefit from providing more efficient retirement-
savings-related policies and products. 
5.5. Limitations and Implications 
The thesis contributes to the gap in the literature and provides implications for 
practitioners and policy makers. However, there are limitations to the study which provide 
guidance for further research. 
First, the thesis focuses on NZ. Chapter 2 uses an NZ dataset that may provide results 
that may not be comparable to other countries. NZ’s retirement provision system is unique. 
Differences between retirement provisions between countries may make comparisons difficult 
when assessing financial adequacy. 
Second, the program developed in Chapter 3 uses dummy data. However, the versatility 
of the program means that it can be applied to real data from the NZ population or elsewhere. 
The program also allows for future investigations of income and house price shocks, so has 
much untapped potential for future research. The program uses the less commonly used 
GAUSS program language, but there is the potential to transfer it to a more common program 
language, such as MATLAB. 
Chapter 4 uses an online survey. Grandcolas et al. (2003) suggest that web surveys are 
more prone than paper-based surveys to issues of low response and may also suffer from 
sample bias. Online surveys tend to attract people with more time, better internet access and 
connection, better typing skills, more social awareness and those who have greater curiosity 
levels (Novak et al., 1998). The potential for sample selection bias was minimised by adjusting 
the requests to possible respondents to emulate the NZ population distribution based on gender 
and ethnicity. The information gathered from the survey in Chapter 4 has the potential for 
further research opportunities utilising the individual facets of financial literacy instead of the 
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total score, exploration of the different spending choices in retirement and empirical research 
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Conceptual Framework for The World Bank’s Pension Work Presented in: Old 
Age 
Income Support in the 21st Century: An International Perspective on Pension Systems and 
Reform. (OECD, 2015). The Five Pillar Framework (OECD, 2015). 
Pillar Characteristics Explanation 
Non-contributory “zero 
pillar” 
Social assistance, social 
pension to provide minimal 
protection against poverty 
for the elderly 
Poverty alleviation 
objective. 
A mandatory “first pillar” Mandatory contributions 
linked to a scheme that can 
be funded in the form of a 
Pay-as-you-go or on a Save-
as-you-go (SAYG). 
Pension payments can be 
set in a defined benefit (DB) 
or a defined contribution 
(DC) scheme. 
Address the risk of myopia, 
low earnings, and 
inappropriate planning 
horizons. 
A mandatory “second 
pillar” 
In the form of a savings 
account with investment 
options. Usually in the form 
of a DC scheme. 
Retirees are exposed to 
market risks from DC 
schemes that is linked to 
investment portfolios. 
A voluntary “third pillar” Taking many forms (e.g. 
individual savings for 
Compensates for rigidities 




sponsored DB or DC 
scheme). 
similar risks to the second 
pillar.  
A non-financial “fourth 
pillar” 
Includes informal support 
such as family support and 








Pension Types from Barr (2009): 
Types of Pension Explanation 
Defined Benefit (DB) An individual’s pension is based on his or 
her salary history and length of service. It 
is paid at a fixed amount for as long as the 
recipient’s life and risk of varying return on 
pension assets falls on the provider (e.g. 
employer or the government). 
Defined Contribution (DC) An individual’s pension is determined by 
only the amount contributed to his or her 
pension fund. Risk of variable pension 
asset return falls on the individual. 
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions are paid out of current revenue 
(usually by the government from tax 
revenue) rather than out of an accumulated 
fund 
Save-as-you-go (SAYG) pensions are paid out of a specific 
accumulated fund set aside (usually by the 
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Table 1.1. Description of Used Theories 
Theory Description Author (s) 
Life-Cycle theory The Life-Cycle theory 
model posits that individuals 
aim to smooth consumption 
throughout their lifetime. 
Individuals accumulate 
wealth when they are young 
so that they can decumulate 
wealth they are older or 
when they are faced with 
shocks. 




Given probabilistic choices, 
rational individuals behave 
as if they are maximising 
expected utility over 




Bounded Rationality Bounded rationality theory 
suggest that individuals 
make rational choices based 
on the limited information 







Table 1. 2. Thesis Chapters and Conference Presentation/Publication Status 
Chp Chapter title Authors Contribution of candidate Journal/Conference 
Presentation 
Status 
2 Financial Adequacy in 
Retirement in NZ: The 






The candidate has identified the research topic, 
reviewed the literature, conducted data collection, 
identified the methodology, analysed the data, and 
writing of the manuscript. Co-authors contributed in 
terms of guidance throughout the process and had 
editorial input at various stages of the development 
of the paper. 
Housing Studies. 
Paper was also 
Presented at 25th Annual 
Colloquium on Pensions 
and Retirement 
Research by ARC 










received best paper 
presentation at the 
conference. 







The candidate identified the topic, reviewed the 
literature, conducted data collection, model 
estimation, data analysis and writing of the 
manuscript. Co-authors provided supervision 
throughout the process and had editorial input into 
different drafts of the paper. 
Presented at 26th Annual 
Colloquium on Pensions 
and Retirement 
Research by ARC 







4 Financial Literacy and 
Spending Decisions 
among older New 
Zealanders. Evidence 







The candidate identified the topic, reviewed the 
literature, conducted data collection, model 
estimation, data analysis and writing of the 
manuscript. Co-authors provided supervision 
throughout the process and had editorial input into 
different drafts of the paper. 
Presented at 27th Annual 
Colloquium on Pensions 
and Retirement 
Research by ARC 









Figure 2.1. Mean Asset Composition by Asset Liquidity. The x-axis shows the different types of assets and 






Figure 2.2. Median Asset Composition by Asset Liquidity. The x-axis shows the different types of assets 






Figure 2.3. Mean Asset Composition by Gender and Age. The x-axis shows the mean value of each asset 







Figure 2.4. Mean Asset Composition by Gender and Ethnicity. The x-axis shows the mean value of each 






Figure 2.5. Mean Asset Composition by Gender and Region. The x-axis shows the mean value of each asset type and the mean total asset value. 





Table 2.1. Asset Categorisation by Levels of Decreasing Liquidity. 
1 Current Asset 
2 Financial Asset 
3 Investment Property 
4 Inheritance, art collectible, non-NZS pension, insurance 
5 Vehicles and sporting goods 
6 Household items and other illiquid assets 
7 Residential housing 
8 Business investment 














Table 2.2. Sample Distribution 
This table gives the weighted distribution for the sample of individuals over 65 from SoFIE during the period 2002–2009. There are 1,341 individuals with 2,553 observations 
representing 16,856 weighted individual-year observations. 
Characteristic Proportional Sample Representation 
Gender 
Male Female      
48.28% 51.72%      
Participation Year 
2005 2007 2009         
6.85% 27.63% 65.52%         





(partner in sample) 
Widowed/ 
Divorced 
Married No Partner 
(in sample) 
   
4.14% 45.65% 23.32% 26.89%       
Age 
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 
22.22% 21.79% 18.49% 16.40% 10.55% 10.45% 0.11% 
Ethnicity  




Asian-Pacific Island   
87.48% 5.40% 3.57% 3.32% 0.24%     
Region  
Auckland Waikato Wellington Rest of North Island Canterbury Rest of South Island  
27.84% 9.62% 10.14% 26.35% 13.51% 12.54%  
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Table 2.3. Retirement Financial Adequacy for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by Gender for Single and 
Married/Partnered 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across gender, and marital status. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five 
years prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on five different options (baseline wealth, baseline wealth with imputed rent, sell and live with family, sell and rent , downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper 
region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined at an income replacement rate value of 70% 
and above (70RR). Poverty line (PL) is defined as half the median income for each year, respectively. Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement 
income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement 
income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount 
post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. The sample size for 2005 is 63 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 9,600) and 18 (weighted 
sample 2,400) for single, with equal split between genders for Married/Partnered and 53% male and 47% female for Single. The sample size for 2007 is 210 for Married/Partnered (weighted 
sample 31,400) and 39 (weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with equal split between genders for Married/Partnered and 58% male and 42% female for Single. The sample size for 2009 is 402 for 
Married/Partnered (weighted sample 62,600) and 57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with equal split between genders for Married/Partnered and 57% male and 43% female for Single. 
     Housing Asset Options 
Male Female Male Female 
Single   Single   Married/Partnered Married/Partnered 





Baseline wealth 79% 51% 62% 91% 84% 82% 59% 59% 57% 59% 58% 56% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent  100% 65% 94%  100% 84% 82% 72% 83% 65% 72% 83% 65% 
Sell and live with family  100% 65% 94%  100% 84% 82% 76% 83% 73% 76% 83% 73% 
Sell and rent 49% 59% 53% 20% 29% 22% 58% 77% 63% 56% 77% 63% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 79% 51% 53% 91% 84% 82% 59% 75% 50% 59% 74% 50% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 93% 51% 68% 91% 84% 82% 71% 78% 61% 70% 78% 61% 





Baseline wealth 82% 79% 58% 86% 95% 71% 56% 70% 55% 56% 72% 56% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 88% 88% 64% 95% 95% 81% 65% 87% 60% 64% 88% 60% 
Sell and live with family 91% 88% 73% 95% 95% 81% 75% 92% 74% 74% 93% 73% 
Sell and rent 49% 57% 48% 34% 51% 28% 55% 78% 60% 52% 80% 57% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 82% 86% 51% 86% 95% 71% 57% 76% 52% 56% 78% 50% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 88% 86% 58% 86% 95% 71% 59% 78% 54% 58% 79% 52% 





Baseline wealth 82% 97% 66% 81% 88% 70% 60% 85% 60% 60% 85% 59% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 87% 100% 70% 88% 90% 74% 68% 95% 65% 68% 95% 66% 
Sell and live with family 93% 100% 79% 93% 90% 79% 83% 97% 79% 83% 97% 79% 
Sell and rent 38% 50% 38% 48% 60% 42% 63% 85% 65% 62% 86% 65% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 82% 97% 59% 83% 88% 72% 65% 90% 56% 65% 90% 56% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 82% 100% 63% 83% 88% 72% 66% 92% 56% 66% 92% 56% 
Reverse mortgage 82% 100% 65% 90% 88% 76% 63% 95% 59% 63% 94% 59% 
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Table 2.4. Retirement Financial Adequacy for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by Ethnicity for Single and 
Married/Partnered 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across ethnicity. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years prior to 
retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on 
five different options (baseline wealth, baseline wealth with imputed rent, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper region 
or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Poverty line (PL) is defined as half the median income for each year, 
respectively.  Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the 
lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; 
an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy 
requirement. N/A means not available and refers to a lack of available data to compute the adequacy ratio. The sample size for 2005 is 63 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 9,600) and 18 
(weighted sample 2,400) for Single, with 92% Pākeha, 2.5% Māori, 0% Pacific, and 5.3% Asian for Married/Partnered, and 88% Pākeha and 12% Māori for Single. The sample size for 2007 is 
210 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 31,400) and 39 (weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with 89% Pākeha, 4.4% Māori, 2.2% Pacific, and 3.8% Asian for Married/Partnered, and 89% 
Pākeha and 8.5% Māori, and 2.5% Asian for Single. The sample size for 2009 is 402 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 62,600) and 57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with 88% 
Pākeha, 4.9% Māori, 1.7% Pacific, and 4.9% Asia for Married/Partnered, and 89% Pākeha, 5.4% Māori, 3.7% Pacific, and 1.9% Asian for Single. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Pākehā/Asian Māori Pākehā/Asian Māori Pacific Island 
Single Single Married/Partnered Married/Partnered Married/Partnered 





Baseline wealth 76% 63% 31% 100% 64% 58% 0%     0% N/A N/A 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 86% 85% 31% 100% 85% 67% 100% 100% N/A N/A 
Sell and live with family 86% 85% 31% 100% 85% 76% 74% 100% N/A N/A 
Sell and rent 58% 50% 0% 0% 78% 66% 48% 100% N/A N/A 
Downsize, stay in the same region 76% 57% 31% 100% 78% 52% 74% 100% N/A N/A 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 76% 67% 31% 100% 82% 64% 74% 100% N/A N/A 





Baseline wealth 87% 73% 100% 41% 74% 58% 57%   60% 0%     0% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 89% 78% 100% 41% 90% 62% 75%   64% 0% 100% 
Sell and live with family 89% 80% 100% 41% 94% 76% 95%   44% 100%   27% 
Sell and rent 61% 44% 0% 0% 82% 60% 49%   44% 24%     0% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 87% 64% 100% 41% 80% 54% 82%   44% 48%     0% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 87% 64% 100% 41% 82% 58% 82%   44% 48%     0% 





Baseline wealth 94% 82% 100% 37% 85% 60% 69%   59% 100%     0% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 98% 84% 100% 37% 95% 67% 93%   61% 100% 100% 
Sell and live with family 98% 90% 100% 37% 97% 79% 92%   61% 100% 100% 
Sell and rent 63% 46% 0% 0% 85% 68% 44%   45% 84%   68% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 94% 75% 100% 37% 90% 59% 78%   42% 100%   67% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 97% 78% 100% 37% 91% 59% 78%   42% 100%   67% 
Reverse mortgage 97% 82% 100% 37% 94% 61% 88%   32% 100% 100% 
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Table 2.5. Retirement Financial Adequacy for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by Home Ownership for Single 
and Married/Partnered 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across home ownership status. Pre -retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five 
years prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on five different options (baseline wealth, baseline wealth with imputed rent, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper 
region or reverse mortgage). Poverty line (PL) is defined as half the median income for each year, respectively.  Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-
retirement income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-
retirement income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of 
this amount post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. The sample size for 2005 is 63 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 9,600) and 
18 (weighted sample 2,400) for Single, with 34% Non-homeowners and 66% Homeowners for Married/Partnered, and 53% Non-homeowners and 47% Homeowners for Single. The sample size 
for 2007 is 210 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 31,400) and 39 (weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with 33% Non-homeowners and 67% Homeowners for Married/Partnered, and 56% 
Non-homeowners and 44% Homeowners for Single. The sample size for 2009 is 402 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 62,600) and 57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with 30% Non-
homeowners and 70% Homeowners for Married/Partnered, and 54% Non-homeowners and 46% Homeowners for Single. 
     Housing Asset Options 
Homeowner Renter Homeowner Renter 
Single Single Married/Partnered Married/Partnered 





Baseline wealth 81% 61% 57% 80% 63% 63% 51% 36% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 100% 100%    100% 79%   
Sell and live with family 100% 100%    100% 92%   
Sell and rent 100% 89% 9% 0%  100% 77% 36% 36% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 81% 50%   87% 57%   
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 81% 68%   92% 74%   





Baseline wealth 87% 63% 84% 57% 68% 55% 78% 47% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 100% 87%   93% 69%   
Sell and live with family 100% 100%    100% 86%   
Sell and rent 92% 75% 28% 14%  100% 75% 44% 25% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 96% 60%   76% 53%   
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 96% 69%   79% 56%   





Baseline wealth 92% 82% 94% 65% 83% 64% 91% 45% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 100% 82%   97% 76%   
Sell and live with family 100% 100%    100% 94%   
Sell and rent 100% 88% 25% 8%  100% 79% 58% 33% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 92% 63%   90% 61%   
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 97% 68%   92% 61%   
Reverse mortgage 97% 76%   97% 66%   
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Table 2.6. Retirement Financial Adequacy for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by Living Arrangement for 
Single and Married/Partnered 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across living arrangement. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years 
prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on five different options (baseline wealth, baseline wealth with imputed rent, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper 
region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Poverty line (PL) is defined as half the median income for each year, 
respectively.  Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the 
lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; 
an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy 
requirement. Single dwelling refers an individual living alone, double dwelling refers to an individual sharing accommodation with one other, multi-dwelling refers to three or more individuals 
sharing the same accommodation. The sample size for 2005 is 63 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 9,600) and 18 (weighted sample 2,400) for Single, with 89% double dwelling and 11% 
multi-dwelling for Married/Partnered, and 88% single dwelling, 6% double dwelling, and 6% multi-dwelling for Single. The sample size for 2007 is 210 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 
31,400) and 39 (weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with 83% double dwelling, and 17% multi-dwelling for Married/Partnered, and 92% single dwelling, 2.8% double dwelling, and 5.2% multi-
dwelling for Single. The sample size for 2009 is 402 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 62,600) and 57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with 90.5% double dwelling, and 9.5% multi-
dwelling for Married/Partnered, and 91% single dwelling, 7.2% double dwelling, and 1.8% multi-dwelling for Single. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Single Dwelling Double Dwelling Multi-dwelling Double Dwelling Multi-dwelling 
Single Single Single Married/Partnered Married/Partnered 





Baseline wealth 59% 65% 100% 100% 100% 100% 57% 58%   73% 38% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 68% 86% 100% 100% 100% 100% 81% 69% 100% 30% 
Sell and live with family 68% 86% 100% 100% 100% 100% 81% 73% 100% 73% 
Sell and rent 55% 48%     0%     0%     0%     0% 81% 67% 100% 28% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 59% 59% 100% 100% 100% 100% 75% 53%   73% 28% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 59% 69% 100% 100% 100% 100% 79% 65%   73% 28% 





Baseline wealth 84% 60% 100% 100% 100% 100% 73% 58%   63% 35% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 90% 67% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 64%   79% 41% 
Sell and live with family 90% 73% 100% 100% 100% 100% 95% 74%   79% 70% 
Sell and rent 55% 46%     0%     0%   60%   60% 95% 62%   79% 42% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 88% 54% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 57%   63% 19% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 88% 58% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 58%   71% 27% 





Baseline wealth 94% 68%   79%   79% 100% 100% 84% 60%   88% 59% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 98% 70%   79%   79% 100% 100% 94% 64% 100% 76% 
Sell and live with family 98% 78%   79% 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 100% 95% 
Sell and rent 56% 43%   17%   17% 100% 100% 97% 64% 100% 74% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 94% 61%   79% 100% 100% 100% 90% 56%   93% 55% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 97% 64%   79% 100% 100% 100% 91% 56%   93% 62% 
Reverse mortgage 97% 67%   79% 100% 100% 100% 94% 57% 100% 79% 
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Table 2.7. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by RA for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by Region for 
Single and Married/Partnered 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders by region. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years prior to retirement 
age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on five different 
options (baseline wealth, baseline wealth with imputed rent, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper region or reverse 
mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement 
income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement 
income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount 
post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. The sample size for 2005 is 63 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 9,600) and 18 (weighted 
sample 2,400) for Single, with 45% Auckland, 11% Waikato, 7% Wellington, 16% Rest of North Island, 15% Canterbury, and 6% Rest of South Island for Married/Partnered, and 18% Auckland, 
6% Waikato, 18% Wellington, 23% Rest of North Island, 29% Canterbury, and 6% Rest of South Island for Single. The sample size for 2007 is 210 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 
31,400) and 39 (weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with 32% Auckland, 12% Waikato, 10% Wellington, 21% Rest of North Island, 11% Canterbury, and 14% Rest of South Island for 
Married/Partnered, and 22% Auckland, 8% Waikato, 11% Wellington, 31% Rest of North Island, 11% Canterbury, and 17% Rest of South Island for Single. The sample size for 2009 is 402 for 
Married/Partnered (weighted sample 62,600) and 57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with 25% Auckland, 10% Waikato, 10% Wellington, 27% Rest of North Island, 15% Canterbury, and 
13% Rest of South Island for Married/Partnered, and 25% Auckland, 5% Waikato, 11% Wellington, 27% Rest of North Island, 12% Canterbury, and 20% Rest of South Island for Single. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Single Married Partnered 
 




















Baseline wealth 48% N/A 66% 86% 76% 100% 35% 70% 65% 57% 82% 50% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 100% N/A 100% 86% 76% 100% 45% 70% 65% 83% 100% 60% 
Sell and live with family 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 67% 100% 65% 83% 91% 60% 
Sell and rent 100% 0% 57% 0% 84% 100% 45% 25% 65% 83% 83% 60% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 67% 100% 77% 100% 86% 100% 34% 100% 65% 83% 75% 60% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 100% 100% 77% 100% 86% 100% 59% 100% 65% 83% 75% 60% 





Baseline wealth 58% 100% 74% 34% 100% 85% 46% 67% 62% 48% 50% 63% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 69% 100% 100% 40% 100% 74% 47% 75% 65% 63% 63% 66% 
Sell and live with family 82% 100% 100% 94% 100% 100% 63% 91% 80% 83% 83% 64% 
Sell and rent 64% 42% 44% 17% 29% 63% 38% 49% 57% 65% 67% 61% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 58% 100% 100% 94% 100% 87% 33% 77% 60% 77% 54% 62% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 70% 100% 100% 94% 100% 87% 40% 77% 65% 77% 54% 59% 





Baseline wealth 75% 100% 51% 44% 100% 89% 61% 54% 73% 50% 64% 66% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 77% 100% 62% 45% 100% 88% 67% 64% 72% 69% 73% 66% 
Sell and live with family 92% 100% 85% 93% 100% 93% 80% 87% 78% 86% 89% 75% 
Sell and rent 49% 78% 20% 32% 31% 68% 67% 55% 56% 61% 70% 59% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 77% 78% 85% 85% 100% 72% 65% 70% 50% 66% 74% 60% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 77% 78% 85% 85% 100% 72% 73% 70% 52% 66% 74% 54% 
Reverse mortgage 77% 78% 85% 89% 100% 85% 64% 70% 50% 64% 72% 57% 
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Table 2.8. Retirement Financial Adequacy under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Gender for Divorced/Widowed 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across gender, and marital status. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five 
years prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on seven different options (No housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a 
cheaper region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined at an income replacement rate of 
70% and above (70RR). Poverty line (PL) is defined as half the median income for each year, respectively. Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement 
income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement 
income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount 
post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. The sample size for 2005 is 111 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 16,648) with 26% 
male and 74% female. The sample size for 2007 is 271 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 30% male and 70% female. The sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed 
(weighted sample 58,447) with 30% male and 70% female. 
     Housing Asset Options 
Male Female 
Divorced/Widowed  Divorced/Widowed  





Baseline wealth 74% 93% 72% 78% 76% 62% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 83% 100% 80% 84% 84% 76% 
Sell and live with family 89% 100% 89% 87% 86% 91% 
Sell and rent 36% 57% 53% 50% 58% 52% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 74% 93% 64% 78% 76% 65% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 78% 96% 74% 78% 78% 68% 





No house 73% 87% 61% 77% 82% 75% 
No house with imputed rent 78% 88% 67% 86% 90% 80% 
Sell and live with family 85% 92% 73% 93% 91% 87% 
Sell and rent 40% 55% 42% 50% 58% 52% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 78% 91% 66% 82% 84% 70% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 81% 91% 66% 83% 84% 71% 





No house 70% 82% 68% 77% 89% 73% 
No house with imputed rent 73% 90% 64% 83% 92% 78% 
Sell and live with family 83% 93% 80% 87% 91% 82% 
Sell and rent 54% 71% 57% 46% 58% 46% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 77% 90% 72% 79% 89% 69% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 77% 90% 71% 80% 89% 70% 
Reverse mortgage 80% 91% 74% 81% 90% 74% 
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Table 2.9. Retirement Financial Adequacy under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Ethnicity for Divorced/Widowed 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across ethnicity. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years prior to 
retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on 
five different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper 
region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Poverty line (PL) is defined as half the median income for each year, 
respectively.  Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the 
lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; 
an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy 
requirement. N/A means not available and refers to a lack of available data to compute the adequacy ratio. The sample size for 2005 is 111 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 16,648) with 
80.5% Pākeha, 6% Māori, 9.5% Pacific, and 4% Asia. The sample size for 2007 is 271 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 82% Pākeha, 6% Māori, 8% Pacific, and 4% Asian. 
The sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 58,447) with 82% Pākeha, 6% Māori, 5% Pacific, and 7% Asian. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Pākehā/Asian Māori Pacific Island Mix Māori, Non-Māori 
Divorced/Widowed Divorced/Widowed Divorced/Widowed Divorced/Widowed 





No house 82% 67% 70% 70% 68% 32% 85% 100% 
No house with imputed rent 90% 82% 100% 70% 68% 32% 100% 100% 
Sell and live with family 92% 87% 100% 100% 68% 38% 100% 100% 
Sell and rent 60% 56% 76% 46% 18% 12% 85% 86% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 82% 67% 70% 70% 68% 32% 85% 100% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 84% 73% 100% 70% 68% 32% 85% 100% 





No house 86% 72% 57% 59% 72% 56% 100% 100% 
No house with imputed rent 93% 79% 65% 65% 72% 56% 100% 100% 
Sell and live with family 93% 85% 84% 84% 72% 56% 100% 100% 
Sell and rent 61% 52% 32% 32% 0% 0% 93% 86% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 87% 68% 77% 79% 72% 56% 100% 100% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 87% 68% 77% 79% 72% 56% 100% 100% 





No house 89% 73% 60% 58% 68% 36% 100% 93% 
No house with imputed rent 93% 75% 76% 65% 68% 36% 100% 96% 
Sell and live with family 94% 83% 69% 65% 68% 36% 100% 100% 
Sell and rent 65% 52% 34% 26% 7% 7% 92% 70% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 92% 71% 52% 42% 68% 36% 100% 96% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 92% 72% 52% 42% 68% 36% 100% 96% 
Reverse mortgage 93% 76% 52% 50% 68% 36% 100% 95% 
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Table 2.10. Retirement Financial Adequacy under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Home Ownership for Divorced/Widowed 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across home ownership status. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five 
years prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on five different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a 
cheaper region or reverse mortgage). Poverty line (PL) is defined as half the median income for each year, respectively.  Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of 
pre-retirement income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a 
pre-retirement income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% 
of this amount post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. The sample size for 2005 is 1 11 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 
16,648) with 45% non-homeowner and 55% homeowner. The sample size for 2007 is 271 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 55% non-homeowner and 45% homeowner. The 
sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 58,447) with 58% non-homeowner and 42% homeowner. 
 homeowner     Housing Asset Options 
Homeowner Renter 
Divorced/Widowed Divorced/Widowed 





No house 83% 61%   
No house with imputed rent 97% 88% 77% 63% 
Sell and live with family 100% 99%   
Sell and rent 94% 83% 14% 13% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 83% 66%   
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 87% 75%   





No house 88% 72%   
No house with imputed rent 100% 87% 80% 67% 
Sell and live with family 100% 98%   
Sell and rent 94% 86% 22% 16% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 88% 67%   
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 88% 68%   





No house 90% 69%   
No house with imputed rent 99% 85% 85% 64% 
Sell and live with family 99% 99%   
Sell and rent 97% 87% 32% 18% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 94% 73%   
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 93% 75%   
Reverse mortgage 96% 83%   
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Table 2.11. Retirement Financial Adequacy under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Living Arrangement for Divorced/Widowed 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across living arrangement. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years 
prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on five different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downs izing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a 
cheaper region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Poverty line (PL) is defined as half the median income for 
each year, respectively.  Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income 
is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-
retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the 
adequacy requirement. Single dwelling refers an individual living alone, double dwelling refers to an individual sharing accommodation with one other, multi-dwelling refers to three or more 
individuals sharing the same accommodation. The sample size for 2005 is 111 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 16,648) with 79% single dwelling, 8% double dwelling, and 13% multi-
dwelling. The sample size for 2007 is 271 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 67% single dwelling, 18% double dwelling, and 15% multi-dwelling. The sample size for 2009 
is 390 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 58,447) with 69% single dwelling, 21% double dwelling, and 10% multi-dwelling. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Single Dwelling Double Dwelling Multi-dwelling 
Divorced/Widowed Divorced/Widowed Divorced/Widowed 





No house 84% 68% 50% 54% 63% 33% 
No house with imputed rent 92% 80% 73% 70% 63% 46% 
Sell and live with family 94% 87% 73% 70% 63% 50% 
Sell and rent 60% 54% 42% 30% 43% 4% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 84% 69% 50% 54% 63% 33% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 87% 72% 50% 54% 63% 50% 





No house 86% 70% 80% 82% 68% 65% 
No house with imputed rent 93% 75% 83% 88% 68% 66% 
Sell and live with family 95% 84% 83% 88% 74% 74% 
Sell and rent 60% 52% 52% 43% 36% 27% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 88% 66% 80% 87% 74% 74% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 88% 66% 80% 87% 74% 74% 





No house 91% 74% 78% 70% 58% 53% 
No house with imputed rent 95% 76% 80% 70% 63% 68% 
Sell and live with family 95% 83% 83% 80% 63% 73% 
Sell and rent 66% 54% 55% 33% 25% 27% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 93% 71% 78% 67% 58% 35% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 93% 72% 78% 70% 58% 67% 




Table 2.12. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by RA under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Region for 
Divorced/Widowed 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders by region. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years prior to retirement 
age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on five different 
options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper region or reverse 
mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement 
income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement 
income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount 
post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. The sample size for 2005 is 111 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 16,648) with 38% 
Auckland, 5% Waikato, 6% Wellington, 25% Rest of North Island, 14% Canterbury, and 12% Rest of South Island. The sample size for 2007 is 271 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 
40,212) with 35% Auckland, 9% Waikato, 10% Wellington, 24% Rest of North Island, 12% Canterbury, and 10% Rest of South Island. The sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed 
(weighted sample 58,447) with 30% Auckland, 10% Waikato, 10% Wellington, 27% Rest of North Island, 14% Canterbury, and 9% Rest of South Island. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Divorced/Widowed 
 





No house 59% 21% 48% 69% 86% 69% 
No house with imputed rent 77% 35% 56% 80% 100% 73% 
Sell and live with family 81% 81% 56% 88% 100% 77% 
Sell and rent 50% 64% 85% 62% 60% 50% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 58% 17% 48% 80% 92% 53% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 70% 17% 48% 80% 92% 53% 





No house 75% 80% 74% 66% 67% 66% 
No house with imputed rent 80% 79% 72% 77% 81% 65% 
Sell and live with family 84% 84% 82% 87% 85% 75% 
Sell and rent 51% 54% 37% 59% 43% 39% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 78% 72% 68% 45% 68% 48% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 82% 72% 68% 65% 68% 48% 





No house 68% 67% 82% 71% 76% 74% 
No house with imputed rent 69% 80% 73% 76% 78% 75% 
Sell and live with family 79% 86% 82% 81% 85% 78% 
Sell and rent 43% 66% 48% 51% 50% 46% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 74% 68% 69% 64% 78% 64% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 77% 68% 69% 64% 78% 62% 
Reverse mortgage 77% 76% 71% 70% 80% 71% 
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Table 2.13. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by RA for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by Gender 
for Single and Married/Partnered after Deflating Male Pre-retirement Income 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across gender and marital status after deflating male pre-retirement income by 13% five years prior to 
retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on 
five different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper 
region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined by the Relative Adequacy measure defined 
as the achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this 
amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement 
income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. The sample size for 2005 is 
63 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 9,600) and 18 (weighted sample 2,400) for Single, with equal split between genders for Married/Partnered and 53% male and 47% female for Single. 
The sample size for 2007 is 210 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 31,400) and 39 (weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with equal split between genders for Married/Partnered and 58% 
male and 42% female for Single. The sample size for 2009 is 402 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 62,600) and 57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with equal split between genders 
for Married/Partnered and 57% male and 43% female for Single. 
     Housing Asset Options 
Single Married/Partnered 





Baseline wealth 70% 82% 41% 60% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 100% 82% 61% 77% 
Sell and live with family 100% 82% 68% 85% 
Sell and rent 63% 22% 59% 65% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 70% 82% 46% 65% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 85% 82% 58% 77% 





Baseline wealth 81% 71% 30% 62% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 88% 81% 53% 79% 
Sell and live with family 90% 81% 71% 92% 
Sell and rent 59% 28% 55% 63% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 88% 71% 43% 67% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 88% 71% 46% 70% 





Baseline wealth 87% 70% 36% 66% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 97% 74% 60% 78% 
Sell and live with family 100% 79% 73% 88% 
Sell and rent 45% 42% 58% 70% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 72% 72% 48% 71% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 91% 72% 51% 72% 
Reverse mortgage 90% 76% 52% 75% 
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Table 2.14. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by 70RR for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by 
Ethnicity for Single and Married/Partnered 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across ethnicity. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years prior to 
retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on 
seven different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper 
region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined at an income replacement rate value of 70% 
and above (70RR). Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. N/A means not available and refers to a lack of available data to compute the adequacy ratio. 
The sample size for 2005 is 63 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 9,600) and 18 (weighted sample 2,400) for Single, with 92% Pākeha, 2.5% Māori, 0% Pacific, and 5.3% Asian for 
Married/Partnered, and 88% Pākeha and 12% Māori for Single. The sample size for 2007 is 210 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 31,400) and 39 (weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with 
89% Pākeha, 4.4% Māori, 2.2% Pacific, and 3.8% Asian for Married/Partnered, and 89% Pākeha and 8.5% Māori, and 2.5% Asian for Single. The sample size for 2009 is 402 for Married/Partnered 
(weighted sample 62,600) and 57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with 88% Pākeha, 4.9% Māori, 1.7% Pacific, and 4.9% Asian for Married/Partnered, and 89% Pākeha, 5.4% Māori, 3.7% 
Pacific, and 1.9% Asian for Single.  
 
Housing Asset Options 
Pākehā/Asian Māori Pākehā/Asian Māori Pacific Island 





Baseline wealth   81% 100% 61% 100% N/A 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 100% 100% 75% 100% N/A 
Sell and live with family 100% 100% 80% 100%     0% 
Sell and rent   46%     0% 59% 100%     0% 
Downsize, stay in the same region   81% 100% 62% 100%     0% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region   90% 100% 74% 100%     0% 





Baseline wealth   85% 100% 58%   61% 100% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent   89% 100% 66%   61% 100% 
Sell and live with family   91% 100% 77%   61%   27% 
Sell and rent   47%     0% 54%   44%   14% 
Downsize, stay in the same region   85% 100% 59%   61%     0% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region   85% 100% 62%   61%     0% 





Baseline wealth   81% 100% 63%   58% 100% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent   88% 100% 69%   69% 100% 
Sell and live with family   91% 100% 83%   69% 100% 
Sell and rent   49%     0% 64%   61%   68% 
Downsize, stay in the same region   82% 100% 67%   66%   67% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region   82% 100% 68%   66%   67% 




Table 2.15. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by RA for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by Ethnicity 
for Single and Married/Partnered Adjusting for the Life Expectancy of Pacific Island People 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across ethnicity after adjusting for the difference in life expectancy for Pacific Island people. Post-retirement 
income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on five different options (no housing assets, 
imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper region or  reverse mortgage). Income 
replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement income based on 
population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement income between 
the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount post-retirement. 
N/A means not available and refers to a lack of available data to compute the adequacy ratio. The sample size for 2005 is 63 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 9,600) and 18 (weighted 
sample 2,400) for Single, with 92% Pākeha, 2.5% Māori, 0% Pacific, and 5.3% Asian for Married/Partnered, and 88% Pākeha and 12% Māori for Single. The sample size for 2007 is 210 for 
Married/Partnered (weighted sample 31,400) and 39 (weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with 89% Pākeha, 4.4% Māori, 2.2% Pacific, and 3.8% Asian for Married/Partnered, and 89% Pākeha 
and 8.5% Māori, and 2.5% Asian for Single. The sample size for 2009 is 402 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 62,600) and 57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with 88% Pākeha, 4.9% 
Māori, 1.7% Pacific, and 4.9% Asian for Married/Partnered, and 89% Pākeha, 5.4% Māori, 3.7% Pacific, and 1.9% Asian for Single. 
     Housing Asset Options 
Single Married/Partnered 





Baseline wealth 64% 100% 59% 0% N/A 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 85% 100% 70% 100% N/A 
Sell and live with family 85% 100% 79% 100% N/A 
Sell and rent 50%     0% 63% 100% N/A 
Downsize, stay in the same region 57% 100% 54% 100% N/A 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 67% 100% 66% 100% N/A 





Baseline wealth 73%   41% 59%   60%     0% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 78%   41% 63%   64% 100% 
Sell and live with family 80%   41% 78%   44% 100% 
Sell and rent 44%     0% 64%   44% 100% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 64%   41% 56%   44%     0% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 64%   41% 57%   44%     0% 





Baseline wealth 82%   37% 60%   59%     0% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 84%   37% 67%   61% 100% 
Sell and live with family 90%   37% 81%   61% 100% 
Sell and rent 46%     0% 68%   45% 100% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 75%   37% 60%   32%     0% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 78%   37% 61%   32%     0% 
Reverse mortgage 82%   37% 64%   32% 100% 
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Table 2.16. Retirement Financial Adequacy (70RR) for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by Home Ownership 
for Single and Married/Partnered 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across home ownership status. Pre -retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five 
years prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on five different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a 
cheaper region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined at an income replacement rate value 
of 70% and above (70RR). The sample size for 2005 is 63 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 9,600) and 18 (weighted sample 2,400) for Single, with 34% Non-homeowners and 66% 
Homeowners for Married/Partnered, and 53% Non-homeowners and 47% Homeowners for Single. The sample size for 2007 is 210 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 31,400) and 39 
(weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with 33% Non-homeowners and 67% Homeowners for Married/Partnered, and 56% Non-homeowners and 44% Homeowners for Single. The sample size for 
2009 is 402 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 62,600) and 57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with 30% Non-homeowners and 70% Homeowners for Married/Partnered, and 54% Non-
homeowners and 46% Homeowners for Single.  
     Housing Asset Options 
Homeowner Renter Homeowner Renter  





Baseline wealth   41%  56%  
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 100%  76%  
Sell and live with family 100% 100% 85% 60% 
Sell and rent   89%     0% 78% 17% 
Downsize, stay in the same region   62%  59%  
Downsize and move to a cheaper region   80%  76%  





Baseline wealth   79%  53%  
Baseline wealth with imputed rent   87%  66%  
Sell and live with family 100%   87% 83% 57% 
Sell and rent   88%   10% 69% 21% 
Downsize, stay in the same region   79%  56%  
Downsize and move to a cheaper region   88%  60%  





Baseline wealth   67%  59%  
Baseline wealth with imputed rent   82%  70%  
Sell and live with family   96%   91% 91% 64% 
Sell and rent   93%   10% 79% 26% 
Downsize, stay in the same region   69%  65%  
Downsize and move to a cheaper region   69%  67%  




Table 2.17. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by 70RR for Baseline, Rent Imputation and Five Housing Liquidation Options by Living 
Arrangement for Single and Married/Partnered 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across living arrangement. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years 
prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on five different options (baseline wealth, baseline wealth with imputed rent, sell and live with family, sell and rent , downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper 
region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined at an income replacement rate value of 70% 
and above (70RR). Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. Single dwelling refers an individual living alone, double dwelling refers to an i ndividual 
sharing accommodation with one other, multi-dwelling refers to three or more individuals sharing the same accommodation. The sample size for 2005 is 63 for Married/Partnered (weighted 
sample 9,600) and 18 (weighted sample 2,400) for Single, with 89% double dwelling and 11% multi-dwelling for Married/Partnered, and 88% single-dwelling, 6% double dwelling, and 6% multi-
dwelling Single. The sample size for 2007 is 210 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 31,400) and 39 (weighted sample 5,400) for Single, with 83% double dwelling, and 17% multi-dwelling 
for Married/Partnered, and 92% single dwelling, 2.8% double dwelling, and 5.2% multi-dwelling for Single. The sample size for 2009 is 402 for Married/Partnered (weighted sample 62,600) and 
57 (weighted sample 8,200) for Single, with 90.5% double dwelling, and 9.5% multi-dwelling for Married/Partnered, and 91% single dwelling, 7.2% double dwelling, and 1.8% multi-dwelling 
for Single. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Single Dwelling Double Dwelling Multi-dwelling Double Dwelling Multi-dwelling 





Baseline wealth   82% 100% 100% 62% 28% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent 100% 100% 100% 77% 28% 
Sell and live with family 100% 100% 100% 82% 28% 
Sell and rent   43%     0%     0% 60% 28% 
Downsize, stay in the same region   82% 100% 100% 63% 28% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region   90% 100% 100% 76% 28% 





Baseline wealth   82% 100% 100% 60% 35% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent   86% 100% 100% 67% 53% 
Sell and live with family   92% 100% 100% 73% 81% 
Sell and rent   48%     0%     0% 57% 34% 
Downsize, stay in the same region   82% 100% 100% 61% 35% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region   86% 100% 100% 63% 35% 





Baseline wealth   79% 100% 100% 63% 35% 
Baseline wealth with imputed rent   86% 100% 100% 68% 63% 
Sell and live with family   92% 100% 100% 82% 95% 
Sell and rent   46%   17%     0% 62% 69% 
Downsize, stay in the same region   80% 100% 100% 66% 52% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region   80% 100% 100% 66% 64% 
Reverse mortgage   83% 100% 100% 65% 54% 
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Table 2.18. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by RA under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Gender for 
Divorced/Widowed after Deflating Male Pre-retirement Income 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older Divorced/Widowed New Zealanders by gender after deflating male pre-retirement income by 13% five years prior to 
retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on 
five different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper 
region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined by the Relative Adequacy measure defined 
as the achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement income based on population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this 
amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement income between the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement 
income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount post-retirement. Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. The sample size for 2005 is 
111 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 16,648) with 26% male and 74% female. The sample size for 2007 is 271 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 30% male and 
70% female. The sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 58,447) with 30% male and 70% female. 







No house 74% 62% 
No house with imputed rent 91% 76% 
Sell and live with family 98% 91% 
Sell and rent 56% 52% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 75% 65% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 85% 68% 





No house 77% 75% 
No house with imputed rent 81% 80% 
Sell and live with family 90% 87% 
Sell and rent 45% 52% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 82% 70% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 82% 71% 





No house 75% 73% 
No house with imputed rent 77% 78% 
Sell and live with family 89% 82% 
Sell and rent 58% 46% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 84% 69% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 85% 70% 
Reverse mortgage 84% 74% 
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Table 2.19. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by 70RR under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Ethnicity for 
Divorced/Widowed 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across ethnicity. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years prior to 
retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on 
seven different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper 
region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined at an income replacement rate value of 70% 
and above (70RR). Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. N/A means not available and refers to a lack of available data to compute the adequacy ratio. 
The sample size for 2005 is 111 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 16,648) with 80.5% Pākeha, 6% Māori, 9.5% Pacific, and 4% Asia. The sample size for 2007 is 271 for 
Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 82% Pākeha, 6% Māori, 8% Pacific, and 4% Asian. The sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 58,447) with 
82% Pākeha, 6% Māori, 5% Pacific, and 7% Asian. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Pākehā/Asian Māori Pacific Island 





No house 74% 70% 94% 
No house with imputed rent 82% 70% 100% 
Sell and live with family 86% 70% 100% 
Sell and rent 49% 46% 18% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 74% 70% 94% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 75% 70% 94% 





No house 74%   80% 100% 
No house with imputed rent 83%   80% 100% 
Sell and live with family 89% 100% 100% 
Sell and rent 51%   32%     0% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 77% 100% 100% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 79% 100% 100% 





No house 73% 72% 91% 
No house with imputed rent 79% 72% 91% 
Sell and live with family 86% 72% 91% 
Sell and rent 52% 26%   7% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 78% 57% 91% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 78% 57% 91% 




Table 2.20. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by RA under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Ethnicity for 
Divorced/Widowed Adjusting for the Life Expectancy of Pacific Island People 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across ethnicity after adjusting for the difference in life expectancy for Pacific Island people. Post-retirement 
income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based on five different options (no housing assets, 
imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a cheaper region or reverse mor tgage). Income 
replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Relative Adequacy (RA) refers to achievement of a certain proportion of pre-retirement income based on 
population quartile. An individual whose pre-retirement income is in the lowest quartile must achieve 100% of this amount post-retirement; an individual with a pre-retirement income between 
the 25th and 75th percentile must achieve 70% of this amount post-retirement; an individual whose pre-retirement income is in the upper quartile must achieve 50% of this amount post-retirement. 
N/A means not available and refers to a lack of available data to compute the adequacy ratio. The sample size for 2005 is 111 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 16,648) with 80.5% 
Pākeha, 6% Māori, 9.5% Pacific, and 4% Asia. The sample size for 2007 is 271 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 82% Pākeha, 6% Māori, 8% Pacific, and 4% Asian. The 
sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 58,447) with 82% Pākeha, 6% Māori, 5% Pacific, and 7% Asian. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Pākehā/Asian Māori Pacific Island 





No house 69% 70% 32% 
No house with imputed rent 82% 70% 32% 
Sell and live with family 87% 100% 38% 
Sell and rent 57% 46% 12% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 67% 70% 32% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 73% 70% 32% 





No house 73% 59% 56% 
No house with imputed rent 79% 65% 56% 
Sell and live with family 86% 84% 56% 
Sell and rent 52% 32% 0% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 68% 79% 56% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 68% 79% 56% 





No house 73% 58% 36% 
No house with imputed rent 75% 65% 36% 
Sell and live with family 83% 65% 36% 
Sell and rent 53% 34% 7% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 71% 50% 36% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 72% 50% 36% 
Reverse mortgage 76% 58% 36% 
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Table 2.21. Retirement Financial Adequacy (70RR) under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Home Ownership for 
Divorced/Widowed 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across home ownership status. Pre -retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five 
years prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on five different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a 
cheaper region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined at an income replacement rate value 
of 70% and above (70RR). The sample size for 2005 is 111 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 16,648) with 45% non-homeowner and 55% homeowner. The sample size for 2007 is 271 
for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 55% non-homeowner and 45% homeowner. The sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 58,447) with 58% 
non-homeowner and 42% homeowner. 







No house 71% 84% 
No house with imputed rent 83% 84% 
Sell and live with family 90% 84% 
Sell and rent 78% 9% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 71% 84% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 72% 84% 





No house 69% 82% 
No house with imputed rent 85% 82% 
Sell and live with family 97% 85% 
Sell and rent 87% 10% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 75% 85% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 79% 85% 





No house 73% 77% 
No house with imputed rent 84% 77% 
Sell and live with family 96% 78% 
Sell and rent 87% 15% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 79% 78% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 80% 78% 




Table 2.22. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by 70RR under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Living Arrangement for 
Divorced/Widowed 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders across living arrangement. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years 
prior to retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing 
based on five different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a 
cheaper region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined at an income replacement rate value 
of 70% and above (70RR). Adequacy rate is the proportion of individuals fulfilling the adequacy requirement. Single dwelling refers an individual living alone, double dwelling refers to an 
individual sharing accommodation with one other, multi-dwelling refers to three or more individuals sharing the same accommodation. The sample size for 2005 is 111 for Divorced/Widowed 
(weighted sample 16,648) with 79% single dwelling, 8% double dwelling, and 13% multi-dwelling. The sample size for 2007 is 271 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 67% 
single dwelling, 18% double dwelling, and 15% multi-dwelling. The sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 58,447) with 69% single dwelling, 21% double dwelling, 
and 10% multi-dwelling. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Single Dwelling Double Dwelling Multi-dwelling 





No house 77% 58%   83% 
No house with imputed rent 85% 58%   83% 
Sell and live with family 88% 58% 100% 
Sell and rent 50% 35%   26% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 77% 58%   83% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 78% 58%   83% 





No house 73% 85%   90% 
No house with imputed rent 82% 87%   90% 
Sell and live with family 90% 92% 100% 
Sell and rent 49% 44%   27% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 78% 92%   90% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 79% 92% 100% 





No house 75% 69% 82% 
No house with imputed rent 81% 76% 82% 
Sell and live with family 87% 82% 82% 
Sell and rent 54% 26% 20% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 79% 72% 82% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 79% 75% 82% 
Reverse mortgage 81% 76% 82% 
283 
 
Table 2.23. Retirement Financial Adequacy Measured by 70RR under Seven Possible Housing Liquidation Options by Region for 
Divorced/Widowed 
This table summarises the retirement financial adequacy rate of older New Zealanders by region. Pre-retirement income is calculated as the inflation adjusted income five years prior to 
retirement age of 65. Post-retirement income is the sum of non-employment income and the annuitized income from non-housing assets,  investment housing plus residential housing based 
on five different options (no housing assets, imputed rent with no housing assets, sell and live with family, sell and rent, downsizing and stay in the same region, downsize and move to a 
cheaper region or reverse mortgage). Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-retirement income and pre-retirement income. Income replacement rate is the ratio between post-
retirement income and pre-retirement income. Adequacy is determined at an income replacement rate value of 70% and above (70RR). The sample size for 2005 i s 111 for 
Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 16,648) with 38% Auckland, 5% Waikato, 6% Wellington, 25% Rest of North Island, 14% Canterbury, and 12% Rest of South Island. The sample 
size for 2007 is 271 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 40,212) with 35% Auckland, 9% Waikato, 10% Wellington, 24% Rest of North Island, 12% Canterbury, and 10% Rest of 
South Island. The sample size for 2009 is 390 for Divorced/Widowed (weighted sample 58,447) with 30% Auckland, 10% Waikato, 10% Wellington, 27% Rest of North Island, 14% 
Canterbury, and 9% Rest of South Island. 
 
Housing Asset Options 
Divorced/Widowed 





No house 73% 55% 89% 89% 92% 53% 
No house with imputed rent 82% 55% 89% 92% 100% 68% 
Sell and live with family 90% 55% 89% 95% 100% 68% 
Sell and rent 46% 12% 16% 59% 61% 41% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 73% 55% 89% 89% 92% 53% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 76% 55% 89% 89% 92% 53% 





No house 74% 74% 82% 80% 86% 57% 
No house with imputed rent 84% 78% 84% 87% 92% 70% 
Sell and live with family 93% 85% 93% 94% 93% 78% 
Sell and rent 48% 46% 31% 53% 48% 44% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 83% 78% 82% 86% 88% 57% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 92% 78% 82% 83% 88% 57% 





No house 72% 75% 75% 73% 81% 81% 
No house with imputed rent 77% 84% 79% 79% 83% 88% 
Sell and live with family 85% 92% 79% 83% 90% 92% 
Sell and rent 40% 65% 40% 54% 53% 45% 
Downsize, stay in the same region 82% 80% 75% 73% 84% 79% 
Downsize and move to a cheaper region 83% 80% 75% 73% 84% 79% 
Reverse mortgage 83% 84% 77% 74% 86% 85% 
 
 284 
Table 3.1. List of Variables 
Variable Explanation  
𝑉𝑡 Lifetime utility 𝑉𝑡 = 𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 , 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) 
𝑈𝑡 
Utility of an expenditure item 
for the period 𝑡 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝)
+ 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡)  
+ 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
𝐶𝑡 
General consumption 




Health expenditure in dollar 
value in period 𝑡 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 
House size measured in square 
meters in period 𝑡 
 
𝛼𝑐  




The propensity for health 
spending 
 
𝛼𝑠 The propensity for house scaling  
𝑛 




The final period when an 
individual would not survive 
living past the end of this period 
 
𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 
The amount remaining at the 
end of the final period left for a 
bequestee. Bequest is estimated 










Rent price per square meter rate 
in period t or T 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇
𝑝
=  𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖1 + 𝛿











Estimated optimal consumption 
for the period 𝑡 
 
𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡 
Estimated optimal health 
expenditure for the period 𝑡 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡 
Estimated optimal house size in 




expenditure in dollar value in 
final period 𝑇 
 
𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇  
Health expenditure in dollar 
value in final period 𝑇 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑇  
House size measured in square 







The total wealth from income, 
liquid asset, and current house 
liquidation (accounting for 
depreciation and liquidation 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑇
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝐴𝑙𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝
∗ (1 − 𝛿𝑛) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞 
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The total wealth from income, 
liquid asset, and current house 
liquidation (accounting for 
depreciation and liquidation 




= 𝑌𝑡 + 𝐴𝑙𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝛿








The total wealth from income 
and liquid asset in period 𝑡 or T. 
There is no housing liquidation 




= 𝐴𝑙𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 
𝑌𝑡 Income received in period 𝑡  
𝐴𝑙𝑡 
Liquid wealth available at the 
beginning of period 𝑡 
 
𝛿𝑛 










Liquidation cost (can be only 
monetary cost or can also 
account for non-monetary cost) 
 
𝑟𝑛 
The real compound value of real 
interest accounting for annual 
inflation, interest rate, and 
taxation rate 
𝑟𝑛 = 1 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛/(1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
𝑛 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛 
The nominal compound value of 
interest accounting for annual 
inflation, interest, and tax rate 
for a period 𝑡 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛 = (1 + ((1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡)
∗ (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) − 1)





The compounded inflation in a 
period 𝑡. This depends on the 
number of periods away from 
the final period. 
𝜋𝑛 
= (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑡 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖1 
Annual interest rate net of 
inflation and tax 𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖1 = (1 + 𝑁𝑜𝑚_𝑛𝑒𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡)
1
𝑛 − 1 
∅𝑡  or ∅𝑇  
Inflation adjustments calculated 
from 𝜋 compounded by the 
number of periods 𝑡 away to the 
final period 𝑇 
 
𝜑 
Annual return from house price 








Expected future house price for 
next period dependent on the 
state of house price 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑝 
Current period’s house price at a 
given specific house price state 
 
𝐵𝑒𝑞1 





Bequest in the form of a house 




Compounded net interest for a 
period 𝑡 or the return on housing 
investment 
𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = (1 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝑖1)
𝑛 
𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟  
The expected future price next 
period net of depreciation 𝛿 and 
liquidation cost 𝐿𝑖𝑞. Dependent 
on house price state next period 
𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝛿) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞 
𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
The rate of maintenance 
investment which is equal to the 
annual depreciation rate to 
maintain house size 
 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦 
The total wealth from income 
and liquid asset. There is no 
housing liquidation as 
individuals choose to stay in 
their home 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦 = 𝐴𝑙𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 
 
𝑉𝑡 Lifetime utility 𝑉𝑡 = 𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 , 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) 
𝑈𝑡 
Utility of an expenditure item 
for the period 𝑡 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 ln(𝐶) + 𝛼ℎ ln(𝐻𝐸𝑥𝑝)
+ 𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝛼𝑠 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡)  
+ 𝛽𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
𝐶𝑡 
General consumption 




Table 3.2. Wealth Column Explanation 
The wealth column (vertical axis) is interpreted assuming one time period represents 10 years. The ‘Wealth 
Position’ column has 450 values ranging from 1 to 450.  ‘Wealth Position’ represents the total wealth in a period 
consisting of housing wealth (first column) and non-housing wealth (second column). House size can take one of 
nine possible values that start from 0 and increase in increments of 40 square metres (sqm) to a maximum of 
320sqm. Non-housing wealth has 50 possible values that start from 0 and increase in steps of $40,000 up to 
$1,960,000. The ‘Wealth Position’ column reports all the possible housing and non-housing value combinations 
of increases in non-housing wealth per incremental change in housing wealth. 
Wealth Position Housing Wealth (sqm) Non-Housing Wealth ($) 
1 0 40,000 
2 0 80,000 
3 0 120,000 
4 0 160,000 
…… …. … 
50 0 1,960,000 
51 40 40,000 
52 40 80,000 
…. … … 
100 40 1,960,000 
101 80 40,000 
102 80 80,000 
…. … … 
200 120 1,960,000 
201 160 40,000 
…. … … 
300 200 1,960,000 
301 240 40,000 
… …. … 
449 320 1,920,000 
450 320 40,000 
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Table 3.3. The State Composition Matrix 
The State Matrix represents all the possible income, house price, and health state combinations available to 
retirees. The matrix is formatted for each (i) Health State, from bad health (H1) to good health (H3); (ii) House 
Price State from low house price (P1) to high house price (P5); (iii) Income State from low income (Y1) to high 
income (Y4) and (iv) death (Y5). There are 61 possible state combinations going across each wealth position. The 






























1          
2          
3          
…          
…          
…          
450          
 
Table 3.4. Summary of Column Number and Combination of States 
Column Number 
State Combinations 
At Final Period T At T-1 At T-2 
184 123 62 H1 Y1 P1 
185 124 63 H2 Y1 P1 
186 125 64 H3 Y1 P1 
187 126 65 H1 Y1 P2 
188 127 66 H2 Y1 P2 
189 128 67 H3 Y1 P2 
190 129 68 H1 Y1 P3 
191 130 69 H2 Y1 P3 
192 131 70 H3 Y1 P3 
193 132 71 H1 Y1 P4 
194 133 72 H2 Y1 P4 
195 134 73 H3 Y1 P4 
196 135 74 H1 Y1 P5 
197 136 75 H2 Y1 P5 
198 137 76 H3 Y1 P5 
199 138 77 H1 Y2 P1 
200 139 78 H2 Y2 P1 
201 140 79 H3 Y2 P1 
202 141 80 H1 Y2 P2 
203 142 81 H2 Y2 P2 
204 143 82 H3 Y2 P2 
205 144 83 H1 Y2 P3 
206 145 84 H2 Y2 P3 
207 146 85 H3 Y2 P3 
208 147 86 H1 Y2 P4 
209 148 87 H2 Y2 P4 
210 149 88 H3 Y2 P4 
211 150 89 H1 Y2 P5 
212 151 90 H2 Y2 P5 
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213 152 91 H3 Y2 P5 
214 153 92 H1 Y3 P1 
215 154 93 H2 Y3 P1 
216 155 94 H3 Y3 P1 
217 156 95 H1 Y3 P2 
218 157 96 H2 Y3 P2 
219 158 97 H3 Y3 P2 
220 159 98 H1 Y3 P3 
221 160 99 H2 Y3 P3 
222 161 100 H3 Y3 P3 
223 162 101 H1 Y3 P4 
224 163 102 H2 Y3 P4 
225 164 103 H3 Y3 P4 
226 165 104 H1 Y3 P5 
227 166 105 H2 Y3 P5 
228 167 106 H3 Y3 P5 
229 168 107 H1 Y4 P1 
230 169 108 H2 Y4 P1 
231 170 109 H3 Y4 P1 
232 171 110 H1 Y4 P2 
233 172 111 H2 Y4 P2 
234 173 112 H3 Y4 P2 
235 174 113 H1 Y4 P3 
236 175 114 H2 Y4 P3 
237 176 115 H3 Y4 P3 
238 177 116 H1 Y4 P4 
239 178 117 H2 Y4 P4 
240 179 118 H3 Y4 P4 
241 180 119 H1 Y4 P5 
242 181 120 H2 Y4 P5 
243 182 121 H3 Y4 P5 
244 183 122 Y5 Death 
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Graph 3.1. Graph of Optimal Utility of State Combinations on Wealth Position in the Final 
Period 
The y-axis shows the optimal total utility of a point on the x-axis and on the z-axis. The x-axis shows points in 
the wealth position (1 to 500) explained by the Wealth Column (Table 3.2). The wealth column is designed to 
have an increase in housing size every 50 points in the column and the numbers between every 1st and 50th shows 
the increasing value of non-housing wealth. The z-axis shows the point on the State Composition Matrix (Table 
3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, 
there are 61 combination of states in each period. Final period covers state combinations 184  to 244. State 
combination 244 is “death” so a substantial drop in utility is to be expected. The different lines represent the 
optimal utility chosen by the program from renting, sell-buy, or stay across wealth position (x-axis) for each state 
combinations 184 to 244 in the final period (z-axis). 
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Graph 3.2. Optimal Utility when Renting in the Final Period on Wealth Position and State 
Combinations 
The y-axis shows the optimal total utility of a point on the x-axis and on the z-axis. The x-axis shows points in 
the wealth position (1 to 500) explained by the Wealth Column (Table 3.2). The wealth column is designed to 
have an increase in housing size every 50 points in the column and the numbers between every 1 st and 50th shows 
the increasing value of non-housing wealth. The z-axis shows the point on the State Composition Matrix (Table 
3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, 
there are 61 combination of states in each period. Final period covers state combinations 184 to 244. The different 
lines represent the optimal utility chosen by the program from renting, sell-buy, or stay across wealth position (x-





Graph 3.3. Optimal Utility when Selling/Buying in the Final Period on Wealth Position and 
State Combinations 
The y-axis shows the optimal total utility of a point on the x-axis and on the z-axis. The x-axis shows points in 
the wealth position (1 to 500) explained by the Wealth Column (Table 3.2). The wealth column is designed to 
have an increase in housing size every 50 points in the column and the numbers between every 1 st and 50th shows 
the increasing value of non-housing wealth. The z-axis shows the point on the State Composition Matrix (Table 
3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, 
there are 61 combination of states in each period. Final period covers state combinations 184 to 244. The different 
lines represent the optimal utility chosen by the program from renting, sell-buy, or stay across wealth position (x-








Graph 3.4. Optimal Utility when Staying in Current Home on Wealth Position and State 
Combinations in the Final Period 
The y-axis shows the optimal total utility of a point on the x-axis and on the z-axis. The x-axis shows points in 
the wealth position (1 to 500) explained by the Wealth Column (Table 3.2). The wealth column is designed to 
have an increase in housing size every 50 points in the column and the numbers between every 1 st and 50th shows 
the increasing value of non-housing wealth. The z-axis shows the point on the State Composition Matrix (Table 
3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, 
there are 61 combination of states in each period. Final period covers state combinations 184 to 244. The different 
lines represent the optimal utility chosen by the program from renting, sell-buy, or stay across wealth position (x-





Graph 3.5. The Optimal Utility when Comparing Renting and Sell/Buy in the Final Period for 
Retirees with No Housing or Non-Housing Wealth (Wealth Position 1) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting and sell/buy in the final period across state combinations. The x -
axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house 
price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period 
(x-axis). Final period covers state combinations 184 to 244. The y-axis shows total optimal utility for renting and 
sell/buy. The orange line and the blue line show the optimal utility when selling/buying, and when renting, 









Graph 3.6.The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in the Final Period for 
Individuals with No Non-Housing Wealth and with Minimal Housing Wealth (Wealth 
Position 51) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay in the final period across state combinations. The 
x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house 
price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period 
(x-axis). Final period covers state combinations 184 to 244. The y-axis shows total optimal utility for renting and 
sell/buy. The orange, blue, and grey lines show the optimal utility when selling/buying, when renting, and when 






Graph 3.7. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in the Final Period for 
Individuals with Average Housing Wealth (200sqm) and No Non-Housing Wealth 
(Wealth Position 251) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay in the final period across state 
combinations. The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing 
combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 
61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). Final period covers state combinations 184 to 244. The 
y-axis shows total optimal utility for renting and sell/buy. The orange, blue, and grey lines show the optimal 
utility when selling/buying, when renting, and when staying in current home, respectively, for the final 










Graph 3.8. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in The Final Period for 
Individuals with Average Housing Wealth (200sqm) and Non-Housing Wealth of 
$120,000 (Wealth Position 254) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay in the final period across state 
combinations. The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing 
combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 
61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). Final period covers state combinations 184 to 244. The 
y-axis shows total optimal utility for renting and sell/buy. The orange, blue, and grey lines show the optimal 
utility when selling/buying, when renting, and when staying in current home, respectively, for the final 










Graph 3.9. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in the Final Period for 
Individuals with A Larger House (320sqm) and No Non-Housing Wealth (Wealth 
Position 401) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay in the final period across state 
combinations. The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing 
combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 
61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). Final period covers state combinations 184 to 244. The 
y-axis shows total optimal utility for renting and sell/buy. The orange, blue, and grey lines show the optimal 
utility when selling/buying, when renting, and when staying in current home, respectively, for the final 












Graph 3.10. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in the Final Period for 
Individuals with A Larger House (320sqm) and Large Non-Housing Wealth of 
$790,000 (Wealth Position 424) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay in the final period across state 
combinations. The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing 
combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 
61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). Final period covers state combinations 184 to 244. The 
y-axis shows total optimal utility for renting and sell/buy. The orange, blue, and grey lines show the optimal 
utility when selling/buying, when renting, and when staying in current home, respectively, for the final 









Graph 3.11. The Optimal Utility for Renting and Sell/Buy in Periods T1 and T2 for 
Individuals with No Housing and Non-Housing Wealth (Wealth Position 1) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting and sell/buy periods T1 and T2 across state combinations. 
The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of 
income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination 
of states in each period (x-axis). The blue and orange lines show the optimal utility when renting and 
selling/buying, respectively, in period T1 across state combinations. The grey and yellow lines show the 











Graph 3.12. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in Periods T1 and T2 
for Individuals with Limited Housing and No Non-Housing Wealth (Wealth Position 
51) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay periods T1 and T2 across state 
combinations. The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing 
combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 
61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). The dark blue, orange, and grey lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, respectively, in period T1 across state combinations. The 
yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, 
respectively, in period T2 across state combinations. The zero values on the green and grey lines for stay 
in state combinations 1 to 30, and 1-45, respectively, indicate that the option stay is a viable option in T1 
and T2 until there is an increase in the income state to income state 4 (or $35,000) in T1 and an increase 
to income state 3 ($30,000) in T2. This finding suggests that stay is a viable option for an individual with 
limited housing and no non-housing wealth in T1 and T2 only when there is sufficient income to support 






Graph 3.13. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in Periods T1 and T2 
for Individuals with Average Housing Wealth (200sqm) and No Non-Housing Wealth 
(Wealth Position 251) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay periods T1 and T2 across state 
combinations. The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing 
combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 
61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). The dark blue, orange, and grey lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, respectively, in period T1 across state combinations. The 
yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, 
respectively, in period T2 across state combinations. The zero values on the green and grey lines for stay 
in all state combinations, indicate that the option stay is not viable in T1 and T2. This suggests that staying 
in a 200sqm home for an individual with no non-housing wealth may be too expensive in maintaining 
consumption levels irrespective of income, health, and house price levels. Individuals with such 







Graph 3.14. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in Periods T1 and T2 
for Individuals with Average Housing (200sqm) and Non-Housing Wealth of $120,000 
(Wealth Position 254) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay periods T1 and T2 across state 
combinations. The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing 
combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 
61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). The dark blue, orange, and grey lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, respectively, in period T1 across state combinations. The 
yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, 
respectively, in period T2 across state combinations. The zero values on the grey line for stay in state 
combinations 1 to 45 indicate that the option stay is a viable option in T1 with an increase income to income 
state 4 ($35,000). Stay is not a viable option across all state combinations in T2. This finding suggests that 
stay is a viable option for an individual with limited average housing (200sqm) and non-housing wealth in 
T1 only when there is sufficient income to support the option to stay in their current home. Stay is not a 
viable option in T2 as it may be too expensive an option so, optimally, individuals need to liquidate their 






Graph 3.15. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in Periods T1 and T2 
for Individuals with a Larger Housing Wealth (320sqm) and No Non-Housing Wealth 
(Wealth Position 401) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay periods T1 and T2 across state 
combinations. The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing 
combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 
61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). The dark blue, orange, and grey lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, respectively, in period T1 across state combinations. The 
yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, 
respectively, in period T2 across state combinations. The zero values on the green and grey lines for stay 
in all state combinations, indicate that the option stay is not viable in T1 and T2. This suggests that staying 
in a 320sqm home for an induvial with no non-housing wealth may be too expensive in maintaining 
consumption levels irrespective of income, health, and house price levels. Individuals with such 







Graph 3.16. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in Periods T1 and T2 
for Individuals with a Larger Housing Wealth (320sqm) and Large Non-Housing 
Wealth of $790,000 (Wealth Position 424) 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay periods T1 and T2 across state 
combinations. The x-axis represents points on the State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing 
combination of income, house price, and health states. Given the number of state combinations, there are 
61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). The dark blue, orange, and grey lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, respectively, in period T1 across state combinations. The 
yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and staying, 
respectively, in period T2 across state combinations. Graph 3.16 shows that staying as a viable option in 
all state combinations only occurs in the presence of high non-housing wealth to support the possibility of 
staying in current home. This suggests that individuals require adequate non-housing wealth to support the 
possibility of choosing to stay in their own home and that staying in own home is an expensive option that 












Graph 3.17. Optimal Utility when Renting on Wealth Position and State Combinations 
in the Period T1 in the Presence of Persistent Bad Health Probability 
The y-axis shows the optimal total utility of a point on the x-axis and on the z-axis. The x-axis shows points 
in the wealth position (1 to 500) explained by the Wealth Column (Table 3.2). The wealth column is 
designed to have an increase in housing size every 50 points in the column and the numbers between every 
1st and 50th shows the increasing value of non-housing wealth. The z-axis shows the point on the State 
Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. 
Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period. T1 period covers 
state combinations 123 to 183. The different lines represent the optimal utility chosen by the program from 






Graph 3.18. Optimal Utility when Selling/Buying on Wealth Position and State 
Combinations in the Period T1 in the Presence of Persistent Bad Health Probability 
The y-axis shows the optimal total utility of a point on the x-axis and on the z-axis. The x-axis shows points 
in the wealth position (1 to 500) explained by the Wealth Column (Table 3.2). The wealth column is 
designed to have an increase in housing size every 50 points in the column and the numbers between every 
1st and 50th shows the increasing value of non-housing wealth. The z-axis shows the point on the State 
Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. 
Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period. T1 per iod covers 
state combinations 123 to 183. The different lines represent the optimal utility chosen by the program from 







Graph 3.19. The Optimal Utility for Renting and Sell/Buy in the Final Period, and in 
Periods T1 and T2 for Individuals with a No Housing and No Non-Housing Wealth 
(Wealth Position 1) in the Presence of Persistent Bad Health Probability 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting and sell/buy across all time periods and across state 
combinations when applying a persistent bad health probability matrix. The x-axis represents points on the 
State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. 
Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period. State 
combination 61 on the x-axis is the “death” state so a substantial drop in utility is expected.The dark blue 
and orange lines show the optimal utility when renting and selling/buying, respectively, in the final period 
across state combinations. The grey and yellow lines show the optimal utility when renting and 
selling/buying in period T1. The light blue and green lines show the optimal utility when renting and 







Graph 3.20. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in the Final Period, 
and in Periods T1 and T2 for Individuals with Limited Housing Wealth and No Non-
Housing Wealth (Wealth Position 51) in the Presence of Persistent Bad Health 
Probability 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay across all time periods and across state 
combinations when applying a persistent bad health probability matrix. The x-axis represents points on the 
State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. 
Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period (x -axis). State 
combination 61 on the x-axis is the “death” state so a substantial drop in utility is expected. The dark blue, 
orange, and light grey lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay, respectively, 
in the final period across state combinations. The yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T1. The black, brown and dark grey lines show the 
optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T2 across state combinations. The zero 
values for stay on state combinations 0 to 30 of the green line, and in all state combinations of the dark 
grey lines indicate that the option stay is not viable in T1 until a minimum income of $30,000 and is not a 
viable option in all state combinations in T2. This suggests that staying in current home for an individual 
with no non-housing wealth may be expensive in maintaining consumption levels unless they have at least 
a $30,000 income in T1. It is too expensive to stay in their current homes in T2 irrespective of income, 
health, and house price levels. Individuals with such circumstances would, optimally, need to liquidate 






Graph 3.21. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in the Final Period, 
and in Periods T1 and T2 for Individuals with Average Housing Wealth (200sqm) and 
No Non-Housing Wealth (Wealth Position 251) in the Presence of Persistent Bad 
Health Probability 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay across a ll time periods and across state 
combinations when applying a persistent bad health probability matrix. The x-axis represents points on the 
State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. 
Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). State 
combination 61 on the x-axis is the “death” state so a substantial drop in utility is expected. The dark blue, 
orange, and light grey lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay, respectively, 
in the final period across state combinations. The yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T1. The black, brown and dark grey lines show the 
optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T2 across state combinations. The zero 
values on the green and dark grey lines for stay in all state combinations, indicate that the option stay is 
not viable in T1 and T2. This suggests that staying in a 200sqm home for an individual with no non-housing 
wealth may be too expensive in maintaining consumption levels irrespective of income, health, and house 
price levels. Individuals with such circumstances would, optimally, need to liquidate some of their housing 






Graph 3.22. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in the Final Period, 
and in Periods T1 and T2 for Individuals with Average Housing (200sqm) and Non-
Housing Wealth of $120,000 (Wealth Position 254) in the Presence of Persistent Bad 
Health Probability 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay across all time periods and across state 
combinations when applying a persistent bad health probability matrix. The x-axis represents points on the 
State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. 
Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period (x -axis). State 
combination 61 on the x-axis is the “death” state so a substantial drop in utility is expected. The dark blue, 
orange, and light grey lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay, respectively, 
in the final period across state combinations. The yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T1. The black, brown and dark grey lines show the 
optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T2 across state combinations. The zero 
values for stay on state combinations 0-46 of the green line, and in all state combinations of the dark grey 
lines indicate that the option stay is not viable in T1 until a minimum income of $35,000 and is not a viable 
option in all state combinations in T2. This suggests that staying in current home of 200sqm for an 
individual with average non-housing wealth may be too expensive in maintaining consumption levels 
unless they have at least a $30,000 income in T1. It is too expensive to stay in their current homes in T2 
irrespective of income, health, and house price levels. Individuals facing such circumstances would, 





Graph 3.23. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in the Final Period, 
and in Periods T1 and T2 for Individuals with a Larger Housing Wealth (320sqm) and 
No Non-Housing Wealth (Wealth Position 401) in the Presence of Persistent Bad 
Health Probability 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay across all time periods and across state 
combinations when applying a persistent bad health probability matrix. The x-axis represents points on the 
State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. 
Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period (x -axis). State 
combination 61 on the x-axis is the “death” state so a substantial drop in utility is expected. The dark blue, 
orange, and light grey lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay, respectively, 
in the final period across state combinations. The yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T1. The black, brown and dark grey lines show the 
optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T2 across state combinations. The zero 
values on the green and dark grey lines for stay in all state combinations, indicate that the option stay is 
not viable in T1 and T2. This suggests that staying in a 320sqm home for an individual with no non-housing 
wealth may be too expensive in maintaining consumption levels irrespective of income, health, and house 
price levels. Individuals with such circumstances would, optimally, need to liquidate some of their housing 






Graph 3.24. The Optimal Utility for Renting, Sell/Buy, and Stay in the Final Period, 
and in Periods T1 and T2 for Individuals with Larger Housing Wealth (320sqm) and 
High Non-Housing Wealth of $790,000 (Wealth Position 424) in the Presence of 
Persistent Bad Health Probability 
The graph compares optimal utility of renting, sell/buy, and stay across all time periods and across state 
combinations when applying a persistent bad health probability matrix. The x-axis represents points on the 
State Composition Matrix (Table 3.3) with differing combination of income, house price, and health states. 
Given the number of state combinations, there are 61 combination of states in each period (x-axis). State 
combination 61 on the x-axis is the “death” state so a substantial drop in utility is expected. The dark blue, 
orange, and light grey lines show the optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay, respectively, 
in the final period across state combinations. The yellow, light blue, and green lines show the optimal 
utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T1. The black, brown and dark grey lines show the 
optimal utility when renting, selling/buying, and stay in period T2 across state combinations. The graph 
shows that staying as a viable option in all state combinations only occurs in the presence of high non-
housing wealth to support the possibility of staying in current home in T1 from the green lines. The dark 
grey lines in T2 for stay suggests that stay is only a viable option when individuals are in good health (State 
combinations multiples of 3). The inclusion of a persistent bad health probability makes stay a less viable 
option in T2 for individuals with bad or average health because of the need of liquid wealth to support 











Graph 3.25. The Optimal Utility of Rent and Sell in Periods T1, T2, and the Final 
Period for Individuals with No Housing and Non-Housing Wealth (Wealth Position 51) 
in the Presence of Persistent Bad Health Probability 
The y-axis shows the optimal utility and the x-axis shows the different periods and relevant housing 
scenarios. The blue, orange, and grey lines represent bad, medium and good health, respectively. The 





Graph 3.26. The Optimal Utility of Rent and Sell in Periods T1, T2, and the Final Period for 
Individuals with a 120sqm House and Some Non-Housing Wealth of $320,000 (Wealth 
Position 158) in the Presence of Persistent Bad Health Probability 
The y-axis shows the optimal utility and the x-axis shows the different periods and relevant housing scenarios. 
The blue, orange, and grey lines represent bad, medium and good health, respectively. The graph shows the 









Table 4.1. Total Sample Distribution 
The table presents the distribution of the sample in the study compared to the NZ Population in the 2013 Census 
by Statistics NZ. 
Sample Distribution Percentage 
Statistics NZ Population 
Percentage (2013 Census) 
Gender Female 51.05 51.30 
  Male 48.95 48.70 
Age 55-59 22.08 23.64 
  60-64 24.60 21.19 
  65-69 23.09 17.81 
  70 and over 30.23 37.36 
Ethnicity European New Zealander 73.47 70.67 
  Māori   9.99   6.90 
  Pacific Islands   3.02   2.90 
  Asian   7.64   6.00 
  Other   5.88   2.67 
Income 
Group 
up to NZ$20,845 (NZ Super) 31.74 35.45 
$20,846-$48,000 38.08 31.40 
$48,001-$70,000 16.74   9.60 
  $70,001-$100,000   8.23   5.70 
  Over $100,000   5.21   4.80 
 
Table 4. 2. Possible Spending Choices 
The table lists the possible alternatives for spending decision-making. 
No. Possible Spending Choice 
1 Place in KiwiSaver or investment fund. 
2 Put a deposit on a home for myself. 
3 Put a deposit on an investment property. 
4 Make donations. 
5 Increase general consumption (e.g. buy better quality groceries, eat out more often, etc.). 
6 Give money to family/friends now. 
7 Leave money to family/friends when I die. 
8 Luxury purchases (e.g. overseas holidays, boats, etc.). 
9 Put money in bank. 
10 Make improvements on house/upgrade. 
11 Invest in health (e.g. private health insurance, private operations/procedures, etc.). 
12 Pay off debt (personal and/or mortgage). 








Table 4.3. Financial Literacy Score Distribution from the Sample 
  Financial Literacy Score 




Low Medium High  
30 67 141 274 679 1,191 
97 415 679 1,191 
Percentage 2.52 5.63 11.84 23.01        57.01    100 
 8.14 34.84        57.01    100 
 
Table 4.4. Financial Literacy Distribution 
The table presents the distribution of financial literacy scores in the sample across demographics.  
Sample Distribution by Percentage Total 
Financial Literacy Score 
Low Medium High 
Gender 
Male 48.95 5.17 28.97 65.86 
Female 51.05 10.74 40.50 48.76 
Age 
55-59 22.08 11.03 45.63 43.35 
60-64 24.60 6.48 31.74 61.77 
65-69 23.09 8.00 30.18 61.82 
70 and over 30.23 7.50 33.06 59.44 
Ethnicity 
European New Zealander 73.47 6.40 31.89 61.71 
Māori 9.99 17.65 48.74 33.61 
Pacific Islands 3.02 19.44 50.00 30.56 
Asian 7.64 12.09 37.36 50.55 
Other 5.88 2.86 37.14 60.00 
Income Group 
Up to NZ$20,845 (NZ Super) 31.74 13.49 34.13 52.38 
$20,846-$48,000 38.08 6.62 39.51 53.86 
$48,001-$70,000 16.74 5.00 30.50 64.50 
$70,001-$100,000 8.23 4.08 34.69 61.22 
Over $100,000 5.21 3.23 19.35 77.42 
Highest 
Education 
No school qualification 13.18 24.84 47.77 27.39 
Some school qualification 40.47 8.71 37.14 54.15 
At least an undergraduate degree 46.35 2.90 29.17 67.93 
Marital status 
Single/never married 9.49 15.04 37.17 47.79 
Married/civil union 63.06 6.26 32.76 60.99 
Divorced/widowed 27.46 10.09 38.84 51.07 
Number of 
Children 
I have no children 16.46 6.63 31.63 61.73 
1 11.08 7.58 43.94 48.48 
2 33.25 6.31 32.83 60.86 
3 20.74 10.53 31.98 57.49 
4 18.47 10.45 39.09 50.45 
Have debt worth 
more than one 
month's salary 
No 66.08 7.24 33.42 59.34 
Yes 33.92 9.90 37.62 52.48 
Debt position 
Have no debt 43.91 6.12 31.17 62.72 
Have no difficulty paying debt 39.55 6.58 37.58 55.84 
May have difficulty paying debt 16.54 17.26 38.07 44.67 
Medical visits in 
the last year 
Zero 7.22 4.65 47.67 47.67 
One to three 42.65 6.89 35.83 57.28 
Four to seven 35.94 8.64 32.48 58.88 
Eight and eleven 8.23 13.27 31.63 55.10 
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Twelve or more 5.96 11.27 30.99 57.75 
Self-reported 
health rating 
Generally poor 4.45 7.55 39.62 52.83 
Sometimes poor 18.47 13.18 35.00 51.82 
Good 39.13 7.73 33.69 58.58 
Very good 28.13 7.16 34.03 58.81 
Excellent 9.82 3.42 39.32 57.26 
Self-reported 
family health 
Generally poor 2.43 13.79 24.14 62.07 
Sometimes poor 8.40 10.00 42.00 48.00 
Good 38.37 8.32 38.51 53.17 
Very good 34.59 7.04 29.37 63.59 
Excellent 16.20 8.29 35.75 55.96 
Living 
arrangement 
In my own home 73.97 5.22 31.56 63.22 
Living in a rental accommodation 20.99 17.60 44.40 38.00 
Live in family member's home 3.11 10.81 51.35 37.84 
In supported care 0.34 25.00 50.00 25.00 
Other 1.60 10.53 26.32 63.16 
Work hours per 
week 
Not in paid work 60.45 10.00 32.50 57.50 
1-15 hours 9.24 6.36 34.55 59.09 
16-39 hours 8.31 6.06 38.38 55.56 
At least 30 hours 22.00 4.58 40.08 55.34 
Risk taker 
Extremely unwilling to take risk 11.42 19.12 46.32 34.56 
Low risk taking capability 23.59 6.76 34.88 58.36 
Careful 42.15 8.37 35.06 56.57 
Willing to take evaluated risk 21.75 3.09 26.64 70.27 




Table 4.5. Risk Attitude Distribution 
The table presents the distribution of risk attitude in the sample across demographics.  














Male 48.95   7.41 20.00 42.07 29.31 1.21 
Female 51.05 15.04 26.94 42.64 14.38 0.99 
Age 
55-59 22.08 14.07 20.53 39.54 23.57 2.28 
60-64 24.60 10.24 20.82 40.27 26.96 1.71 
65-69 23.09 15.43 20.82 36.36 23.64 0.00 
70 and over 30.23 11.67 23.06 50.00 14.72 0.56 
Ethnicity 
European New Zealander 73.47 11.66 25.83 41.03 21.03 0.46 
Māori   9.99 15.97 11.76 47.06 21.85 3.36 
Pacific Islands   3.02 11.11 11.11 47.22 25.00 5.56 
Asian   7.64   6.59 21.98 39.56 28.57 3.30 
Other   5.88   7.14 24.29 48.57 20.00 0.00 
Income Group 
Up to NZ$20,845 (NZ Super) 31.74 17.20 25.13 41.53 15.34 0.79 
$20,846-$48,000 38.08 11.04 23.62 43.93 20.31 1.10 
$48,001-$70,000 16.74   6.50 22.50 42.50 27.50 1.00 
$70,001-$100,000   8.23   5.10 23.47 41.84 27.55 2.04 
Over $100,000   5.21   4.84 17.74 32.26 43.55 1.61 
Highest Education 
No school qualification 13.18 19.11 24.84 45.86 8.28 1.91 
Some school qualification 40.47 13.28 22.20 22.20 18.26 1.87 
At least an undergraduate degree 46.35   7.61 24.46 24.46 28.62 0.18 
Marital status 
Single/never married 9.49 15.04 17.70 40.71 25.66 0.88 
Married/civil union 63.06 10.39 23.17 42.61 22.90 0.93 
Divorced/widowed 27.46 12.54 26.61 41.59 17.74 1.53 
Number of Children 
I have no children 16.46 10.71 31.06 39.80 27.55 1.02 
1 11.08 17.42 26.52 37.12 18.94 0.00 
2 33.25   9.09 23.99 43.94 20.96 2.02 
3 20.74 10.53 10.53 46.56 17.81 0.40 
4 18.47 13.64 13.64 39.09 24.09 0.91 
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Have debt more than a 
month's salary 
No 66.08 11.94 23.51 44.22 19.82 0.51 
Yes 33.92 10.40 23.76 38.12 25.50 2.23 
Debt position 
Have no debt 43.91 11.85 24.86 43.59 19.12 0.57 
Have no difficulty paying debt 39.55 9.77 22.72 40.55 25.69 1.27 
May have difficulty paying debt 16.54 14.21 22.34 42.13 19.29 2.03 
Medical visits in the last 
year 
Zero   7.22 11.63 16.28 41.86 27.91 2.33 
One to three 42.65 11.22 22.24 41.54 24.21 0.79 
Four to seven 35.94 11.45 27.34 42.29 18.69 0.23 
Eight and eleven   8.23 13.27 22.45 40.82 21.43 2.04 
Twelve or more   5.96   9.86 21.13 47.89 15.49 5.63 
Self-reported health rating 
Generally poor   4.45 20.75 18.87 43.40 15.09 1.89 
Sometimes poor 18.47 18.18 25.00 40.45 13.18 3.18 
Good 39.13   9.66 25.97 43.35 20.82 0.21 
Very good 28.13   7.76 21.79 42.99 26.57 0.90 
Excellent   9.82 11.97 18.80 37.61 30.77 0.85 
Self-reported family 
health 
Generally poor   2.43 24.14 20.69 31.03 24.14 0.00 
Sometimes poor   8.40 17.00 26.00 40.00 16.00 1.00 
Good 38.37   8.97 24.73 45.51 19.47 1.31 
Very good 34.59 12.38 20.63 41.75 24.27 0.97 
Excellent 16.20 10.36 26.42 37.82 24.35 1.04 
Living arrangement 
In my own home 73.97 10.33 25.09 42.34 21.68 0.57 
Living in a rental accommodation 20.99 16.00 19.20 40.00 22.00 2.80 
Live in family member's home   3.11   8.11 21.62 45.95 21.62 2.70 
In supported care   0.34   0.00 25.00 75.00 0.00 0.00 
Other   1.60 10.53 15.79 47.37 26.32 0.00 
Work hours per week 
Not in paid work 60.45 13.06 24.17 44.03 18.06 0.69 
1-15 hours   9.24   8.18 30.00 37.27 20.91 3.64 
16-39 hours   8.31 12.12 18.18 10.10 29.29 0.00 




Table 4.6. Debt Position Distribution 
The table presents the distribution of debt position in the sample across demographics. 
Sample Distribution by Percentage Total 








May have difficulty 
paying debt 
Gender 
Male 48.95 63.97 36.03 43.97 38.97 17.07 
Female 51.05 68.26 31.74 43.97 39.83 16.20 
Age 
55-59 22.08 49.81 50.19 26.24 49.81 23.95 
60-64 24.60 59.04 40.96 38.23 40.27 21.50 
65-69 23.09 70.55 29.45 51.27 37.09 11.64 
70 and over 30.23 80.28 19.72 55.83 33.33 10.83 
Ethnicity 
European New Zealander 73.47 68.57 31.43 46.51 38.40 15.09 
Māori 9.99 46.22 53.78 24.37 45.38 30.25 
Pacific Islands 3.02 41.67 58.33 22.22 52.78 25.00 
Asian 7.64 71.43 28.57 50.55 38.46 10.99 
Other 5.88 74.29 25.71 47.14 38.57 14.29 
Income Group 
Up to NZ$20,845 (NZ Super) 31.74 65.87 34.13 43.65 36.51 19.84 
$20,846-$48,000 38.08 68.65 31.35 46.36 37.53 16.11 
$48,001-$70,000 16.74 66.00 34.00 42.00 43.00 15.00 
$70,001-$100,000 8.23 56.12 43.88 36.73 48.98 14.29 
Over $100,000 5.21 64.52 35.48 45.16 46.77 8.06 
Highest Education 
No school qualification 13.18 66.88 33.12 42.04 35.67 22.29 
Some school qualification 40.47 66.18 33.82 42.74 40.66 16.60 
At least an undergraduate degree 46.35 65.76 34.24 45.47 39.67 14.86 
Marital status 
Single/never married 9.49 52.21 47.79 34.51 35.40 30.09 
Married/civil union 63.06 69.51 30.49 44.34 42.21 13.45 
Divorced/widowed 27.46 63.00 37.00 46.18 34.86 18.96 
Number of Children 
I have no children 16.46 65.31 34.69 45.92 20.95 22.45 
1 11.08 64.39 35.61 40.15 46.21 13.64 
2 33.25 68.69 31.31 45.20 40.15 13.38 
3 20.74 70.04 29.96 46.96 38.46 14.57 
4 18.47 58.64 41.36 38.64 42.73 18.64 
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Have debt more than a 
month's salary 
No 66.08     65.95 31.00 3.05 
Yes 33.92     0.99 56.19 42.82 
Debt position 
Have no debt 43.91 99.24 0.76     
Have no difficulty paying debt 39.55 51.80 48.20     
May have difficulty paying debt 16.54 12.18 87.82     
Medical visits in the last 
year 
Zero 7.22 63.95 36.05 46.51 41.86 11.63 
One to three 42.65 68.31 31.69 45.47 39.96 14.57 
Four to seven 35.94 66.36 33.64 42.76 40.19 17.06 
Eight and eleven 8.23 64.29 35.71 44.90 36.73 18.37 
Twelve or more 5.96 53.52 46.48 35.21 33.80 30.99 
Self-reported health rating 
Generally poor 4.45 60.38 39.62 41.51 22.64 35.85 
Sometimes poor 18.47 58.18 41.82 39.09 33.64 27.27 
Good 39.13 67.38 32.62 41.63 42.27 16.09 
Very good 28.13 65.37 34.63 46.27 42.39 11.34 
Excellent 9.82 80.34 19.66 56.41 39.32 4.27 
Self-reported family 
health 
Generally poor 2.43 65.52 34.48 41.38 31.03 27.59 
Sometimes poor 8.40 64.00 36.00 40.00 35.00 25.00 
Good 38.37 65.21 34.79 40.70 40.04 19.26 
Very good 34.59 66.50 33.50 46.12 40.29 13.59 
Excellent 16.20 68.39 31.61 49.22 40.41 10.36 
Living arrangement 
In my own home 73.97 72.64 27.36 49.04 39.61 11.35 
Living in a rental accommodation 20.99 46.00 54.00 26.80 40.00 33.20 
Live in family member's home 3.11 51.35 48.65 32.43 37.84 29.73 
In supported care 0.34 75.00 25.00 75.00 0.00 25.00 
Other 1.60 52.63 47.37 47.37 42.11 10.53 
Work hours per week 
Not in paid work 60.45 73.75 26.25 50.56 33.47 15.97 
1-15 hours 9.24 66.36 33.64 49.09 33.64 17.27 
16-39 hours 8.31 55.56 44.44 31.31 55.56 13.13 
At least 30 hours 22.00 48.85 51.15 28.24 52.67 19.08 
Risk taker 
Extremely unwilling to take risk 11.42 69.12 30.88 45.59 33.82 20.59 
Low risk taking capability 23.59 65.84 34.16 46.26 38.08 15.66 
Careful 42.15 69.32 30.68 45.42 38.05 16.53 
Willing to take evaluated risk 21.75 60.23 39.77 46.72 46.72 14.67 
Reckless/hasty 1.09 30.77 69.23 46.15 46.15 30.77 
323 
 
Table 4.7. Ordinal Logistic Regression of Demographics, Debt Position, and Risk Attitude on 
Financial Literacy 
The odds ratio shows the likelihood of an individual in a demographic category to move up one category in the 
financial literacy scoring band or higher financial literacy score. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
LR Chi2 277.6 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.132 
  Odds Ratio 
Have no difficulty paying debt 0.816 
May have difficulty paying debt 0.488*** 
Low risk taking capability 2.001*** 
Careful 1.895*** 









Over 70 1.355 
Some school qualification 3.346*** 
At least a Tertiary undergraduate degree 5.606*** 
Married 1.404 
Divorced/widowed 1.073 
Income $20,846-$48,000 1.035 
Income $48,001-$70,000 1.666** 
Income $70,001-$100,000 1.361 
Income Over $100,000 2.200** 
Self-reported health: Sometimes poor 0.792 
Self-reported health: Good 0.807 
Self-reported health: Very good 0.806 
Self-reported health: Excellent 0.652 
1-3 medical visits in the past year 1.179 
4-7 medical visits in the past year 1.298 
8-11 medical visits in the past year 1.005 
12 or more medical visits in the past year 1.565 
Family Responsibility 0.814** 
Work 1-15hrs/week 1.106 
Work 16-29hrs/week 1.059 
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Table 4.8. Ordinal Logistic Regression of Financial Literacy, Risk Attitude and 
Demographics on Debt Position 
The odds ratio shows the likelihood of an individual in a demographic  category to move up one category in the 
debt position band or more worrying debt. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
LR Chi2 171.9 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.071 
  Odds Ratio 
Financial literacy score "medium" 0.529*** 
Financial literacy score "high" 0.405*** 
Low risk taking capability 1.180 
Careful 1.139 









Over 70 0.366*** 
Some school qualification 1.151 
At least a Tertiary undergraduate degree 1.180 
Married 0.728 
Divorced/widowed 0.750 
Income $20,846-$48,000 0.856 
Income $48,001-$70,000 0.685* 
Income $70,001-$100,000 0.752 
Income Over $100,000 0.516** 
Self-reported health: Sometimes poor 0.984 
Self-reported health: Good 0.845 
Self-reported health: Very good 0.630 
Self-reported health: Excellent 0.456** 
1-3 medical visits in the past year 1.234 
4-7 medical visits in the past year 0.349 
8-11 medical visits in the past year 0.249 
12 or more medical visits in the past year 0.891* 
Family Responsibility 1.218** 
Work 1-15hrs/week 1.206 
Work 16-29hrs/week 1.475* 
Work at least 30hrs/week 1.882*** 
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Table 4. 9. Ordinal Logistic Regression of Financial Literacy, Debt Position and 
Demographics on Risk Attitude 
The odds ratio shows the likelihood of an individual in a demographic category to move up one category in the 
risk attitude band or higher risk appetite. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
LR Chi2 159.1 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.050 
  Odds Ratio 
Financial literacy score "medium" 1.290 
Financial literacy score "high" 1.766*** 
Have no difficulty paying debt 0.281* 








Over 70 0.834 
Some school qualification 1.541** 
At least a Tertiary undergraduate degree 1.791*** 
Married 0.870 
Divorced/widowed 0.925 
Income $20,846-$48,000 1.389** 
Income $48,001-$70,000 1.677*** 
Income $70,001-$100,000 1.741** 
Income Over $100,000 2.458*** 
Self-reported health: Sometimes poor 1.110 
Self-reported health: Good 1.518 
Self-reported health: Very good 2.174** 
Self-reported health: Excellent 2.205** 
1-3 medical visits in the past year 0.784 
4-7 medical visits in the past year 0.765 
8-11 medical visits in the past year 1.043 
12 or more medical visits in the past year 1.409 
Family Responsibility 1.046 
Work 1-15hrs/week 1.020 
Work 16-29hrs/week 1.010 
Work at least 30hrs/week 0.804 
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Table 4. 10. Choice Ranks of the Total Sample 
The table shows the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total sample. Yellow highlights the top 3 choices and green highlights 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.092   2 0.011 0.214 0.037 
Home Deposit 0.068   9 0.011 0.214 0.037 
Property Investment Deposit 0.068   9 0.011 0.200 0.032 
Donation 0.058 13 0.011 0.195 0.035 
General Consumption 0.064 11 0.011 0.193 0.033 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.077   6  0.011 0.217 0.038 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.074   7 0.011 0.210 0.034 
Luxury Items 0.080   5 0.011 0.214 0.039 
Money in Bank 0.106   1 0.019 0.217 0.034 
Home Improvements 0.092   2 0.011 0.206 0.038 
Health Investments 0.063 12 0.011 0.188 0.034 
Debt Payment 0.091   4 0.011 0.217 0.048 





Table 4.11. Fractional multinomial regression choices 
The models are fitted using the data from the 1000Minds survey on financial literacy, debt position, risk -taking attitude, and demographic factors. The coefficient shows the 
magnitude of the likelihood for preferring another option compared to choosing KiwiSaver. The estimation is based on 1,1 85 observations. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Alternative Preferred 











Comparable alternative preference is 
against KiwiSaver   
   Coefficient 
Financial literacy    -0.074**  -0.081**  -0.108***  -0.075**  -0.086** 
Debt position (compared to no debt) 
No problem paying debt   0.130***   0.835**   0.028   0.053   0.062 
Difficulty paying debt   0.191***   0.116**  -0.085   0.229***   0.082 
Risk taker (compared to extremely 
unwilling to take risk) 
Low risk taking capability   0.042   0.965  -0.002   0.066  -0.045 
Careful   0.014   0.071  -0.029   0.008  -0.152** 
Willing to take evaluated 
risk  -0.004   0.137*  -0.010  -0.015  -0.128 
Reckless/hasty  -0.081   0.443*  -0.095   0.182   0.476** 
Gender (Compared to Female) Male  -0.027   0.021  -0.175***   0.007  -0.131*** 
Ethnicity (compared to European New 
Zealander) 
Māori   0.096   0.078  -0.001  -0.177**   0.043 
Pacific Island   0.103   0.117   0.189  -0.090  -0.0214 
Asian   0.176**   0.156**   0.039   0.107  -0.154** 
Other   0.071   0.048   0.003  -0.020  -0.008 
Age group (compared to age 55-59) 
60-64  -0.002  -0.056   0.008  -0.079   0.028 
65-69  -0.123*  -0.080   0.135*  -0.131**   0.066 
Over 70  -0.115*  -0.050   0.260***  -0.035   0.178*** 
Advantage    -0.050**   0.002   0.011  -0.061**  -0.006 
Marital Status (compared to single) 
Married/partnered   0.167**   0.183**  -0.007  -0.037   0.093 
Divorced/widowed   0.070   0.113   -0.012  -0.013   0.112 
Family responsibility    -0.001 -0.019  -0.051*  -0.022   0.028 
Medical visits in past year (compared 
to 0) 
One - three  -0.0673  -0.044  -0.070  -0.143  -0.067 
Four - seven  -0.102  -0.057  -0.061  -0.088  -0.059 
Eight - eleven  -0.090  -0.107   0.071  -0.129  -0.193* 
12 or more   0.031  -0.170  -0.093  -0.145  -0.158 
Renting/in supported care   0.352***   0.066   0.003  -0.013  -0.028 
328 
 
Living arrangement (compared to 
living in own home) Living with family/other   0.140   0.007  -0.110   0.024  -0.092 
Work hours per week (compared to 0) 
One - fifteen  -0.077  -0.082  -0.149**  -0.105  -0.127** 
Sixteen-twenty nine  -0.007  -0.007  -0.065  -0.142*  -0.171** 
At least 30 hours  -0.062  -0.097*  -0.170***  -0.202***  -0.216*** 
Constant    -0.170  -0.259   0.007   0.259   0.109 
Wald Chi2 (336)  2,247***     
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    Alternative Preferred 
    Money for family 
and friends later 
Luxury 
goods 




Investment     
    Coefficient 
Financial literacy    -0.083**  -0.009  -0.057**  -0.045  -0.081** 
Debt position (compared to no 
debt) 
No problem paying debt   0.003   0.060  -0.016   0.155***   0.102** 
Difficulty paying debt   0.052   0.097   0.098**   0.272***   0.230*** 
Risk taker (compared to 
extremely unwilling to take 
risk) 
Low risk taking capability  -0.044   0.107  -0.021  -0.012  -0.030 
Careful  -0.056   0.023  -0.050  -0.057  -0.074 
Willing to take evaluated risk  -0.126*   0.015  -0.162***  -0.095  -0.119 
Reckless/hasty   0.478***   0.588***   0.301  -0.014   0.124 
Gender (Compared to Female) Male  -0.053  -0.007   0.040  -0.038  -0.038 
Ethnicity (compared to 
European New Zealander) 
Māori   0.084  -0.156**  -0.021   0.025   0.029 
Pacific Island   0.261**  -0.098   0.003   0.024   0.207* 
Asian  -0.020   0.016  -0.001  -0.094   0.231*** 
Other   0.039  -0.065   0.488  -0.009  -0.038 
Age group (compared to age 
55-59) 
60-64   0.062   0.000   0.017  -0.017   0.076 
65-69   0.139**  -0.017   0.026  -0.042  -0.068 
Over 70   0.244***  -0.012   0.056  -0.057   0.046 
Advantage    -0.016  -0.026  -0.012  -0.028   0.011 
Marital Status (compared to 
single) 
Married/partnered   0.007   0.132*   0.009   0.156**   0.057 
Divorced/widowed   0.004   0.088   0.008   0.139**   0.060 
Family responsibility     0.009   0.021  -0.002   0.012  -0.001 
Medical visits in past year 
(compared to 0) 
One - three  -0.039   0.043  -0.079  -0.012   0.008 
Four - seven  -0.007   0.058  -0.081  -0.028  -0.008 
Eight - eleven  -0.028   0.066  -0.075  -0.006  -0.025 
12 or more  -0.130   0.110  -0.089   0.034   0.081 
Living arrangement (compared 
to living in own home) 
Renting/in supported care   0.002  -0.140  -0.032  -0.484***  -0.086 
Living with family/other  -0.084  -0.049  -0.069  -0.256***  -0.010 
Work hours per week 
(compared to 0) 
One - fifteen  -0.149**  -0.072   0.087*  -0.051  -0.009 
Sixteen-twenty nine  -0.118*  -0.049  -0.074  -0.120*  -0.245*** 
At least 30 hours  -0.170***   0.134***  -0.124***  -0.120***  -0.120** 
Constant     0.036  -0.206   0.440   0.182  -0.232 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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    Alternative Preferred 
    
Pay off debt 
Purchase 
shares     
    Coefficient 
Financial literacy    -0.075**  -0.031 
Debt position (compared to no debt) 
No problem paying debt   0.587***  -0.076* 
Difficulty paying debt   0.786***  -0.054 
Risk taker (compared to extremely 
unwilling to take risk) 
Low risk taking capability   0.174   0.140** 
Careful  -0.016   0.234*** 
Willing to take evaluated risk  -0.006   0.385*** 
Reckless/hasty  -0.014   0.189 
Gender (Compared to Female) Male   0.036   0.096** 
Ethnicity (compared to European New 
Zealander) 
Māori   0.040   0.065 
Pacific Island   0.221**   0.174 
Asian   0.064  -0.010 
Other  -0.045   0.121* 
Age group (compared to age 55-59) 
60-64  -0.009   0.031 
65-69  -0.102*   0.031 
Over 70  -0.056   0.109* 
Advantage    -0.037*   0.041** 
Marital Status (compared to single) 
Married/partnered   0.156**  -0.009 
Divorced/widowed   0.111  -0.025 
Family responsibility    -0.026  -0.013 
Medical visits in past year (compared 
to 0) 
One - three  -0.062   0.048 
Four - seven  -0.078  -0.009 
Eight - eleven  -0.195**  -0.077 
12 or more   0.074  -0.028 
Living arrangement (compared to 
living in own home) 
Renting/in supported care  -0.037   0.017 
Living with family/other  -0.062  -0.180** 
Work hours per week (compared to 0) 
One - fifteen  -0.093  -0.063 
Sixteen-twenty nine   0.037  -0.175** 
At least 30 hours  -0.035  -0.164*** 
Constant    -0.089  -0.568 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
331 
 
Table 4.12. Alternative Ranks of Female Subsample 
This table shows the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total female subsample. Yellow highlights the top 3 choices and 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.090   3 0.127 0.184 0.035 
Home Deposit 0.068   8 0.011 0.175 0.037 
Property Investment Deposit 0.067   9 0.011 0.169 0.032 
Donation 0.062 12 0.011 0.195 0.033 
General Consumption 0.064 11 0.011 0.179 0.032 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.081   6 0.013 0.200 0.037 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.075   7 0.011 0.211 0.035 
Luxury Items 0.081   5 0.011 0.214 0.038 
Money in Bank 0.103   1 0.022 0.217 0.033 
Home Improvements 0.094   2 0.018 0.194 0.039 
Health Investments 0.064 10 0.011 0.161 0.034 
Debt Payment 0.089   4 0.011 0.217 0.049 




Table 4.13. Alternative Ranking of Male Subsample 
This table reports the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total male subsample. Yellow highlights the top 3 choices and green 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.093   2 0.011 0.214 0.038 
Home Deposit 0.066 10 0.011 0.214 0.038 
Property Investment Deposit 0.070   9 0.011 0.200 0.033 
Donation 0.055 13 0.011 0.194 0.036 
General Consumption 0.064 11 0.011 0.172 0.034 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.073   8 0.011 0.217 0.038 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.074   7 0.011 0.200 0.033 
Luxury Items 0.078   5 0.011 0.214 0.041 
Money in Bank 0.108   1 0.019 0.214 0.034 
Home Improvements 0.090   4 0.011 0.206 0.037 
Health Investments 0.062 12 0.011 0.188 0.033 
Debt Payment 0.092   3 0.011 0.214 0.048 
Share Purchase 0.075   6 0.011 0.217 0.039 
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Table 4.14. Alternative Ranking European New Zealander Subsample 
The table shows the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total European New Zealander subsample. Yellow highlights the top 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.092   3 0.011 0.214 0.037 
Home Deposit 0.064 11 0.011 0.179 0.036 
Property Investment Deposit 0.066   9 0.011 0.200 0.032 
Donation 0.059 13 0.011 0.195 0.035 
General Consumption 0.065 10 0.011 0.179 0.034 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.079   6 0.011 0.217 0.038 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.074   7 0.011 0.211 0.033 
Luxury Items 0.082   5 0.011 0.214 0.040 
Money in Bank 0.106   1 0.019 0.217 0.034 
Home Improvements 0.095   2 0.011 0.194 0.038 
Health Investments 0.062 12 0.011 0.161 0.033 
Debt Payment 0.088   4 0.011 0.217 0.049 




Table 4.15. Alternative Ranking Māori and Pacific Subsample 
The table shows the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total Māori and Pacific subsample. Yellow highlights the top 3 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.088   3 0.013 0.207 0.037 
Home Deposit 0.081   5 0.011 0.211 0.041 
Property Investment Deposit 0.072   8 0.014 0.172 0.032 
Donation 0.056 13 0.011 0.139 0.032 
General Consumption 0.056 12 0.011 0.147 0.030 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.076   7 0.013 0.214 0.039 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.079   6 0.016 0.186 0.037 
Luxury Items 0.066 10 0.011 0.194 0.038 
Money in Bank 0.101   2 0.033 0.211 0.032 
Home Improvements 0.085   4 0.011 0.206 0.038 
Health Investments 0.065 11 0.011 0.155 0.031 
Debt Payment 0.107   1 0.013 0.201 0.043 




Table 4.16. Alternative Ranking Married Subsample 
This table reports the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total Married subsample. Yellow highlights the top 3 choices and 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.091   3 0.011 0.188 0.036 
Home Deposit 0.067 10 0.011 0.214 0.037 
Property Investment Deposit 0.070   8 0.011 0.179 0.033 
Donation 0.057 13 0.011 0.163 0.034 
General Consumption 0.062 12 0.011 0.179 0.033 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.076   6 0.011 0.200 0.036 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.073   7 0.011 0.200 0.033 
Luxury Items 0.082   5 0.011 0.214 0.039 
Money in Bank 0.105   1 0.023 0.217 0.033 
Home Improvements 0.096   2 0.011 0.194 0.036 
Health Investments 0.063 11 0.011 0.188 0.033 
Debt Payment 0.091   4 0.011 0.217 0.049 
Share Purchase 0.069   9 0.011 0.217 0.038 
 
 
Table 4.17. Alternative Ranking Single Subsample 
This table reports the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total Single subsample. Yellow highlights the top 3 choices and green 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.096   2 0.012 0.195 0.041 
Home Deposit 0.073   6 0.011 0.182 0.039 
Property Investment Deposit 0.066 11 0.011 0.172 0.034 
Donation 0.060 13 0.011 0.164 0.036 
General Consumption 0.072   7 0.011 0.154 0.033 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.070 10 0.013 0.172 0.038 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.076   5 0.014 0.211 0.039 
Luxury Items 0.070   9 0.013 0.158 0.036 
Money in Bank 0.109   1 0.019 0.211 0.036 
Home Improvements 0.079   4 0.011 0.206 0.039 
Health Investments 0.063 12 0.011 0.150 0.034 
Debt Payment 0.095   3 0.011 0.208 0.045 





Table 4.18. Alternative Ranking Divorced/Widowed Subsample 
The table reports the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total divorced/widowed subsample. Yellow highlights the top 3 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.091   2 0.011 0.214 0.037 
Home Deposit 0.067   8 0.011 0.211 0.037 
Property Investment Deposit 0.066 10 0.011 0.200 0.032 
Donation 0.061 13 0.011 0.195 0.036 
General Consumption 0.066 11 0.011 0.173 0.033 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.082   5 0.013 0.217 0.040 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.078   6 0.011 0.179 0.035 
Luxury Items 0.077   7 0.011 0.214 0.040 
Money in Bank 0.107   1 0.022 0.207 0.034 
Home Improvements 0.088   3 0.011 0.192 0.040 
Health Investments 0.063 12 0.011 0.161 0.033 
Debt Payment 0.088   4 0.013 0.217 0.049 
Share Purchase 0.066   9 0.011 0.211 0.036 
 
 
Table 4.19. Alternative Ranking for People Living in Their Own Home Subsample 
This table reports the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total people living in their own home subsample. Yellow highlights 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.092   3 0.011 0.214 0.037 
Home Deposit 0.060 12 0.011 0.181 0.033 
Property Investment Deposit 0.067   9 0.011 0.170 0.032 
Donation 0.059 13 0.011 0.195 0.035 
General Consumption 0.064 10 0.011 0.179 0.032 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.077   6 0.011 0.214 0.038 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.074   7 0.011 0.211 0.033 
Luxury Items 0.083   5 0.011 0.214 0.040 
Money in Bank 0.106   1 0.022 0.217 0.034 
Home Improvements 0.100   2 0.014 0.206 0.036 
Health Investments 0.063 11 0.011 0.188 0.034 
Debt Payment 0.087   4 0.011 0.217 0.050 




Table 4.20. Alternative Ranking for People Renting Subsample 
This table reports the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total renting subsample. Yellow highlights the top 3 choices and 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.090   4 0.011 0.207 0.038 
Home Deposit 0.091   3 0.015 0.214 0.041 
Property Investment Deposit 0.073   7 0.011 0.200 0.036 
Donation 0.058 13 0.011 0.158 0.034 
General Consumption 0.065 11 0.011 0.172 0.036 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.077   5 0.011 0.217 0.037 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.076   6 0.011 0.200 0.036 
Luxury Items 0.070   8 0.011 0.194 0.038 
Money in Bank 0.105   1 0.019 0.201 0.033 
Home Improvements 0.066 10 0.011 0.157 0.031 
Health Investments 0.061 12 0.011 0.143 0.031 
Debt Payment 0.101   2 0.013 0.208 0.042 




Table 4.21. Alternative Ranking for People Living with Family or Others Subsample 
The table shows the weight preference of each alternative relative to other alternatives for each individual. Total 
of preference weight for each individual equate to 1. The mean weight preference weight shows the average 
preference weight for each alternative of the total living with family or others subsample. Yellow highl ights the 




Rank Min Max 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kiwi Saver 0.095   3 0.018 0.016 0.034 
Home Deposit 0.075   6 0.015 0.153 0.038 
Property Investment Deposit 0.070   9 0.210 0.139 0.029 
Donation 0.054 13 0.011 0.120 0.032 
General Consumption 0.069 10 0.011 0.143 0.035 
Leave Money to Family Now 0.072   8 0.015 0.171 0.037 
Leave Money to Family Later 0.072   7 0.013 0.169 0.036 
Luxury Items 0.080   5 0.014 0.179 0.039 
Money in Bank 0.106   1 0.040 0.211 0.033 
Home Improvements 0.085   4 0.020 0.179 0.037 
Health Investments 0.068 11 0.011 0.136 0.032 
Debt Payment 0.095   2 0.013 0.217 0.053 




Table 4.22.  Interaction Terms 
The table shows the interactions between ethnicity, family responsibility, health, and medical visits. The tables 
presents insignificant results between the interacted variables. 






Ethnicity*Family Responsibility -0.051 0.051 -0.0294 
Ethnicity*Health -0.093 0.110* 0.021 
Ethnicity*Medical Visit -0.078 0.0723 0.0556 
Family Responsibility*Health 0.133 -0.0882 -0.135 
Family Responsibility*Medical Visit 0.12 0.0938 0.1138 
 





Figure 4.2. The Financial Literacy Process 
This process is based on the US Presidency Advisory Council on Financial Literacy (PACFL, 2008) from Lusardi 
(2008). The figure shows how financial knowledge flows in the development of financial skills, perceived 





















Figure 4.3. Structural Equation Modelling for Female who on average say “they choose 
money in bank.” 
The arrow signifies the relationship and the value signifies the strength of the relationship. 
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Figure 4.4. Structural Equation Modelling for Female subsample who on average say “they 
choose KiwiSaver.” 
The arrow signifies the relationship and the value signifies the strength of the relationship. 
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Figure 4.5. Structural Equation Modelling for Male subsample who on average say “they 
choose KiwiSaver.” 
The arrow signifies the relationship and the value signifies the strength of the relationship. 
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Figure 4.6. Structural Equation Modelling for Male subsample who on average say “they 
choose pay debt.” 
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Figure 4.7. Structural Equation Modelling for European New Zealander subsample who on 
average say “they choose money in bank. 
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Figure 4.8. Structural Equation Modelling for European New Zealander subsample who on 
average say “they choose home improvement.” 
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Figure 4.9. Structural Equation Modelling for European New Zealander subsample who on 
average say “they choose KiwiSaver.” 
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Figure 4.10. Structural Equation Modelling for Māori/Pacific subsample who on average say 
“they choose paying debt.” 
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Figure 4.11. Structural Equation Modelling for Married subsample who on average say “they 
choose KiwiSaver.” 
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Figure 4.12. Structural Equation Modelling for Single subsample who on average say “they 
choose money bank.” 
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Figure 4.13. Structural Equation Modelling for Single subsample who on average say “they 
choose KiwiSaver.” 
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Figure 4.14. Structural Equation Modelling for Single subsample who on average say “they 
choose pay debt.” 
The arrow signifies the relationship and the value signifies the strength of the relationship. 
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Figure 4.15. Structural Equation Modelling for Divorced/Widowed subsample who on 
average say “they choose KiwiSaver.” 
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Figure 4.16. Structural Equation Modelling for Living in own home subsample who on 
average say “they choose money in bank.” 
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Figure 4.17. Structural Equation Modelling for Living in own home subsample who on 
average say “they choose home improvement.” 
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Figure 4.18. Structural Equation Modelling for Living in own home subsample who on 
average “say they choose KiwiSaver.” 
The arrow signifies the relationship and the value signifies the strength of the relationship. 
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Figure 4.19. Structural Equation Modelling for Renting subsample who on average say “they 
choose home improvement.” 
The arrow signifies the relationship and the value signifies the strength of the relationship. 
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Figure 4.20. Structural Equation Modelling for Family/other subsample who on average say 
“they choose money in bank.” 
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Figure 4.21. Structural Equation Modelling for Family/other subsample who on average say 
“they choose to pay debt.” 
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Figure 4.22. Structural Equation Modelling for Family/other subsample who on average say 
“they choose KiwiSaver.” 
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